THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR Steven Metz and James Kievit

February 17, 2010

THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND
CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR
Steven Metz
and
James Kievit
July 25, 1994
ii
******
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the
Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is
approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
******
For ideas, comments, and background material, the authors would like to
thank Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., Rod Paschall, William W. Mendel, Charles F.
Swett, Jeffrey Cooper, Stefan Antonmattei III, Gary Guertner, Douglas V.
Johnson, and, especially William T. Johnsen.
******
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded
to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the
authors by calling commercial (717) 245-3822 or DSN 242-3822, FAX (717) 245-
3820, DSN 242-3820.
iii
FOREWORD
For many experts on U.S. national security, the combination of emerging
technology and innovative ideas seen in the Gulf War seem to herald a genuine
revolution in military affairs. The victory of coalition forces demonstrated
the technology and seemed to suggest that the revolution in military affairs
can solve many of the strategic problems faced by the United States in the
post-Cold War security environment.
In this study, the authors concede that the revolution in military
affairs holds great promise for conventional, combined-arms warfare, but
conclude that its potential value in conflict short of war, whether terrorism,
insurgency, or violence associated with narcotrafficking, is not so clear-cut.
Given this, national leaders and strategists should proceed cautiously and
only after a full exploration of the ethical, political, and social
implications of their decisions. To illustrate this, the authors develop a
hypothetical future scenario–a “history” of U.S. efforts in conflict short of
war during the first decade of the 21st century.
It is too early to offer concrete policy prescriptions for adapting many
aspects of the revolution in military affairs to conflict short of war, but
the authors do suggest an array of questions that should be debated. In order
to decide whether to apply new technology and emerging concepts or how to
employ them, the United States must first reach consensus on ultimate
objectives and acceptable costs. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased
to offer this study as a first step in this process.
JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS
STEVEN METZ is Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs at
the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. His specialties are
transregional security issues and military operations other than war. Dr.
Metz has taught at the Air War College, U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, and several universities. He holds a B.A. and M.A. in international
studies from the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political
science from the Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Metz has published many
monographs and articles on world politics, military strategy, and national
security policy.
JAMES KIEVIT is a Strategic Research Analyst at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College. His specialties are operational art,
military engineering, and U.S. Army force structure issues. Commissioned in
the Corps of Engineers, LTC Kievit has served in a variety of troop leading,
command, and staff assignments in the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Engineer
Brigade, and the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized). He has also served as
Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as a force
structure analyst and study director at the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis
Agency. LTC Kievit holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, a M.M.A.S.
from the School of Advanced Military Studies of the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, and a M.A. in history and M.S.E. in construction
management from the University of Michigan.
v
SUMMARY
Many American strategic thinkers believe that we are in the beginning
stages of a historical revolution in military affairs (RMA). This will not
only change the nature of warfare, but also alter the global geopolitical
balance.
To date, most attention has fallen on the opportunities provided by the
RMA rather than its risks, costs, and unintended consequences. In the arena
of conflict short of war, these risks, costs, and unintended consequences may
outweigh the potential benefits.
The Strategic Context.
The Cold War notion of conflict short of war is obsolete. Politically
and militarily, the Third World of the future will be full of danger. The
future will most likely be dominated by peace enforcement in failed states,
new forms of insurgency and terrorism, and “gray area phenomena.” Many if not
most Third World states will fragment into smaller units. Ungovernability and
instability will be the norm with power dispersed among warlords, primal
militias, and well-organized politico-criminal organizations. U.S. policy in
the Third World is likely to be more selective and the U.S. homeland may no
longer provide sanctuary. Renewed external support will restore the lagging
proficiency of insurgents and terrorists.
The Application of Emerging Technology.
Emerging technology will have less impact on conflict short of war than
on conventional, combined-arms warfare. It will, however, have some role. In
noncombatant evacuation operations, new technology can assist with
identification and notification of evacuees. Sensor technology, robotics,
nonlethal weapons, and intelligence meshes will be used in combatting
terrorism, countering narcotrafficking, and peace operations. These
technologies, along with simulator training and unmanned aerial vehicles, will
also be useful in insurgency and counterinsurgency.
Constraints and Countermeasures.
There are a number of constraints on applying the RMA to conflict short
of war. These include the lack of a powerful institutional advocate for this
process, a shortage of money for the development of technology specifically
for conflict short of war, and the possibility that new technology may run
counter to American values.
Enemies may also develop countermeasures to RMA innovations. Rather
than attempt to match the technological prowess of U.S. forces, future enemies
will probably seek asymmetrical countermeasures designed to strike at U.S.
public support for engagement in conflict short of war, at the will of our
friends and allies, or, in some cases, at deployed U.S. forces.
Making Revolution.
Rather than simply graft emerging technology to existing strategy,
doctrine, organization, force structure, objectives, concepts, attitudes, and
norms, the United States could pursue a full revolution in the way we approach
conflict short of war. This is rife with hidden dangers and unintended
consequences. A hypothetical future scenario illustrates some of these.
vi
Conclusions and Recommendations.
In the near future, change will occur in the American approach to
conflict short of war. To understand and control ongoing change, research,
analysis, and debate is needed on a number of topics:
• A comprehensive general theory of military revolutions set within the
context of broader notion of global politics and security;
• The strategy and policy foundation of military revolutions;
• The ethical dimension of RMA;
• The impact of the RMA on the structure of the U.S. national security
organization;
• The impact of RMA on leader development within the military;
• The cultivation of appropriate expertise within the Army; and,
• Technology designed specifically for conflict short of war, especially
psychological, biological, and defensive technology.
1
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND
CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR
Introduction: Groping for the Future.
In the late 1970s Soviet military analysts, led by Marshal N.V. Ogarkov,
began to write of an emerging revolution in the nature of warfare. 1 By the
early 1990s, this idea had spread to the United States, leading strategic
thinkers inside and outside the government to conclude that ongoing innovation
represents a true turning point in history.2 If this is true, the strategic
implications are far-reaching. Revolutionary changes in the character of
warfare, according to Andrew F. Krepinevich, “have profound consequences for
global and regional military balances.”3 But while it is clear that dramatic
change is underway, its ultimate repercussions remain hidden.
In its purest sense, revolution brings change that is permanent,
fundamental, and rapid. The basic premise of the revolution in military
affairs (RMA) is simple: throughout history, warfare usually developed in an
evolutionary fashion, but occasionally ideas and inventions combined to propel
dramatic and decisive change. This not only affected the application of
military force, but often altered the geopolitical balance in favor of those
who mastered the new form of warfare. The stakes of military revolution are
thus immense. Full of promise, it seems to offer Americans an answer to many
enduring strategic dilemmas, whether intolerance of casualties, impatience, or
the shrinking military manpower base. In a time of shrinking defense budgets,
emerging technology may allow the United States to maintain or even enhance
its global military power.4 The Gulf War was widely seen as a foretaste of
RMA warfare, offering quick victory with limited casualties. As a result,
most attention has been on the opportunities provided by RMA rather than its
risks, costs, and unintended side effects.
It is ironic that just as Marxism reached final bankruptcy as a
framework for political and economic organization, one of its basic notions
gained new life. Karl Marx, after all, postulated that revolutions can be
deliberate rather than inadvertent; historical change can be created,
engineered, and harnessed by those who understand it. Without direct
attribution to Marx, this idea led many analysts to assume the current RMA can
be the first deliberate one as senior military leaders and strategic thinkers
consciously shape the future.
Whether Marxist or not, revolutionaries must always ask a series of key
questions. First: Do the proper preconditions exist for revolutionary change
or can they be created? In contemporary military affairs, the answer to this
is “yes.” Emerging technology; economic, political, and social trends; and,
most importantly, new ideas create the right environment for revolution. Then
revolutionaries must ask: How can I begin, sustain, and control the
revolution? In current military affairs, this question is still under debate.
Finally, the most difficult and often most critical questions are: Do we
truly want a revolution? and, Will the long-term benefits outweigh the costs
and risks? Advocates of a revolution in military affairs have not begun to
grapple with these issues.
2
The change wrought by some revolutions is deep; others do not reach such
extremes. This also applies to RMAs. The United States now faces a crucial
choice. We can choose to drive the current RMA further and faster than any of
its predecessors. In combined-arms warfare, this may be necessary. But
conflict short of war–whether terrorism, narcotrafficking, peace enforcement,
or insurgency–is different. Even if the RMA does prove applicable to these
problems, there are good reasons for deliberately limiting it. As the United
States faces this dilemma, strategic considerations rather than our
fascination with technology and enthusiasm for change must be paramount .
Cry “Havoc!”: The Strategic Context.
RMAs are born, develop, and die in specific strategic contexts, each
composed of an array of social, economic, political, and military factors.
The strategic context of the current RMA is dominated by the transformation of
the global system from the Cold War to post-Cold War period. This shapes
conflict short of war and influences the utility of U.S. military force.
During the Cold War, the most strategically significant form of conflict
short of war– then called “low-intensity conflict”–was revolutionary
insurgency in the Third World. Low-intensity conflict outside the Third World
did not require U.S. military force–the British, Italians, Germans, or
Spanish could deal with their own problems–but revolutionary insurgency
targeting our Third World allies often did. Using the strategy of protracted
guerrilla war perfected by Mao and Giap, insurgents, usually supported by the
Soviet Union, China, or their proxies, sought to overthrow fragile, pro-
Western regimes. Because revolutionary insurgency thwarted political reform
and economic development, often spread to neighboring states, and, when
successful, increased Soviet influence, we considered it a major threat.
Admittedly no Third World insurgency directly endangered the United States,
but in combination they did. The dominant strategic logic was what French
counterinsurgent theorists called “death by a thousand small cuts.” 5
In response, Western strategists developed an elaborate
counterinsurgency doctrine. Codified by Robert Thompson, Roger Trinquier, and
others, this initially emerged from the French and British experience in
Malaya, Algeria, and Indochina.6 Eventually Americans assumed responsibility
for the counterinsurgency paradigm; Vietnam replaced Malaya and Algeria as the
seminal event.7 The culmination of Cold War-era thinking was the 1990 release
of Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, Military Operations
in Low Intensity Conflict.8 By defining counterinsurgency as opposition to
Marxist “people’s war,” this document viewed low-intensity conflict in general
as a subset of the struggle between the superpowers.9 Regime legitimacy was
the central concept. The United States sought to augment this and,
ultimately, ameliorate the underlying causes of conflict. The military
dimension of counterinsurgency simply allowed economic and political reforms
to take root. Counterinsurgents could not win through purely military means,
according to this theory, but they could lose.
Full of well-developed, impressive thinking, FM 100-20 deals with forms
of violence rapidly becoming obsolete. Today, the essential nature of
conflict short of war is changing. Marxist “people’s war” represents the
past. The future will most likely be dominated by peace enforcement in failed
states, new forms of “spiritual” insurgency designed to radically alter the
ideological structure of regimes, and “commercial” insurgency from quasipolitical
“gray area phenomena” such as narcoterrorism.10 Other important
changes are also on the way. During the Cold War, conflict short of war
primarily concerned nation-states. In the post-Cold War era, many if not most
Third World states will fragment into smaller units. Ungovernability and
instability will be the norm. Even those which formally remain intact will
see political and military power dispersed among warlords, primal militias,
and well-organized politico-criminal organizations.11 Most of these will be
characterized by ruthlessness, some also by dangerous sophistication as
terrorists and narcotraffickers master modern technology. Rapid, multilayered
global communications will allow insurgents, terrorists, and narcotraffickers
3
to learn and adapt quickly and even to form alliances and coalitions. While
war or near-war may be no more common than in past decades, general, low-level
violence will be pervasive.
In this environment, the United States will probably concentrate on
containing rather than ameliorating conflict. Our future policy in the Third
World is likely to be more selective with a trend toward disengagement. While
the global conflict with the Soviet Union forced American engagement in Third
World struggles where tangible national interests were minimal, the end of the
Cold War gives us the option of limiting our role in certain types of
conflicts to support of the United Nations or other multinational efforts, or
rejecting involvement all together. While the great powers are currently
cooperating on Third World conflict, they are likely to lose interest over the
long-term. If this happens, U.S. objectives will increasingly be symbolic as
we pursue humanitarian relief or attempt to cultivate a system of world order
but are not willing to bear the costs of the final resolution of complex and
long-standing conflicts.
Most ominously, the U.S. homeland may no longer provide sanctuary as it
did from Cold War-era low intensity conflict. As in Great Britain, insurgents
and terrorists angered by U.S. policy may bring the conflict to our country
using global interdependence and the increased international flow of people.
Moreover, as Third World dictators assimilate the lessons of the Gulf War,
they will see conflict short of war as a useful but safer form of aggression.
Renewed external support will restore the lagging proficiency of insurgents
and terrorists including their technological capability. Politically and
militarily, then, the Third World of the future will be full of danger.
Let Slip the Dogs of War: The Application of Emerging Technology.
The emerging RMA in mid- or high-intensity warfare is centered around
the fusion of sophisticated remote sensing systems with extremely lethal,
usually stand-off, precision-strike weapons systems and automation-assisted
command, control, and communications (C3). Trained with electronic
simulations, virtual reality devices, and field exercises, this fusion is
expected to allow smaller military forces to attain rapid, decisive results
through synchronized, near-simultaneous operations throughout the breadth and
depth of a theater of war.12 The eventual result may be radically new forms
of conventional warfare. With a few exceptions, however, the impact of the
RMA on conflict short of war is far less clear.
Attacks or raids–which are doctrinal missions for the U.S. Army–are an
exception. The military objective of attacks or raids in a conflict short of
war is to damage or destroy high value targets of an adversary in order to
seize and maintain the political or military initiative, and to demonstrate
U.S. capability and resolve.13 Although sometimes such operations are covert
and executed by unconventional or special operations forces, in most cases a
successful operation and its effects should be clearly visible to both the
target and the international community. Emerging RMA technologies should
improve the U.S. military’s capability in these types of operations.
Terrestrial, aerial, and space-based, autonomous, wide-ranging, high-speed
collecting devices capable of on-board processing will identify precise
targets and provide near-real-time information about the adversary’s
dispositions. Distributed interactive simulations and virtual reality devices
will train the forces and be used to rehearse the strikes. And automationassisted
C3 systems will synchronize and control lethal, stand-off, precisionguided
weapons systems in near-simultaneous attacks.14 Information technology
could be used to both conceal the intent to strike and, later, provide
evidence of a successful strike.15 Attacks and raids during conflict short of
war are, in effect, mid- to high-intensity operations writ small.16 RMA
therefore can have a significant effect. By contrast, the potential impact of
emerging technology on more “traditional” operations in conflict short of war
such as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), counterterrorism,
counternarcotrafficking, peace enforcement, and counterinsurgency is more
ambiguous.
4
In the increasingly global economy, large numbers of Americans may find
themselves in areas of instability and conflict. Voluntary and involuntary
noncombatant evacuation operations will therefore be more frequent. The
strategic objective of a NEO is the removal of U.S. (and occasionally allied)
citizens from danger. The presence of Americans in areas of conflict reduces
the flexibility of decision makers not only because U.S. citizens might be
taken hostage or endangered, but also because their injury or death can rally
public support in the United States for more militant action than policymakers
might otherwise favor. But the open declaration of a NEO and its execution
also restricts options since it signals the seriousness of a crisis by
“clearing the decks” for further action. For decision makers this creates a
tension between a desire to remove citizens from danger early and a fear of
intensifying a crisis or precipitating undesirable adversary reaction.
While advances in robotics and information technologies may make it
possible to perform many commercial activities with fewer employees in
dangerous regions, those Americans who are overseas will be more isolated and
dispersed. This complicates the main problems of NEOs: identification and
notification of the individuals to be evacuated, identification of safe
evacuation routes, and assessment of threats to the evacuation. Technology
could diminish these problems. In the near future every American at risk
could be equipped with an electronic individual position locator device
(IPLD). The device, derived from the electronic bracelet used to control some
criminal offenders or parolees, would continuously inform a central data bank
of the individuals’ locations. Eventually such a device could be permanently
implanted under the skin, with automatic remote activation either upon
departure from U.S. territory (while passing through the security screening
system at the airport, for example) or by transmission of a NEO alert code to
areas of conflict. Implantation would help preclude removal of the device
(although, of course, some terrorists might be willing to remove a portion of
the hostage’s body if they knew where the device was implanted). The IPLD
could also act as a form of IFFN (identification friend, foe, or neutral) if
U.S. military personnel were equipped with appropriate challenge/response
devices. Finally, such a device might eventually serve, like Dick Tracey’s
wrist radio, as a two-way communication channel permitting the NEO
notification to be done covertly.
The second emerging technology with direct application in NEOs is the
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). UAVs will be able to conduct rapid
reconnaissance of possible evacuation routes and identify threats during the
evacuation. Their small size will make them less conspicuous than either
ground vehicles or manned air platforms. Large numbers of fast UAVs could
cover multiple exit routes, thus complicating any attempt to interfere with
the NEO. In combination with “wrist-radios,” High Altitude Long Endurance
(HALE) UAVs could provide NEO notification capability via scrambled TV/radio
to Americans on the ground.17 When a NEO required combat action, stand-off,
precision-strike weapons systems could allow small military teams to
accomplish missions which today require companies or even battalions.18
Equipping these small units with adaptive camouflage could also reduce the
visibility of NEOs.19 The less visible an operation, the less provocative; the
less visible military teams are, the harder to interfere with them.
Finally, developing military C3I systems could help avoid dangerous,
last minute evacuation of Americans all together. Currently, businessmen and
diplomats facing crises tend to linger until the last possible moment, often
ignoring official warnings. If the U.S. military could gain nondestructive
access to (and perhaps even control of ) the communications of an area from
remote locations and made this available to Americans, businessmen and
diplomats might voluntarily depart early in a crisis knowing they could carry
on their activities even though not physically present. By encouraging
voluntary departure prior to a crisis, reducing the need for a public
disclosure of a NEO, and reducing the political visibility of evacuations,
emerging technology increases options available to decision makers and reduces
the degree to which NEOs act as barometers of U.S. resolve. When evacuees are
5
actually threatened, the ability to strike quickly, precisely, and from a
distance will provide a margin of safety.
Providing safety is also the primary U.S. objective when combatting
terrorism. Currently, the State Department deals with terrorism overseas and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has domestic jurisdiction. The military
supports both. Efforts to combat terrorism fall into two categories:
defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property
(antiterrorism), and offensive actions to prevent, deter, and punish
(counterterrorism).20 Emerging technologies are a two-edged sword. Some–
like bio-technical weapons–can be tools of terrorism. Others–like
precision, stand-off weapons or intrusive information technologies–may be
used either for or against terrorism.
If technology allows a reduced American presence overseas, antiterrorism
will be easier. Improved sensors and robotic guard systems may make
installations, both military and commercial, more difficult to penetrate. In
counterterrorism, according to Count de Marenches, former chief of French
Intelligence, “Precision personal intelligence can be more critical than
precision-guided munitions.”21 Advances in electronics and sensors and, even
more importantly, the ability to fuse data through automation and improved
organizations may provide that most critical commodity. New computer
software, according to Alvin and Heidi Toffler, could “quickly discover and
expose critical associations that would otherwise go undetected.”22 As
demonstrated by Israel, UAVs can also play a significant role: “… a
remotely piloted plane followed a car carrying fleeing terrorists back to
their base, so that it could subsequently be demolished by air attack.”23 If
the Army develops the aerial capability to broadcast and alter television
signals, it could remove a key and essential weapon from the terrorist
arsenal–media coverage.24 Finally, some authors have speculated that
advances in nonlethal weapons may make it possible to disable and capture
terrorists or “glue” incoming car bombs to the street.
At least one analyst has suggested using “soft kill” weapons such as
high energy radio frequency (HERF) guns and electromagnetic pulse transformer
(EMP/T) bombs, to interdict narcotrafficking flights by damaging or destroying
their avionics.25 Like combatting terrorism, counternarcotrafficking
operations are primarily a law enforcement function, with the military
providing support.26 Because narcotraffickers operate like terrorists, much
counterterrorism technology can be used against them. In fact,
narcotraffickers are even more likely than terrorists to rely on radios,
cellular telephones, fax machines, and computers. This greatly increases
their vulnerability to electronic intelligence gathering and disruption. For
example, remote intrusive monitoring of the financial computer networks of
offshore banks could identify the deposits associated with money laundering.
If desired, such accounts could be electronically emptied.
Because interdicting narcotrafficking is similar to locating a military
opponent’s reconnaissance platforms, a military capable, in Martin Libicki’s
words, of collecting “more and more data about a battlefield, knitting a finer
and finer mesh which can catch smaller and stealthier objects” could pinpoint
intruders into U.S. territory.27 Existing radar nets can identify aircraft
attempting low altitude entry into the United States, so a favored technique
of drug smugglers is to transfer the contraband from planes to speedboats
offshore. Tracking and stopping high-speed small craft in coastal waters is
difficult today. With projected advances in sensors and directed-energy or
stand-off precision conventional munitions it could become routine. Drugs
smuggled in commercial carriers might be interdicted by hosts of miniaturized,
remote controlled, robotic detectors capable of rapid stem to stern searches
of ships and airliners.28 Interdiction of narcotics at the source, currently
a resource-intensive activity involving search and destroy operations or large
scale spraying of ecologically damaging herbicides, might be done in the
future by miniature, self-mobile, bio-mechanical “bugs” delivered by aerial
dispenser to seek out and kill or modify narcotic producing plants.29
Alternatively, information warfare systems might influence the behavior of
6
populations by convincing citizens to turn in traffickers or not buy drugs.
Behavior modification is a key component of peace enforcement. The
primary objective of these operations is to prevent violence and facilitate
diplomatic resolution of a conflict.30 “Soft kill” systems can play a key
role. Examples include not only information warfare but also biotechnical
antimaterial agents which “could disable propulsion systems (attacking fuel
and lubricants or clogging airways and critical passages); change the
characteristics of soil or vegetation (to deny terrain to vehicles and
troops); or degrade warfighting material (particularly those with organic
components).”31 Advances in electronics and robotics could also prove useful
in peace operations, allowing commanders to separate forces with a “no man’s
land” populated by remote sensing devices or robotic patrols and enforced with
stand-off precision strike weapons, thus reducing peacekeeper casualties and
improving the chances that the peacekeeping force will remain long enough for
a political resolution of the conflict.
The final area of consideration for application of emerging technologies
to conflict short of war are insurgency and counterinsurgency. The military
objectives of insurgency and counterinsurgency are diametrically opposed. In
insurgency the United States assists an armed political organization
attempting to seize power or extract political concessions from a regime
opposed to U.S. interests. Counterinsurgency seeks to contain or defeat an
insurgency attempting the overthrow of a friendly regime.32 How then, might
the RMA affect these operations? According to FM 100-20 the U.S. armed
forces, when directed to do so, can assist insurgent efforts to:
• Recruit, organize, train, and equip forces;
• Develop institutions and infrastructure;
• Gather intelligence; and
• Perform psychological operations, surreptitious insertions, linkups,
evasion, escape, subversion, sabotage, and resupply.33
Emerging technology can augment U.S. capabilities in a number of these areas.
Simulator training devices can help force development and partially
compensate for the difficulties insurgents face in performing actual field
training. UAVs can be used for psychological operations aimed at mobilizing
support and enhancing the legitimacy of the insurgents. Stealth vehicles can
be used for insertions, biotechnological antimaterial agents for sabotage, and
the U.S.’s extensive sensor and collector network can provide intelligence
support.
Counterinsurgency is similar. Success hinges on obtaining accurate
intelligence about the insurgents, and developing or maintaining government
legitimacy. Greatly improved intelligence gathering and fusion is a primary
component of the RMA, and proposed information warfare capabilities might be
ideally suited for helping develop desired emotions, attitudes, or
behavior.34 Stand-off weapons could interdict outside support to the
insurgents without requiring a U.S. presence. This could help a beleaguered
regime maintain legitimacy. Improved training of security forces using
simulators would improve their effectiveness, thus increasing the public’s
trust in the regime’s ability to provide security.
Potholes in the Information Superhighway: Constraints and Countermeasures.
Emerging technology may improve the application of force in conflict
short of war, but there is probably no imminent RMA in this arena. The
changes in conflict short of war will be considerably less dramatic than in
those projected for mid- to high-intensity combat, particularly when possible
constraints or countermeasures are considered.
These constraints begin at the highest level as the basic nature of our
national security organization generates obstacles to innovation. As Stephen
Peter Rosen points out, large bureaucracies are not only difficult to change,
they are explicitly designed not to change–“the absence of innovation is the
rule, the natural state.”35 Ironically, the successful end of the Cold War,
7
even though it dramatically increased the need for innovation, complicates the
process. In all human endeavors, success tends to stifle innovation. The
natural attitude is “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The fact that the
United States has not faced a recent military or national security disaster
has hindered the development and application of new technology to conflict
short of war. To many Americans, the absence of disaster shows that our
national security strategy “ain’t broke.” Moreover, conflict short of war
lacks a powerful institutional advocate able to transcend this attitude. Both
civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense fear that effort,
time, and, most importantly, money spent on conflict short of war will be
subtracted from that available for conventional combined-arms warfare. And it
is not clear that the American public and the Congress consider improving our
capabilities in conflict short of war important.
In this era of shrinking defense budgets, little money is available for
technology designed specifically for conflict short of war. Fortunately, much
of the technology developed for conventional mid- and high-intensity conflict
can be extrapolated to conflict short of war, but insurgency, terrorism, and
narcotrafficking also demand some unique capabilities. Like a business’
investment in new plant, military technology increases effectiveness and
efficiency in the long-term, but has major short-term costs. If we choose to
engage in conflict short of war, two things could inspire efforts to develop
and apply cutting-edge technology. One is the emergence of an active and
powerful coterie of visionaries within the national security community,
including both senior military and civilian leaders. The other is defeat or
disaster. Yet even if the United States did make a concerted effort to apply
emerging technology to conflict short of war, our opponents would quickly
develop countermeasures, thus posing new problems and forcing further
innovation by U.S. forces. Because U.S. engagement in conflict short of war
will continue to be have weak domestic support, opponents will not have to
match us innovation for innovation, but only increase the cost of American
engagement beyond the low limits of public and congressional tolerance. How,
then, might future opponents attempt to counter high-tech U.S. forces?
First, they will strike at domestic support for U.S. engagement. One
way to do this is to kill Americans or damage U.S. property. Off-duty and
rear-area U.S. forces in country will–as always–be targets. But in the
increasingly mobile and interdependent world, the United States itself may
also be vulnerable. At times, immigrant or resident alien communities within
the United States may provide a base of support. New alliances among groups
unhappy with our policy will coalesce, share information and, occasionally,
conduct cooperative operations. Electronic terrorism–the sabotage of
communications and computer systems in retaliation for official policy–will
also be a tool of our enemies. Cyberspace will supplement international
airports as the point-of-entry for terrorists. As a National Security
Decision Directive signed by President Bush noted, “Telecommunications and
information processing systems are highly susceptible to interception,
unauthorized access, and related forms of technical exploitation…The
technology to exploit these electronic systems is widespread and is used
extensively by foreign nations and can be employed, as well, by terrorist
groups…”36 Opponents will also undercut domestic support for U.S.
engagement through traditional political mobilization using immigrant and
resident alien communities as well as sympathetic indigenous political groups-
-time-tested tactics honed during Vietnam and the 1980s. Advertising and
public relations firms will be hired to construct sophisticated
“consciousness-raising” campaigns. Often these will attack American public
opinion indirectly by creating international opposition to our policy.
Opponents will also counter American military prowess by targeting our
friends and allies. Reliance on allies has long been an American
vulnerability in conflict short of war. In Vietnam, for example, even our
hard-won understanding of revolutionary “people’s war” could not bring victory
to the incompetent and repressive Saigon elite. For American doctrine and
strategy to work, we must have a local ally with some base of legitimacy.
8
Given this, future opponents may not even attempt to confront high-tech
American forces, but instead steal a flank march by undercutting our allies.
In conventional, combined-arms warfare, backward or weak contingents of
coalitions can be assigned peripheral duties–figuratively holding the horses-
-and thus not erode the overall military effectiveness of the alliance. With
the exception of operations in failed states or certain types of raids and
attacks, a host nation must be the centerpiece of efforts to confront
insurgency, terrorism, or narcotrafficking. The United States can be no more
effective than its allies, a coalition no stronger than its weakest element.
Terrorists, insurgents, and narcotraffickers will quickly recognize this.
In some cases, though, our opponents will attempt to directly counter
deployed American forces. Since new technology will improve the ability of
U.S. forces to locate and track enemies and to collect, analyze, and
disseminate intelligence, the most useful countermeasures will be tactical,
operational, and strategic camouflage and deception. Some opponents,
especially those with an external sponsor, may deploy limited but high-tech
methods of camouflage and deception. External sponsors may also provide just
enough technology to their clients to foil our forces as Stingers did for the
Afghan mujahedeen. Some narcotraffickers, insurgents, or terrorists will take
a purely low-tech approach including things as simple as abandoning electronic
communications in favor of written or voice messages, and relying on timetested
cellular organization to foil intelligence efforts.37 Organizational
decentralization may not totally destroy the effectiveness of RMA technology,
but certainly erodes it. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or the other Third World
caricatures of the Soviet Union are perfect opponents for a RMA-type military.
Driven by the well-earned paranoia of tyrants, they have highly centralized
military forces. This prevents coups d’etat, but also limits the chance of
military victory against determined advanced states. Future insurgents,
terrorists, and narcotraffickers will not be so stupid.
The use of new technology may also run counter to basic American values.
Information age–and in particular information warfare–technologies cause
concerns about privacy.38 For example, the individual position locator raises
several thorny issues: Would Americans overseas be forced to wear (or worse
have implanted) such a device or would its use be voluntary? If forced, would
it apply equally to those employed overseas and tourists? Will Americans
accept the fact that the government might, by access to the NEO locator data
base, know every move they make? If a locator device could be remotely
activated, how could Americans be sure that activation was only effective
outside the United States? How would they know that “wrist radios” were not
used to monitor personal conversations? Similarly, military use of
television against foreign adversaries raises the specter of domestic
applications. Even if domestic use was never contemplated, its possibility
might cause greater public skepticism regarding television appearances,
reducing the impact of one of the American politician’s greatest communication
tools. Deception, while frequently of great military or political value, is
thought of as somehow “un-American.”
American values also make the use of directed energy weapons against
suspected narcotrafficking aircraft technologically feasible but morally
difficult, perhaps unacceptable. The advantage of directed energy weapons
over conventional ones is deniability. Against whom is such deniability
aimed? Certainly not the narcotraffickers, who will quickly recognize that
interception by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or military planes leads to
loss of their aircraft.39 Instead, deniability must be aimed at the American
people, who do not sanction the imprisonment, much less execution, of
individuals without a trial (and execution is how they will perceive it–the
argument “we only disabled the aircraft, it was the crash which killed the
pilot” will carry little weight). Deniability will not last long, since
narcotraffickers can choose any number of ways to make such interceptions
public such as landing and then challenging the intercept technique in court,
or arranging to relay communications with their aircraft to a ground station
which could broadcast the “nonlethal” downing (ideally of a plane carrying no
9
drugs). The American public may perceive the DEA or military involved in such
actions to be as bad or worse than the narcotraffickers.
Certain biotechnical weapons–considered by some to violate the
biological warfare convention to which the United States is a signatory–also
may transgress American values regarding appropriate means.40 Most Americans
would not support the use of a weapon designed to target only a specific
racial or ethnic group in anything less than a war for survival of the
nation.41 Could the government and military of this multi-ethnic republic
face charges that it was developing or using a weapon targeting Africans,
Jews, Koreans, Hispanics, etc.? Would defense against such a charge occupy
the attention of policymakers to the detriment of other essential business?
And even accidental injuries or deaths caused by “nonlethal” antimaterial
substances could be politically damaging.
American values and attitudes thus form significant constraints on full
use of emerging technology, at least in anything short of a perceived war for
national survival. Overcoming these constraints to make a RMA in conflict
short of war would require fundamental changes in the United States–an
ethical and political revolution may be necessary to make a military
revolution.
The Silicon Icarus: Making Revolution.
Even with all the constraints and countermeasures, there is some value
in applying emerging technology using existing strategy, doctrine,
organization, force structure, objectives, concepts, attitudes, and norms.
But there is another alternative: we could deliberately engineer a
comprehensive revolution, seeking utter transformation rather than simply an
expeditious use of new technology. However alluring, such a program is rife
with hidden dangers and unintended consequences. Unlike the architects of the
Manhattan Project, we are not forced to pursue revolution without considering
the implications. In conflict short of war, RMA is a Pandora’s box
desperately in need of careful scrutiny before opening.
But how to do so? Because it transcends the comfortable familiarity of
both the past and present, revolution is never easy. It is, above all, a
challenge to the imagination. Even the greatest revolutionaries have only
hazy images of the future, their lives driven more by shadowy vision than
concrete plans. But for decision makers contemplating revolution, visualizing
long-term implications–however difficult–is the only way to gauge whether or
not they truly want the kind of fundamental and irrevocable change revolution
brings. To decide how far we want to push RMA in the arena of conflict short
of war, Americans must speculate on where it might ultimately lead. One way
to do this is by constructing hypothetical future scenarios. There are any
number of feasible scenarios. The probability of any one is less important
than the interconnections it uncovers. What follows, then, is such a
hypothetical future scenario–a “history” of the application of RMA to
conflict short of war written in the year 2010. It is not a prediction and
certainly not a preference, but is a possibility.
The first question is: What led American leaders and national
security professionals to apply the revolution in military affairs to
conflict short of war? Most often, a revolution in military affairs
occurs in response to defeat or a perception of rising threat. Napoleon
led an undrilled army stripped of most veteran officers against a host
of enemies; the architects of blitzkrieg all had first-hand experience
with bitter military defeat. Likewise, the RMA of the 2000s was sparked
by a series of fiascos in the mid-1990s. First was the emergence of
what became known as “third wave terrorism.” Recognizing the strategic
bankruptcy of old-fashioned hijacking, kidnapping, assassination, and
bombing, terrorists rapidly adopted state-of-the art technology to their
sinister ends. Within Third World countries, they developed the means
to identify and kill American businessmen, diplomats and military
advisors at will, and to disrupt international air traffic and
10
electronic communications in and out of their countries. Even more
damaging was their ability to “carry the war to its source” in the
United States. Biotechnology and information warfare, especially
sabotage of communications and computer networks using mobile high power
microwave sources, replaced AK-47s and SEMTEX as the preferred tools of
terrorism. The new post-Mafia generation of silicon criminals provided
models and even mentors for third wave terrorists.
About the same time, the U.S. military became embroiled in several
horrific ethnic struggles. Our involvement usually began as part of a
multinational peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, but rapidly
turned violent when American forces were killed or held hostage. The
usual response to the first few attacks on Americans was to send
reinforcements, thus placing U.S. prestige on the line. Since our
strategy was contingent on global leadership, we were aware of the
political damage which would result from being forcibly expelled from a
Third World country, and thus doggedly “stayed the course” until
domestic pressure forced withdrawal. On the ground, enemies would not
directly fight our magnificent military forces, but relied instead on
mines, assassination, and terror bombings.
The costs of these imbroglios were immense. A bitter dispute
broke out in the United States between supporters of multinational peace
operations and isolationists. And domestic political acrimony was not
the only long-term cost of these operations: many of our troops assigned
to operations in tropical areas brought back new resilient diseases
which then gained a foothold in the United States. Debate was fierce
over the new law requiring long-term quarantine of troops returning from
Third World operations.
American efforts at counterinsurgency during the mid-1990s were no
more successful. Whether facing commercial insurgents such as
narcotraffickers or spiritual insurgents attempting to forge new systems
of identity and personal meaning in their nations, we found that our
allies were penetrated with enemy agents, corrupt, and unable to
ameliorate the severe political, economic, and social problems that had
given rise to insurgency. When a number of these allied governments
collapsed, we were privately relieved but publicly aware of the
precipitous decline in our prestige. At times, the United States
tottered dangerously close to being the “poor, pitiful giant” Richard
Nixon warned against.
In areas where the United States was not militarily involved, the
major trends of the 1990s were the disintegration of nations,
ungovernability, ecological decay, and persistent conflict. Much of
this had a direct impact on the United States whether by generating
waves of desperate immigrants, inspiring terrorists frustrated by our
failure to solve their nations’ problems, creating health and ecological
problems which infiltrated the continental United States, or increasing
divisiveness in the robustly multicultural American polity.
This series of fiascos led a small number of American political
leaders, senior military officers, and national security experts to
conclude that a revolution was needed in the way we approached conflict
short of war. They held the Vietnam-inspired doctrine of the 1980s and
1990s directly responsible for these disasters. Only radical
innovation, they concluded, could renew U.S. strategy and avoid a slide
into the global irrelevance. Nearly everyone agreed the old strategic
framework which coalesced in the 1960s was bankrupt. This thinking,
derived from the Marshall Plan, sought to use American aid and advice to
ameliorate the “root causes” of conflict in the Third World and build
effective, legitimate governments. By the 1990s this was impossible or,
at least, not worth the costs. Few, if any, Third World governments had
the inherent capability of becoming stable and legitimate even with
outside assistance.
The revolutionaries’first task was to recruit proselytes
11
throughout the government and national security community. Initially
the revolutionaries, who called their new strategic concept “Dynamic
Defense,” were opposed by isolationists who felt that new technology
should be used simply to build an impenetrable electronic and physical
barrier around the United States. Eventually the revolutionaries
convinced the president-elect following the campaign of 2000 that
Dynamic Defense was both feasible and effective–a task made easier by
his background as a pioneering entrepreneur in the computer-generated
and controlled “perception-molding” systems developed by the advertising
industry. The President was thus amenable to the use of the sort of
psychotechnology which formed the core of the RMA in conflict short of
war.
The first step in implementing Dynamic Defense was reshaping the
national security organization and its underlying attitudes and values.
Technology provided opportunity; only intellectual change could
consolidate it. With the full and active support of the President, the
revolutionaries reorganized the American national security system to
make maximum use of emerging technology and new ideas. This loosely
reflected the earlier revolution in the world of business, and sought to
make the U.S. national security organization more flexible and quicker
to react to shifts in the global security environment. The old Cold War
structures–the Department of Defense, Department of State, Central
Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and others–were
replaced by two organizations. One controlled all U.S. actions designed
to prevent conflict, including economic assistance programs and
peacetime diplomacy. The second was responsible for containing conflict
by orchestrating sanctions, quarantines, embargoes, the building of
multinational coalitions, and conflict short of war. This integrated
the military, civilian law enforcement, the diplomatic corps, and
organizations responsible for gathering and analyzing intelligence.
Since so many of the conflicts faced by the United States were “gray
area” threats falling somewhere in between traditional military problems
and traditional law enforcement problems, the organizational division
between the two was abolished. Moreover, many aspects of national
security were civilianized or sub-contracted to save costs.42
One of the most difficult dimensions of the reorganization was
altering the dominant ethos of the armed forces. As technology changed
the way force was applied, things such as personal courage, face-to-face
leadership, and the “warfighter” mentality became irrelevant.
Technological proficiency became the prime criterion for advancement
within the military while the officer corps came to consider research
universities such as Cal Tech and MIT its breeding ground rather than
increasingly archaic institutions like West Point and Annapolis. For
the military, the most common career track alternated assignments in
national security with ones in business and science. Since physical
endurance was not particularly important, military careers no longer
ended after 20 or 30 years. In fact, soldiers and officers were given
few responsibilities until the twentieth year of their careers. As
proposed by Carl Builder, the Army was organized into highly specialized
units permanently associated with a territorial franchise.43 Careers
were within one of these units, thus allowing all soldiers and officers
to develop the sort of language and cultural abilities previously
limited to Special Forces and Foreign Area Officers.
One of the turning points of the revolution came when its leaders
convinced the President and key members of Congress that traditional
American ethics were a major hinderance to the RMA. This was crucial:
the revolutionaries and their allies then crafted the appropriate
attitudinal vessel for the RMA. Through persistent efforts and very
sophisticated domestic “consciousness-raising,” old-fashioned notions of
personal privacy and national sovereignty changed. This was relatively
12
easy since frustration with domestic crime had already begun to alter
attitudes and values. In fact, the RMA in conflict short of war was, in
many ways, a spin-off of the domestic “war on drugs and crime” of the
late 1990s when the military, as predicted by William Mendel in 1994,
became heavily involved in support to domestic law enforcement.44 The
changes in American values that accompanied that struggle were easily
translated to the national security arena. Once the norms concerning
personal privacy changed, law soon followed.
Old-fashioned ideas about information control and scientific
inquiry also changed. Preventing enemies (or potential enemies) from
responding to our technological advantages became a prime objective of
U.S. national security strategy. The government closely controlled and
monitored foreign students attending American universities and exchanges
of information within the global scientific and business communities.
When necessary, the government protected valuable information through
outright deception. And the national security community cooperated
closely with business on counterespionage, providing training, advice,
and equipment.
With values changed, technology then opened the door to profound
innovation. Vast improvements in surveillance systems and information
processing made it possible to monitor a large number of enemies (and
potential enemies). In the pre-RMA days, psychological operations and
psychological warfare were primitive. As they advanced into the
electronic and bioelectronic era, it was necessary to rethink our
ethical prohibitions on manipulating the minds of enemies (and potential
enemies) both international and domestic. Cutting-edge pharmaceutical
technology also provided tools for national security strategists.
Sometimes the revolutionaries found it necessary to stoke the
development of technology designed specifically for conflict short of
war. Whenever possible, profitability was used to encourage private and
quasi-private enterprises to develop appropriate technology. For
example, much of the lucrative technology of surveillance, intelligence
collection, and attitude manipulation used to solve the domestic crime
problem was easily adapted to conflict short of war. The same held for
new weapons, especially nonlethal biological ones and advanced
psychotechnology. Only when there was absolutely no expectation of
profit did the government directly sponsor research of cutting-edge
technology, often with funds freed by disbanding what were seen as
increasingly irrelevant conventional military forces.
All of this reorganization and technological development was
simply preface for the full flowering of the revolution in military
affairs. American leaders popularized a new, more inclusive concept of
national security. No distinction–legal or otherwise–was drawn
between internal and external threats. In the interdependent 21st
century world, such a differentiation was dangerously nostalgic. The
new concept of security also included ecological, public health,
electronic, psychological, and economic threats. Illegal immigrants
carrying resistant strains of disease were considered every bit as
dangerous as enemy soldiers. Actions which damaged the global ecology,
even if they occurred outside the nominal borders of the United States,
were seen as security threats which should be stopped by force if
necessary. Computer hackers were enemies. Finally, external
manipulation of the American public psychology was defined as a security
threat.
The actual strategy built on the RMA was divided into three
tracks. The first sought to perpetuate the revolution. Its internal
dimension institutionalized the organizational and attitudinal changes
that made the revolution possible, and pursued future breakthroughs in
close conjunction with business, the scientific community, and local law
enforcement agencies–the core troika of 21st century security. The
external dimension actively sought to delay or prevent counterresponses
13
by controlling information and through well-orchestrated deception.
The second track consisted of offensive action. Our preference
was preemption. In a dangerous world, it was preferable to kill
terrorists before they could damage the ecology or strike at the United
States. While Americans had long supported this in theory, the RMA
allowed us to actually do it with minimal risk just as the Industrial
Revolution allowed 19th century strategists to build the massive
militaries they had long desired. If regional conflicts–whether
ethnic, racial, religious, or economic–did not damage the global
ecology or appear likely to bring disease or violence to the United
States, they were ignored. When conflicts seemed likely to generate
direct challenges, the United States did not attempt ultimate
resolution, but only to preempt and disrupt whatever aspect of the
conflict seemed likely to endanger us. In the quest for strategic
economy, preemption was the byword. Since the RMA made preemption
quick, covert, usually successful, and politically acceptable, the
United States gradually abandoned collective efforts. Nearly all
allies, with their old-fashioned, pre-RMA militaries, proved more an
encumbrance than a help. When preemption failed, the United States
sought either passive containment which included isolation and
quarantines, or active containment where strikes (electronic,
psychological, or physical) were used to limit the spread of the
deleterious effects of a conflict. For opponents with the ability to
harm the United States, the military preemptively destroyed their
capabilities.
The third track of the strategy was defensive, and included
missile defense, cyberspace defense, and rigid immigration control.
By 2010, the RMA accomplished its desired objectives. Most of the
time, we prevented Third World conflict from directly touching our
shores. Probably the finest hour of the new warriors was the Cuba
preemption of 2005–Operation Ceberus. This was so smooth, so effective
that it warrants explanation. Following the overthrow of Fidel Castro
in 1995 by a popular revolt, an elected government of national unity
quickly proved unable to engineer massive economic and ecological
reconstruction of the country or build a stable democracy. Frequent
seizures of emergency powers and fraudulent elections were the rule.
Within a few years, nostalgia for the stability of the old regime gave
rise to an armed insurgency; most of the front-line rebels were former
members of Castro’s security forces and military. The United States
refused to directly support the corrupt and inept regime, but recognized
that the conflict required our attention.
The operation officially began when the President transferred the
Cuban portfolio from the Conflict Preemption Agency to the Conflict
Containment Agency. An existing contingency plan with implementing
software provided the framework for quick action. Immediately, all
electronic communication in and out of Cuba was surreptitiously
transferred to the national security filter at Fort Meade. This allowed
full monitoring, control, and, when necessary, manipulation of private,
commercial, and government signals. Potential or possible supporters of
the insurgency around the world were identified using the Comprehensive
Interagency Integrated Database. These were categorized as “potential”
or “active,” with sophisticated computerized personality simulations
used to develop, tailor, and focus psychological campaigns for each.
Individuals and organizations with active predilections to support
the insurgency were targets of an elaborate global ruse using computer
communications networks and appeals by a computer-generated insurgent
leader. Real insurgent leaders who were identified were left in place
so that sophisticated computer analysis of their contacts could be
developed. Internecine conflict within the insurgent elite was
engineered using psychotechnology. Psychological operations included
traditional propaganda as well as more aggressive steps such as drug14
assisted subliminal conditioning. At the same time, Cubans within the
United States and around the world were assigned maximum surveillance
status to monitor their physical presence and communications webs. This
thwarted several attempts to establish terrorist cells in the United
States.
Within Cuba itself, fighting was widespread. Several acts of
industrial and ecological terrorism led to the outbreak of disease.
U.S. forces under the command of the Conflict Containment Agency helped
control these while limiting the chance of their own infection by
“stand-off” and robotic medical and humanitarian relief. Naturally all
food supplies contained a super long-lasting sedative. This calmed
local passions and led to an immediate decline in anti-regime activity.
Where there were no direct U.S. relief efforts, sedatives were
dispersed using cruise missiles. In areas thought to have high areas of
insurgent activity, the dosage was increased.
Since all Americans in Cuba had been bioelectrically tagged and
monitored during the initial stages of the conflict, the NEO went
smoothly, including the mandatory health screening of all those
returning to the United States. Coast Guard aircraft and hovercraft
stanched illegal refugees. The attitude-shaping campaigns aimed at the
American public, the global public, and the Cuban people went quite
well, including those parts using computer-generated broadcasts by
insurgent leaders–“morphing”– in which they were shown as disoriented
and psychotic. Subliminal messages surreptitiously integrated with
Cuban television transmissions were also helpful.45 In fact, all of
this was so successful that there were only a few instances of covert,
stand-off military strikes when insurgent targets arose and government
forces seemed on the verge of defeat. U.S. strike forces also attacked
neutral targets to support the psychological campaign as
computer-generated insurgent leaders claimed credit for the raids. At
times, even the raids themselves were computer-invented “recreations.”
(These were a specialty of the Army’s elite Sun Tzu Battalion.)
Eventually it all worked: the insurgents were discredited and
their war faded to simmering conflict unlikely to directly threaten the
United States. Even the relatively unimportant criticism from domestic
political groups was stilled when the President temporarily raised the
quota of Cuban orphans eligible for adoption in the United States.
Unfortunately, there are growing signs in 2010 that the great
advantages brought by the RMA might be eroding. With a decade to adapt,
many opponents of the United States–both state and non-state actors–are
themselves bending technology to their ends. While none can match the
prowess of American forces across the board, indications are that by
concentrating on one potential weakness of U.S. forces, enemies might be
able to increase the human costs of intervention and, if not defeat the
United States, at least deny us success. The RMA has amplified our
distaste for death, a liability our enemies initially disdained and are
now learning to manipulate in simple, low-tech ways.
In 2010, a decade of constant success in counterterrorism was
marred by several dramatic failures. The post-attack environmental
clean-up and reconstruction of St. Louis will take decades. Many of the
difficult-to-detect drugs and psychotechnology developed for use in
conflict short of war have appeared on the domestic black market and,
increasingly, in American schools and workplaces. Perhaps most
important, Americans are beginning to question the economic, human, and
ethical costs of our new strategy. A political movement called the “New
Humanitarianism” is growing, especially among Americans of non-European
descent, and seems likely to play a major role in the presidential
election of 2012. There are even rumblings of discontent within the
national security community as the full meaning of the revolution
becomes clear. Since the distinction between the military and
non-military components of our national security community has eroded,
15
many of those notionally in the military service have to come to feel
unbound by traditional notions of civil-military relations. This group
has founded a new political party–The Eagle Movement–which is beginning
to exert great pressure on the traditional political parties for
inclusion in national policymaking. The traditional parties are, to put
it lightly, intimidated by the Eagle Movement, and seem likely to accept
its demands.
In the end, only historians and philosophers of the future can
ultimately assess the consequences of applying the RMA to conflict short
of war.
Defining the Agenda: Conclusions and Recommendations.
The impact of purely military innovation, whether revolutionary or
evolutionary, is nearly always less in conflict short of war than in
warfare. The military dimension of conflict short of war is smaller, a
less decisive proportion of the total struggle. Political, diplomatic,
cultural, psychological, and economic factors matter in all conflicts,
but are preeminent in conflict short of war. Military superiority–
however measured–nearly always brings battlefield victory, but as
Vietnam, Algeria, and a hundred other steamy struggles showed, it is not
always strategically decisive in conflict short of war.
Still, there is some value in applying emerging technology and
innovative concepts to conflict short of war. If the United States wants
marginal improvements of effectiveness and efficiency, emerging
technology and new concepts offer it. The bigger question is whether to
seek true revolution rather than simply marginal improvements. To do so
will demand fundamental changes in attitudes and values as well as
organization, force structure, doctrine, and techniques. After serious
debate, the people and leaders of the United States may decide the costs
and risks of applying RMA to conflict short of war are not worth the
expected benefits.
Even without such debate, undesirable change may come through
accretion. By applying new technology here and new concepts there, by
making apparently limited and benign modifications in the way we
approach conflict short of war, by serendipity, we may eventually
stumble into change as ultimately profound as deliberate revolution.
Equally, revolutionary change in our approach to conflict short of war
may come about indirectly as we grapple with domestic problems such as
crime and drugs. If our traditional notions of privacy and public
security are altered to fight these battles, it is an easy step to
change our attitudes toward intervention in the affairs and psyches of
foreign foes. Again, the focus on short-term considerations may lead to
an undesirable future.
Whether we opt for revolution or evolution, change will occur. Our
current approach to conflict short of war is a child of the Cold War.
New threats demand new ideas; old assumptions no longer hold. To
understand and control ongoing change, research, analysis, and debate is
needed. Adaptation of military force structure, doctrine, and procedures
must follow rather than precede this. The agenda for research, analysis,
and debate, at least, is fairly clear.
For starters, we must develop a comprehensive general theory of
military revolutions set within the context of broader notion of global
politics and security. Currently, there is no accepted definition of
RMAs or even agreement on which historical transformations constituted
revolutions. It is not clear whether military revolutions are
independent variables created by military leaders, or dependent
variables that occur as spin-offs of wider social, political, and
economic changes. We do not know conclusively whether military
revolutions can be deliberately created, or whether rapid change is only
seen as revolutionary after the fact. If the latter is true, then
perhaps military revolutions are gist only for historians and not
strategists. The concept of the “life-span” of a revolution–the period
16
during which the enemy deliberately or inadvertently allows asymmetry to
persist–also demands attention. What determines the “life-span”? Does
military innovation increase the chances of conflict or diminish it?
Finally, what is the relationship between the nature of future armed
conflict and RMAs? Most of what are considered RMAs occurred in the
Westphalian state system. Can they also occur in some different type of
political system not based on nation-states and traditional inter-state
war?
The strategy and policy foundation of military revolutions also
warrants further study. Again, the direction of influence is central:
Can military revolutions cause strategy to change, do strategic changes
somehow generate military revolutions, or must they always occur
simultaneously? Can an incomplete or partial military revolution occur
in the absence of fundamental strategic change? Once these questions
are answered, the architects of RMA must, if they are to gauge the
potential for a military revolution, discern the future of U.S. strategy
and policy in the Third World. American decision makers and strategists
must then decide whether institutionalizing military revolution should
be an integral part of our national security strategy in the absence of
an equally innovative opponent like the Soviet Union.
Perhaps more importantly, analysis of the ethical dimension of RMA
is needed. Military strategists often overlook the fact that the
employment of force occurs within and is structured by an elaborate
normative framework. This has a historical foundation based on just war
theory, the Judeo- Christian ethical tradition, and international law as
well as a superstructure constantly modified by specific military and
political developments. In the 20th century total war, strategic
bombing, nuclear weapons, limited war, and revolutionary people’s war
forced adaptation of the normative framework Americans use when
employing force. The RMA will require a new assessment. We must decide
whether innovative military capabilities are, in fact, acceptable and
desirable. That can only happen through open debate. The military must
be a vital participant, but not the sole one. But as the institution
most intensely aware of both the opportunities and dangers offered by
emerging technology and concepts, the military must–as our notion of
civil-military relations evolves to meet changing conditions–serve as a
catalyst of this debate.
We must also examine the impact of the revolution in military
affairs on the structure of the U.S. national security organization
including both the policymaking apparatus and the military services.
Reflecting the Cold War strategic environment, the military services are
each organized around a key warfighting competency defined by geographic
medium–landpower dominance, air superiority, control of the seas, power
projection on the oceanic littoral. If writers like Alvin Toffler and
Winn Schwartau are correct and the key to future conflict is
information, organization of the military by geographic medium may be
obsolete.46 At a minimum, the growing importance of information suggests
the need for an integrated, interservice C4I force.47 The same logic
holds for conflict short of war: since it must be confronted with a
cohesive blend of military, political, economic, and intelligence
assets, organizational integration makes sense. This notion bears
careful analysis in the context of changes in the global security
environment and emerging technology. Organizational change which was
politically impossible or undesirable in the past should be considered
anew.
The military services must also assess the impact of RMA on leader
development. Since the Army plays the largest role of any service in
conflict short of war, it must take the lead in this assessment. Based
on a careful analysis of recent history, Stephen Rosen concludes that
neither money nor outside encouragement determines the ability of a
17
military to innovate. The key is acceptance by senior leaders that the
nature of conflict is undergoing fundamental change. Then, Rosen argues,
if “military leaders…attract talented young officers with great
potential for promotion to a new way of war, and then…protect and
promote them, they [can] produce new, usable military capabilities.”48
This suggests that the ultimate fate of the current revolution in
military affairs will not be decided in the laboratories of the great
universities, the board rooms of the major defense contractors, or even
the offices of the Pentagon, but at Fort Leavenworth, in the classrooms
of the Combined Arms Services and Staff School and the Command and
General Staff College, and at PERSCOM.
The cultivation of expertise is related to leader development, but
is not the same. Technological expertise should be of particular concern
to the Army. Because of their roles and functions, the Air Force and
Navy have traditionally emphasized technological expertise. For the
Army, successful officers need branch-specific competence, interpersonal
leadership and management ability, proficiency at staff functions, and,
later in their careers, expertise at the operational and strategic
levels of war. Technological acumen is relegated to a very few Army
officers. But if an RMA is, in fact, underway, whether in conventional
warfare or conflict short of war, and the Army intends to play a major
role, it must develop a long-term program for cultivating technological
expertise among all its officers rather than simply a tiny cadre. The
same holds for nontechnological skills. If the Army is to pursue a RMA
in conflict short of war, it must decide which nonmilitary skills from
the worlds of law enforcement, science, intelligence, and psychology are
necessary and then cultivate them throughout an officer’s career.
Research and analysis is also needed on technology designed specifically
for conflict short of war. Currently, the primary advances of the RMA
are in integrated, stand-off strike systems–the ability to find and
destroy or disable targets by synchronized strike forces. Such
capabilities form the heart of conventional, combined-arms warfare, but
play only a very limited role in conflict short of war. Advances in
sensors and other elements of information technology may bring great
benefits to conventional, combined-arms warfare, but will have less
impact in conflict short of war, which is most often won or lost through
the manipulation of images, beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions.49 These
things rather than troop concentrations, command and control nodes, and
transportation infrastructure are the key military targets in conflict
short of war. This makes psychological technology much more important
than strike technology. Ways must be found to use emerging technology,
including advanced artificial intelligence and information dissemination
systems, to help military strategists develop, implement, and
continually improve methods of influencing opinion, mobilizing public
support, and sometimes demobilizing it. There is also the potential for
defensive pyschotechnology such as “strategic personality simulations”
to aid national security decision makers.50 To date, most analysts feel
that the RMA has not generated adequate advances in such “soft war”
capabilities or even the promise of such gains. But ultimate success in
applying the RMA to conflict short of war hinges on the development of
psychotechnology. As this emerges, it could be tested for political
acceptability by using it first in non-lethal operations other than war
like humanitarian relief and nation assistance.
Additional research is also needed on defensive technology for
conflict short of war. Most current attention to defensive technology
concerns protection against missiles. This is appropriate: ballistic
missile proliferation poses a real and present danger to American
national security. But in the arena of conflict short of war, different
forms of strategic defense apply. For example, research is needed on the
defense of cyberspace against politically-motivated terrorists.51 As
Winn Schwartau argues, the United States needs a national information
18
policy to integrate the efforts of the national security community,
business, and the criminal justice system.52 And, as public health
increasingly becomes a national security issue, strategic medical
defense, including buffering the effects of ecological decay and
preventing the import of new resilient diseases, demands study.
Finally, research is needed on the application of biotechnology to
conflict short of war. It is possible that some of the conceptual
confusion concerning the current RMA may have to do with the compression
of time which is such an integral characteristic of the modern era. In
the past, RMAs took years, often decades to develop. Today, two RMAs may
be underway simultaneously. The first (and more mature) is electronic.
Its manifestations are improved C4I and precision strike systems. The
second (and potentially more profound) RMA is biotechnological,
including genetic engineering and advanced behavior-altering drugs.
Because of the compression of time and the shortening of historical
patterns, the biotechnical revolution is totally enmeshed with the
electronic. It may ultimately be the combination of the two that proves
truly revolutionary.
*******
Distilled to their essence, revolutions are acts of supreme
creativity. The U.S. military is not inherently hostile to creativity,
but is cautious. If the nation–our political and intellectual leaders
and the public–decide that improving American capabilities in conflict
short of war is necessary and desirable, the preeminent task for the
military is to continue to build and enlarge a culture of creativity and
strategic entrepreneurship among the officer corps. To some extent, this
has begun. The changes leading to AirLand Battle, victory in the Gulf
War, and the current RMA were supremely creative. Still, these were only
first steps. To make a revolution in conflict short of war will be more
difficult. But to allow technology to develop without concomitant
creativity would, in the end, endanger the Nation’s security.
19
ENDNOTES.
1. Jeffrey R. Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military
Affairs,” a paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference on Strategy,
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 27, 1994, pp. 42-43.
2. See, for example, reports of the roundtables on the revolution in
military affairs held for the Army, Air Force, and Navy by Science
Applications International Corporation of McLean, VA, and Michael J.
Mazarr, et. al., The Military Technical Revolution, Final Report of a
CSIS Study, Washington, DC: CSIS, March 1993. Another important early
work was Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Military-Technical Revolution:
A Preliminary Assessment,” a report prepared for the Office of the
Secretary Defense/Net Assessment (OSD/NA), July 1992.
3. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Coming Revolution in the Nature of
Conflict: An American Perspective,” in The US Air Force Roundtable on
the Revolution in Military Affairs, a report prepared by Science
Applications International Corporation, January 1994, p. 2.
4. Dan Gouré, “Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America’s
Future?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 1993, p. 175.
5. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in Peter Paret,
ed., Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 852.
6. See Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, New York:
Praeger, 1966; and Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of
Counterinsurgency, New York: Praeger, 1967.
7. On the development of American counterinsurgency doctrine, see
especially Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, New York:
Free Press, 1977; Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of
American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War, New York: New
York University Press, 1986; and, D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms:
The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1988.
8. FM (Field Manual) 100-20/AFP (Air Force Pamphlet) 3-20, Military
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Washington, DC: Headquarters,
Departments of the Army and the Air Force, December 5, 1990.
9. Ibid., pp. 2-7 through 2-14.
10. On the concepts of commercial and spiritual insurgency, see Steven
Metz, The Future of Insurgency, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
11. For detailed analysis, see Steven Metz, America and the Third
World: Strategic Alternatives and Military Implications, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994,
pp. 12-24.
12. See, for example, Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, Land
Warfare in the 21st Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993. Also the reports of the
roundtables on the revolution in military affairs held for the Army, Air
Force, and Navy by Science Applications International Corporation of
McClean, VA.
13. FM (Field Manual) 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters,
Department of the Army, 1993, p. 13-8.
14. These are the capabilities identified as essential to future
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) technologies
in the Army’s final draft Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Pamphlet 525-xx, Concept for Information Operations, Ft. Monroe, VA:
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, May 5, 1994, p. 4-7.
15. Although the Army’s most recent proposed doctrine in regard to
Information Operations merely states: “The Army supports the timely and
accurate release of information to the media as well as open and
independent reporting as the principal means of coverage of U.S.
military operations.” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-xx, p. 2-9.
20
16. FM 100-20, pp. 5-5 to 5-7.
17. National Research Council, STAR 21 (Strategic Technologies for the
Army of the Twenty-first Century), Airborne Systems, Washington DC:
National Academy Press, 1993, pp. 49-55. Also Chuck de Caro, “Sats,
Lies, and Video-Rape: The Soft War Handbook,” unpublished paper,
Aerobureau Corporation, 1994.
18. See for example the discussion in National Research Council, STAR
21, Airborne Systems, p. 19.
19. “Chameleon” camouflage is based on commercially available heat- and
light-sensitive colorants that adapt to the surrounding environment, as
well as electrically stimulated colorants that change color according to
the surrounding landscape. See “Living Camouflage,” Soldiers’ Magazine,
Volume 49, No. 3, March 1994, p. 9. Also National Research Council,
STAR 21, Special Technologies and Systems, Washington DC: National
Academy Press, 1993, pp. 23-24.
20. FM 100-5, pp. 13-6 and 13-7.
21. Quoted in Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at
the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston: Little, Brown, 1993, p. 157.
22. Ibid., p. 157.
23. Ibid., p. 113.
24. de Caro, “Sats, Lies, and Video-Rape,” pp. 32-34.
25. Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic
Superhighway, New York: Thunder’s Mouth, 1994, pp. 171-176. Note that de
Caro defines “soft war” as the hostile utilization of global television.
“Soft kill” is used here in a more generic sense of any system designed
to achieve its effect without causing harm to human beings. See National
Research Council, STAR 21, Technology Forecast Assessments, p. 314.
26. FM 100-5, p. 13-6 .
27. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed
Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, Washington, DC: National Defense
University Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1994, p. 24.
The utility of Libicki’s very interesting analysis is limited by his
failure to provide supporting references.
28. For a brief description of very small autonomous systems, see
Richard O. Hundley and Eugene C. Gritton, Future Technology-Driven
Revolutions in Military Operations: Results of a Workshop, Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, November 1993, pp. 12-37.
29. Possible advances in biotechnology are outlined in STAR 21,
Technology Forecast Assessments, Washington DC: National Academy
Press, 1993, pp. 314-346.
30. FM 100-5, p. 13-7.
31. National Research Council, STAR 21, Technology Forecast
Assessments, Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1993, p. 346.
32. FM 100-20, p. 2-0 and pp. 2-7 to 2-9.
33. Ibid., pp. 2-17 to 2-18.
34. Ibid., p. 2-22.
35. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the
Modern Military, Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 5.
36. Quoted in Schwartau, Information Warfare, p. 127.
37. A classic explanation of cellular organization by insurgents is
Andrew R. Molnar, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in
Insurgencies, Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in
Social Systems, 1966, pp. 3-22.
38. See, as an example, Stephen Sloan, “Technology and Terrorism:
Privatizing Public Violence,” Technology and Society, Vol. 10, No. 2,
Summer 1991, pp. 8-14.
39. Narcotraffickers may, in fact, respond by arming their own aircraft
with conventional air-to-air weaponry. Imagine the surprise of the first
DEA crew who sees, as they pass ahead of a suspected drug laden aircraft
to aim their HERF gun at its vulnerable avionics, a Sidewinder exiting a
21
concealed cargo compartment.
40. The Army contends that its research falls within the limitations of
the chemical and biological conventions. See National Research Council,
STAR 21, Technology Forecast Assessments, pp. 314-315.
41. Tofflers, War and Anti-War, p. 122.
42. Michael Mazarr, an early analyst of the revolution in military
affairs, considered “civilianization of war” one of the principles of
the RMA. See The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense
Planning, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute, 1994, pp. 22-27.
43. Carl Builder, “Information Technologies and the Future of
Conflict,” Briefing to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASDSOLIC), March 23,
1994.
44. William W. Mendel, “The Cold War Returns,” Military Review, Vol.
74, No. 5, May 1994, pp. 69-71.
45. This is described in Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations and
Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century, Washington: Brassey’s, 1990,
pp. 56-57.
46. Tofflers, War and Anti-War; Schwartau, Information Warfare.
47. For a detailed discussion, see Libicki, The Mesh and the Net, pp.
52-69.
48. Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 252.
49. By contrast, a seminal study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies suggests that emerging sensor technologies (at
least) will have equal benefits for conventional and unconventional
military operations. (Mazarr, et. al., The Military Technical
Revolution, p. 44.)
50. See Norman D. Livergood and Stephen D. Williams, “Strategic
Personality Simulation: A New Strategic Concept,” unpublished draft
paper, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994.
51. For thinking on this topic, see Hundley and Gritton, Future
Technology-Driven Revolutions in Military Operations, pp. 60-73.
52. Schwartau, Information Warfare, pp. 316-353.
22
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General William A. Stofft
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Colonel John W. Mountcastle
Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Authors
Dr. Steven Metz
Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit
Editor
Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling
Secretary
Mrs. Shirley E. Martin
*****
Cover Design
Mr. James E. Kistler
Composition
Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

Advertisements

Operation Mockingbird (wiki)

February 17, 2010

Operation Mockingbird was a secret Central Intelligence Agency campaign to influence domestic and foreign media beginning in the 1950s. The activities, extent and even the existence of the CIA project remain in dispute: the operation was first called Mockingbird in Deborah Davis’ 1979 book, Katharine the Great: Katharine Graham and her Washington Post Empire. But Davis’ book, alleging that the media had been recruited (and infiltrated) by the CIA for propaganda purposes, was itself controversial and has since been shown to have had a number of erroneous assertions.[1] More evidence of Mockingbird’s existence emerged in the 2007 memoir American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate and Beyond, by convicted Watergate “plumber” E. Howard Hunt and The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America by Hugh Wilford (2008)[2].
Contents
[hide]
 1 History
o 1.1 Part of the Directorate for Plans
o 1.2 Guatemala
o 1.3 First exposure
o 1.4 Church Committee investigations
o 1.5 “Family Jewels” Report
 2 See also
 3 Further reading
 4 Notes
 5 External links [edit] History In 1948, Frank Wisner was appointed director of the Office of Special Projects (OSP). Soon afterwards OSP was renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). This became the espionage and counter-intelligence branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. Wisner was told to create an organization that concentrated on “propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.”[3] Later that year Wisner established Mockingbird, a program to influence the domestic and foreign media. Wisner recruited Philip Graham from The Washington Post to run the project within the industry. According to Deborah Davis in Katharine the Great; “By the early 1950s, Wisner ‘owned’ respected members of The New York Times, Newsweek, CBS and other communications vehicles.”[4]
In 1951, Allen W. Dulles persuaded Cord Meyer to join the CIA. However, there is evidence that he was recruited several years earlier and had been spying on the liberal organizations he had been a member of in the later 1940s.[5] According to Deborah Davis, Meyer became Mockingbird’s “principal operative”.[6] In 1977, Rolling Stone alleged that one of the most important journalists under the control of Operation Mockingbird was Joseph Alsop, whose articles appeared in over 300 different newspapers. Other journalists alleged by Rolling Stone Magazine to have been willing to promote the views of the CIA included Stewart Alsop (New York Herald Tribune), Ben Bradlee (Newsweek), James Reston (New York Times), Charles Douglas Jackson (Time Magazine), Walter Pincus (Washington Post), William C. Baggs (The Miami News), Herb Gold (The Miami News) and Charles Bartlett (Chattanooga Times).[7] According to Nina Burleigh (A Very Private Woman), these journalists sometimes wrote articles that were commissioned by Frank Wisner. The CIA also provided them with classified information to help them with their work.[8] After 1953, the network was overseen by Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. By this time Operation Mockingbird had a major influence over 25 newspapers and wire agencies. These organizations were run by people with well-known right-wing views such as William Paley (CBS), Henry Luce (Time and Life Magazine), Arthur Hays Sulzberger (New York Times), Alfred Friendly (managing editor of the Washington Post), Jerry O’Leary (Washington Star), Hal Hendrix (Miami News), Barry Bingham, Sr., (Louisville Courier-Journal), James Copley (Copley News Services) and Joseph Harrison (Christian Science Monitor).[7] The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was funded by siphoning of funds intended for the Marshall Plan. Some of this money was used to bribe journalists and publishers. Frank Wisner was constantly looking for ways to help convince the public of the dangers of communism. In 1954, Wisner arranged for the funding of the Hollywood production of Animal Farm, the animated allegory based on the book written by George Orwell.[9] According to Alex Constantine (Mockingbird: The Subversion Of The Free Press By The CIA), in the 1950s, “some 3,000 salaried and contract CIA employees were eventually engaged in propaganda efforts”. Wisner was also able to restrict newspapers from reporting about certain events. For example, the CIA plots to overthrow the governments of Iran (See: Operation Ajax) and Guatemala (See: Operation PBSUCCESS).[10] Thomas Braden, head of the International Organizations Division (IOD), played an important role in Operation Mockingbird. Many years later he revealed his role in these events: “If the director of CIA wanted to extend a present, say, to someone in Europe—a Labour leader—suppose he just thought, This man can use fifty thousand dollars, he’s working well and doing a good job – he could hand it to him and never have to account to anybody… There was simply no limit to the money it could spend and no limit to the people it could hire and no limit to the activities it could decide were necessary to conduct the war—the secret war…. It was a multinational. Maybe it was one of the first.
Journalists were a target, labor unions a particular target—that was one of the activities in which the communists spent the most money.”[11] [edit] Part of the Directorate for Plans In August 1952, the Office of Policy Coordination and the Office of Special Operations (the espionage division) were merged under the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP). Frank Wisner became head of this new organization and Richard Helms became his chief of operations. Mockingbird was now the responsibility of the DDP.[12] J. Edgar Hoover became jealous of the CIA’s growing power. He described the OPC as “Wisner’s gang of weirdos” and began carrying out investigations into their past. It did not take him long to discover that some of them had been active in left-wing politics in the 1930s. This information was passed to Joseph McCarthy who started making attacks on members of the OPC. Hoover also gave McCarthy details of an affair that Frank Wisner had with Princess Caradja in Romania during the war. Hoover claimed that Caradja was a Soviet agent.[13] Joseph McCarthy also began accusing other senior members of the CIA as being security risks. McCarthy claimed that the CIA was a “sinkhole of communists”, and claimed he intended to root out a hundred of them. One of his first targets was Cord Meyer, who was still working for Operation Mockingbird. In August, 1953, Richard Helms, Wisner’s deputy at the OPC, told Meyer that Joseph McCarthy had accused him of being a communist. The Federal Bureau of Investigation added credibility to the accusation by announcing it was unwilling to give Meyer “security clearance”. However, the FBI refused to explain what evidence they had against Meyer. Allen W. Dulles and Frank Wisner both came to his defense and refused to permit an FBI interrogation of Meyer.[14] Joseph McCarthy did not realize what he was taking on. Wisner unleashed Mockingbird on McCarthy. Drew Pearson, Joe Alsop, Jack Anderson, Walter Lippmann and Ed Murrow all went into attack mode and McCarthy was permanently damaged by the press coverage orchestrated by Wisner.[15] [edit] Guatemala Mockingbird was very active during the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in Guatemala during Operation PBSUCCESS. People like Henry Luce were able to censor stories that appeared too sympathetic towards the plight of Arbenz. Allen W. Dulles was even able to keep left-wing journalists from travelling to Guatemala, including Sydney Gruson of the New York Times.[16] Even in the wake of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ 1952 presidential campaign pledge to “roll back the Iron Curtain”, American covert action operations came under scrutiny almost as soon as Dwight Eisenhower was inaugurated in 1953. He soon set up an evaluation operation called Solarium, which had three committees playing analytical games to see which plans of action should be continued. In 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the 5412 Committee in order to keep more of a check on the CIA’s covert activities. The committee (also
called the Special Group) included the CIA director, the national security adviser, and the deputy secretaries at State and Defence and had the responsibility to decide whether covert actions were “proper” and in the national interest. It was also decided to include Richard B. Russell, chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. However, as Allen W. Dulles was later to admit, because of “plausible deniability” planned covert actions were not referred to the 5412 Committee. Eisenhower became concerned about CIA covert activities and in 1956 appointed David K. E. Bruce as a member of the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). Eisenhower asked Bruce to write a report on the CIA. It was presented to Eisenhower on 20 December 1956. Bruce argued that the CIA’s covert actions were “responsible in great measure for stirring up the turmoil and raising the doubts about us that exists in many countries in the world today.” Bruce was also highly critical of Mockingbird. He argued: “what right have we to go barging around in other countries buying newspapers and handing money to opposition parties or supporting a candidate for this, that, or the other office.”[17] After Richard M. Bissell, Jr. lost his post as Deputy Director for Plans in 1962, Tracy Barnes took over the running of Mockingbird. According to Evan Thomas (The Very Best Men) Barnes planted editorials about political candidates who were regarded as pro-CIA. [edit] First exposure In 1964, Random House published Invisible Government by David Wise and Thomas Ross. The book exposed the role the CIA was playing in foreign policy. This included the CIA coups in Guatemala (Operation PBSUCCESS) and Iran (Operation Ajax) and the Bay of Pigs Invasion. It also revealed the CIA’s attempts to overthrow President Sukarno in Indonesia and the covert operations taking place in Laos and Vietnam. The CIA considered buying up the entire printing of Invisible Government but this idea was rejected when Random House pointed out that if this happened they would have to print a second edition.[3] John McCone, the new director of the CIA, also attempted to stop Edward Yates from making a documentary on the CIA for the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). This attempt at censorship failed and NBC went ahead and broadcast this critical documentary. In June, 1965, Desmond FitzGerald was appointed as head of the Directorate for Plans. He now took charge of Mockingbird. At the end of 1966 FitzGerald found out that Ramparts, a left-wing publication, had discovered that the CIA had been secretly funding the National Student Association.[18] FitzGerald ordered Edgar Applewhite to organize a campaign against the magazine. Applewhite later told Evan Thomas for his book, The Very Best Men: “I had all sorts of dirty tricks to hurt their circulation and financing. The people running Ramparts were vulnerable to blackmail. We had awful things in mind, some of which we carried off.”[19] This dirty tricks campaign failed to stop Ramparts publishing this story in March 1967. The article, written by Sol Stern, was entitled NSA and the CIA. As well as reporting CIA funding of the National Student Association it exposed the whole system of anti-Communist front
organizations in Europe, Asia, and South America. It named Cord Meyer as a key figure in this campaign. This included the funding of the literary journal Encounter.[11] In May 1967, Thomas Braden responded to this by publishing an article entitled, “I’m Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral'”, in the Saturday Evening Post, where he defended the activities of the International Organizations Division unit of the CIA. Braden also confessed that the activities of the CIA had to be kept secret from Congress. As he pointed out in the article: “In the early 1950s, when the cold war was really hot, the idea that Congress would have approved many of our projects was about as likely as the John Birch Society’s approving Medicare.”[20] Meyer’s role in Operation Mockingbird was further exposed in 1972 when he was accused of interfering with the publication of a book, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia by Alfred W. McCoy. The book was highly critical of the CIA’s dealings with the drug traffic in Southeast Asia. The publisher, who leaked the story, had been a former colleague of Meyer’s when he was a liberal activist after the war.[21] [edit] Church Committee investigations Further details of Operation Mockingbird were revealed as a result of the Frank Church investigations (Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) in 1975. According to the Congress report published in 1976: “The CIA currently maintains a network of several hundred foreign individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the CIA and at times attempt to influence opinion through the use of covert propaganda. These individuals provide the CIA with direct access to a large number of newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, radio and television stations, commercial book publishers, and other foreign media outlets.” Church argued that misinforming the world cost American taxpayers an estimated $265 million a year.[22] In February 1976, George H. W. Bush, the recently appointed Director of the CIA, announced a new policy: “Effective immediately, the CIA will not enter into any paid or contract relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.” However, he added that the CIA would continue to “welcome” the voluntary, unpaid cooperation of journalists.[23] [edit] “Family Jewels” Report According to the “Family Jewels” report, released by the National Security Archive on June 26, 2007, during the period from March 12, 1963 and June 15, 1963, the CIA installed telephone taps on two Washington-based news reporters. [edit] See also
 Cord Meyer  Judith Miller  James Risen  Mighty Wurlitzer  Propaganda in the United States  Robertson Panel [edit] Further reading  Katharine the Great: Katharine Graham and the Washington Post by Deborah Davis, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979. This book makes many claims about Katherine Graham, then owner of the Washington Post, and her cooperation with Operation Mockingbird. [edit] Notes 1. ^ Davis asserts that Deep Throat was Richard Ober, rather than Mark Felt, as has since been revealed 2. ^ http://www.amazon.com/Mighty-Wurlitzer-How-Played-America/dp/0674026810/ref=pd_sim_b_4 3. ^ a b David Wise and Thomas Ross (1964). Invisible Government. 4. ^ Deborah Davis (1979). Katharine the Great. pp. 137–138. 5. ^ Cord Meyer (1980). Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA. pp. 42–59. 6. ^ Deborah Davis (1979). Katharine the Great. pp. 226. 7. ^ a b Carl Bernstein (20 October 1977). “CIA and the Media”. Rolling Stone Magazine. 8. ^ Nina Burleigh (1998). A Very Private Woman. pp. 118. 9. ^ Evan Thomas (1995). The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA. pp. 33. 10. ^ Alex Constantine (2000). Mockingbird: The Subversion Of The Free Press By The CIA. 11. ^ a b Thomas Braden, interview included in the Granada Television program, World in Action: The Rise and Fall of the CIA. 1975. 12. ^ John Ranelagh (1986). The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. pp. 198–202. 13. ^ Evan Thomas (1995). The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA. pp. 98–106. 14. ^ Cord Meyer (1980). Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA. pp. 60–84. 15. ^ Jack Anderson (1979). Confessions of a Muckraker. pp. 208–236. 16. ^ Evan Thomas (1995). The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA. pp. 117. 17. ^ Evan Thomas (1995). The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA. pp. 148–150. 18. ^ Cord Meyer (1980). Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA. pp. 86–89. 19. ^ Evan Thomas (1995). The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA. pp. 330. 20. ^ Thomas Braden (20 May 1967). “I’m Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral'”. Saturday Evening Post. 21. ^ Nina Burleigh (1998). A Very Private Woman. pp. 105. 22. ^ Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. April 1976. pp. 191–201. 23. ^ Mary Louise (2003). Mockingbird: CIA Media Manipulation.

Operation Condor (wiki)

February 17, 2010

Operation Condor (Spanish: Operación Cóndor), was a campaign of political repressions involving assassination and intelligence operations officially implemented in 1975 by the governments of the Southern Cone of South America. The program aimed to eradicate socialist influence and ideas and to control active or potential opposition movements against the governments.[citation needed] Due to its clandestine nature, the precise number of deaths directly attributable to Operation Condor will likely never be known, but it is reported to have caused over sixty thousand victims[1], possibly even more.[2][3][4] Condor’s key members were the governments in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil, with Ecuador and Peru joining later in more peripheral roles.[5]
Contents
[hide]
 1 History
 2 Notable cases and prosecution
o 2.1 Argentina
o 2.2 Brazil
 2.2.1 The Kidnapping of the Uruguayans
o 2.3 Chile
 2.3.1 General Carlos Prats
 2.3.2 Bernardo Leighton
 2.3.3 Orlando Letelier
 2.3.4 Operación Silencio
 2.3.5 U.S. Congressman Edward Koch
 2.3.6 Other cases
 3 U.S. involvement
o 3.1 Henry Kissinger
 4 The “French connection”
 5 Legal actions
 6 See also
o 6.1 South American intelligence agencies
o 6.2 Some participants in Operation Condor
o 6.3 Prominent victims of Operation Condor
o 6.4 Archives and reports
o 6.5 Detention and torture centers
o 6.6 Other operations and strategies related to Condor
 7 Fictional references
 8 Bibliography
 9 Footnotes and references
 10 External links [edit] History
On 25 November 1975, leaders of the military intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay met, with Manuel Contreras, chief of DINA (the Chilean secret police), in Santiago de Chile, officially creating the Plan Condor [6]. However, cooperation between various security services, in the aim of “eliminating Marxist subversion”, previously existed before this meeting and Pinochet’s coup d’état. Thus, during the Xth Conference of American Armies held in Caracas on September 3, 1973, Brazilian General Breno Borges Fortes, head of the Brazilian army, proposed to “extend the exchange of information” between various services in order to “struggle against subversion”.[7] Furthermore, in March 1974, representatives of the police forces of Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia met with Alberto Villar, deputy chief of the Argentine Federal Police and co-founder of the Triple A death squad, to implement cooperation guidelines in order to destroy the “subversive” threat represented by the presence of thousands of political exilees in Argentina [7]. In August 1974 the corpses of the first victims of Condor, Bolivian refugees, were found in garbage dumps in Buenos Aires [7]. According to French journalist Marie-Monique Robin, author of Escadrons de la mort, l’école française (2004, Death Squads, The French School), the paternity of Operation Condor is to be attributed to General Rivero, intelligence officer of the Argentine Armed Forces and former student of the French.[8] Operation Condor, which took place in the context of the Cold War, had the tacit approval of the United States. In 1968, U.S. General Robert W. Porter stated that “In order to facilitate the coordinated employment of internal security forces within and among Latin American countries, we are…endeavoring to foster inter-service and regional cooperation by assisting in the organization of integrated command and control centers; the establishment of common operating procedures; and the conduct of joint and combined training exercises.” Condor was one of the fruits of this effort. The targets were officially armed groups (such as the MIR, the Montoneros or the ERP, the Tupamaros, etc.) but in fact included all kinds of political opponents, including their families and others, as reported by the Valech Commission.[citation needed] The Argentine “Dirty War”, for example, which resulted in approximatively 30,000 victims according to most estimates, targeted many trade-unionists, relatives of activists, etc.[citation needed] From 1976 onwards, the Chilean DINA and its Argentine counterpart, SIDE, were its front-line troops. The infamous “death flights”, theorized in Argentina by Luis María Mendía — and also used during the Algerian War (1954–1962) by French forces — were widely used, in order to make the corpses, and therefore evidence, disappear.[citation needed] There were also many cases of child abduction.[citation needed] On December 22, 1992 a significant amount of information about Operation Condor came to light when José Fernández, a Paraguayan judge, visited a police station in the Lambaré suburb of Asunción to look for files on a former political prisoner. Instead he found what became known as the “terror archives”, detailing the fates of thousands of Latin Americans secretly kidnapped, tortured and killed by the security services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Some of these countries have since used portions of this archive to prosecute former military officers. The archives counted 50,000 persons murdered, 30,000 “desaparecidos” and 400,000 incarcerated.[9]
According to these archives other countries such as Peru cooperated to varying extents by providing intelligence information in response to requests from the security services of the Southern Cone countries. Even though Peru was not at the secret November 1975 meeting in Santiago de Chile there is evidence of its involvement. For instance, in June 1980, Peru was known to have been collaborating with Argentine agents of 601 Intelligence Battalion in the kidnapping, torture and disappearance of a group of Montoneros living in exile in Lima.[10] The “terror archives” also revealed Colombia’s and Venezuela’s greater or lesser degree of cooperation (Luis Posada Carriles was probably at the meeting that ordered Orlando Letelier’s car bombing). It has been alleged that a Colombian paramilitary organization known as Alianza Americana Anticomunista may have cooperated with Operation Condor. Brazil signed the agreement later (June 1976), and refused to engage in actions outside Latin America. Mexico, together with Costa Rica, Canada, France, the U.K., Spain and Sweden received many people fleeing from the terror regimes. Operation Condor officially ended with the ousting of the Argentine dictatorship in 1983, although the killings continued for some time after that[citation needed]. [edit] Notable cases and prosecution [edit] Argentina Main article: Dirty War The Argentine Dirty War was carried on simultaneously with and overlapping Operation Condor. The Argentine SIDE cooperated with the Chilean DINA in numerous cases of desaparecidos. Chilean General Carlos Prats, Uruguayan former MPs Zelmar Michelini, Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz and the ex-president of Bolivia, Juan José Torres, were assassinated in the Argentine capital. The SIDE also assisted Bolivian general Luis Garcia Meza Tejada’s Cocaine Coup in Bolivia, with the help of Gladio operative Stefano Delle Chiaie and Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie (see also Operation Charly). The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, a group of mothers who had lost their children to the dictatorship, started demonstrating each Sunday on Plaza de Mayo from April 1977, in front of the Casa Rosada in Buenos Aires, the seat of the government, to reclaim their children from the junta. The Mothers continue their struggle for justice to this day (2007). The National Commission for Forced Disappearances (CONADEP), led by writer Ernesto Sabato, was created in 1983. Two years later, the Juicio a las Juntas (Trial of the Juntas) largely succeeded in proving the crimes of the various juntas which had formed the self-styled National Reorganization Process. Most of the top officers who were tried were sentenced to life imprisonment: Jorge Rafael Videla, Emilio Eduardo Massera, Roberto Eduardo Viola, Armando Lambruschini, Raúl Agosti, Rubén Graffigna, Leopoldo Galtieri, Jorge Anaya and Basilio Lami Dozo. However, Raúl Alfonsín’s government passed two amnesty laws protecting military officers involved in human rights abuses: the 1986 Ley de Punto Final (law of closure) and the 1987 Ley de Obediencia Debida (law of due obedience). President Carlos Menem then pardoned
the leaders of the junta in 1989–1990. Following continuous protests by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and other associations, the amnesty laws were repealed by the Argentine Supreme Court nearly twenty years later, in June 2005. In Argentina DINA’s civil agent Enrique Arancibia Clavel, prosecuted for crimes against humanity in 2004, was condemned to life imprisonment for his part in General Prat’s murder.[11] In 2003, federal judge Maria Servini de Cubria requested the extradition from Chile of Mariana Callejas, who was Michael Townley’s wife (himself a U.S. expatriate and DINA agent), and Cristoph Willikie, a retired colonel from the Chilean army—all three of them are accused of this murder. Chilean appeal court judge Nibaldo Segura refused extradition in July 2005 on the grounds that they had already been prosecuted in Chile. [2] It has been claimed that Italian terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie—also an operative of Gladio “stay-behind” secret NATO paramilitary organization—was involved in the murder of General Prats. He and fellow extremist Vincenzo Vinciguerra testified in Rome in December 1995 before judge María Servini de Cubría that DINA agents Enrique Arancibia Clavel and Michael Townley were directly involved in this assassination. [3] [edit] Brazil In Brazil, president Fernando Henrique Cardoso ordered in 2000 the release of some military files concerning Operation Condor.[12] Italian attorney general Giancarlo Capaldo, who is investigating the disappearances of Italian citizens, probably by a mixture of Argentine, Chilean, Paraguayan and Brazilian military, accused 11 Brazilians of involvement. However, according to the official statement, “they could not confirm nor deny that Argentine, Brazilian, Paraguayan and Chilean militaries will be submitted to a trial before December.”[13] As of August 2006, nobody in Brazil has been convicted of human rights violations during the 21 years of military dictatorship there. On April 26, 2000 former governor of Rio de Janeiro Leonel Brizola alleged that ex-presidents of Brazil João Goulart and Juscelino Kubitschek were assassinated as part of Operation Condor, and requested the opening of investigations on their deaths. Goulart died of a heart attack and Kubitschek a car accident.[14][15] [edit] The Kidnapping of the Uruguayans The Condor Operation expanded the covered-up repression from Uruguay to Brazil in an event that happened in November 1978 and later known as “o Sequestro dos Uruguaios´, that is, “the Kidnapping of the Uruguayans”.[citation needed] On that occasion, under consent of the Brazilian military regime, high officers of the Uruguayan army secretly crossed the frontier, heading to Porto Alegre, capital of the State of Rio Grande do Sul.[citation needed] There they kidnapped a militant couple of the Uruguayan political opposition, Universindo Rodriguez and Lilian Celiberti, along with her two children, Camilo and Francesca, 8 and 3 years old.[citation needed] The illegal operation failed when two Brazilian journalists – the reporter Luiz Cláudio Cunha and the photographer Joao Baptista Scalco, from Veja Magazine, were warned by an anonymous
phone call about the disappearance of the Uruguayan couple. The two journalists decided to check the information and headed to the appointed address: an apartment in the borough of Menino Deus in Porto Alegre [16]. There, they were mistakenly taken as other members of the Uruguayan opposition by the armed men who had arrested Lilian. Universindo and the children had already been clandestinely taken to Uruguay [17]. The unexpected arrival of the journalists disclosed the secret operation which had to be suddenly suspended. Lillian was then taken back to Montevideo. The failure of the operation avoided the murder of the four Uruguayans. The news of a political kidnapping made headlines in the Brazilian press and became an international scandal which embarrassed the military governments of Brazil and Uruguay. A few days after, the children were taken to their maternal grandparents in Montevideo. Universindo as well as Lilian were imprisoned and tortured in Brazil and then taken to military prisons in Uruguay where they remained during the next five years. After the Uruguayan re-democratization in 1984, the couple was released and then confirmed all the details of the kidnapping.[18] In 1980, two inspectors of DOPS (Department of Political and Social Order, an official police branch in charge of the political repression during the military regime) were convicted by the Brazilian Justice as the armed men who had arrested the journalists in Lilian’s apartment in Porto Alegre. They were João Augusto da Rosa and Orandir Portassi Lucas (a former football player of Brazilian teams known as Didi Pedalada), both identified later as participants in the kidnapping operation by the reporters and the Uruguayan couple — which surely confirmed the involvement of the Brazilian Government in the Condor Operation. In 1991, through the initiative of Governor Pedro Simon, the State of Rio Grande do Sul officially recognized the kidnapping of the Uruguayans and compensated them for this, inspiring the democratic government of the President Luis Alberto Lacalle in Uruguay to do the same a year later [19]. Police officer Pedro Seelig, the head of the DOPS at the time of the kidnapping, was identified by the Uruguayan couple as the man in charge of the operation in Porto Alegre. When Seelig was denounced to the Brazilian Justice, Universindo and Lílian were in prison in Uruguay and they were prevented from testifying against him. The Brazilian policeman was then cleared of all charges due to alleged lack of evidences. Lilian and Universindo’s later testimony also proved that four officers of the secret Uruguayan Counter-information Division – two majors and two captains – took part in the operation under consent of the Brazilian authorities[20]. One of these officers, Captain Glauco Yanonne, was himself responsible for torturing Universindo Dias in the DOPS headquarters in Porto Alegre [21]. Even though Universindo and Lilian recognized the Uruguayan military men who had arrested and tortured them, not a single one of them was prosecuted by the Justice in Montevideo. This was due to the Law of Impunity which guaranteed amnesty to all Uruguayan people involved in political repression. The investigative journalism of the Veja Magazine awarded Cunha and Scalco with the 1979 Esso Prize, the most important prize of the Brazilian Press [22]. Hugo Cores, a former Uruguayan political prisoner who was living in São Paulo at the time of the kidnapping and was the author of the anonymous phone call to Cunha, spoke the following to the Brazilian press in 1993: “All the Uruguayans kidnapped abroad, around 180 people, are missing to this day. The only ones who managed to survive are Lilian, her children, and Universindo”[23].
The kidnapping of the Uruguayans in Porto Alegre entered into history as the only failure with international repercussion in the whole Operation Condor, among several hundreds of clandestine actions from the Latin America Southern Cone dictatorships, who were responsible for thousands of killed and missing people in the period between 1975 and 1985. Analyzing the political repression in the region during that decade, the Brazilian journalist Nilson Mariano estimates the number of killed and missing people as: 297 in Uruguay, 366 in Brazil, 2,000 in Paraguay, 3,196 in Chile and 30,000 in Argentina[24]. The so-called “Terror Files” (Portuguese: “Arquivos do Terror”) – a whole set of 60,000 documents, weighting 4 tons and making 593,000 microfilmed pages which were discovered by a former Paraguayan political prisoner Marti Almada, in Lambare, Paraguay, in 1992 – provides even higher numbers: the total result of Southern Cone Operation Condor had left up to 50,000 killed, 30,000 missing and 400,000 arrested[25]. [edit] Chile When Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998 in response to Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón’s request for his extradition to Spain, information concerning Condor was revealed. One of the lawyers who asked for his extradition talked about an attempt to assassinate Carlos Altamirano, leader of the Chilean Socialist Party: it was claimed that Pinochet met Italian terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie during Franco’s funeral in Madrid in 1975 in order to have Altamirano murdered.[26] But as with Bernardo Leighton, who was shot in Rome in 1975 after a meeting the same year in Madrid between Stefano Delle Chiaie, former CIA agent Michael Townley and anti-Castrist Virgilio Paz Romero, the plan ultimately failed. Chilean judge Juan Guzmán Tapia eventually established a precedent concerning the crime of “permanent kidnapping”: since the bodies of victims kidnapped and presumably murdered could not be found, he deemed that the kidnapping was deemed to continue, rather than to have occurred so long ago that the perpetrators were protected by an amnesty decreed in 1978 or by the Chilean statute of limitations. Ironically, the perpetrators’ success in hiding evidence of their crimes frustrated their attempts to escape from justice.[citation needed] [edit] General Carlos Prats General Carlos Prats and his wife were killed by the Chilean DINA on September 30, 1974 by a car bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where they lived in exile. In Chile the judge investigating this case, Alejandro Solís, definitively terminated the prosecution of Pinochet for this particular case after the Chilean Supreme court rejected a demand to revoke his immunity from prosecution in January 2005. The leaders of DINA, including chief Manuel Contreras, ex-chief of operation and retired general Raúl Itturiaga Neuman, his brother Roger Itturiaga, and ex-brigadeers Pedro Espinoza Bravo and José Zara, are accused in Chile of this assassination. DINA agent Enrique Arancibia Clavel has been convicted in Argentina for the murder. [edit] Bernardo Leighton Bernardo Leighton and his wife were severely injured by gunshots on October 5, 1976 while in exile in Rome. According to the National Security Archive and Italian attorney general Giovanni
Salvi, in charge of former DINA head Manuel Contreras’ prosecution, Stefano Delle Chiaie met with Michael Townley and Virgilio Paz Romero in Madrid in 1975 to plan the murder of Bernardo Leighton with the help of Franco’s secret police.[27] [edit] Orlando Letelier Another target was Orlando Letelier, a former minister of the Chilean Allende government who was assassinated by a car bomb explosion in Washington, D.C. on September 21, 1976. His assistant, Ronni Moffitt, a U.S. citizen, also died in the explosion. Michael Townley, General Manuel Contreras, former head of the DINA, and Brigadier Pedro Espinoza Bravo, also formerly of DINA, were convicted for the murders. In 1978, Chile agreed to hand over Townley to the US, in order to reduce the tension about Letelier’s murder. Townley, however, was freed under the witness protection program. The US is still waiting for Manuel Contreras and Pedro Espinoza to be extradited. In an article published 17 December 2004 in the Los Angeles Times, Francisco Letelier, the son of Orlando Letelier, wrote that his father’s assassination was part of Operation Condor, described as “an intelligence-sharing network used by six South American dictators of that era to eliminate dissidents.” Augusto Pinochet has been accused of being a participant in Operation Condor. Francisco Letelier declared, “My father’s murder was part of Condor.” Michael Townley has accused Pinochet of being responsible for Orlando Letelier’s death. Townley confessed that he had hired five anti-Castro Cuban exiles to booby-trap Letelier’s car. According to Jean-Guy Allard, after consultations with the terrorist organization CORU’s leadership, including Luis Posada Carriles and Orlando Bosch, those elected to carry out the murder were Cuban-Americans José Dionisio “Bloodbath” Suárez, Virgilio Paz Romero, Alvin Ross Díaz, and brothers Guillermo and Ignacio Novo Sampoll.[28][29] According to the Miami Herald, Luis Posada Carriles was at this meeting that decided on Letelier’s death and also about the Cubana Flight 455 bombing. [edit] Operación Silencio Operación Silencio (Operation Silence) was an operation to impede investigations by Chilean judges by removing witnesses from the country, starting about a year before the “terror archives” were found in Paraguay. In April 1991 Arturo Sanhueza Ross, linked to the murder of MIR leader Jecar Neghme in 1989, left the country. According to the Rettig Report, Jecar Neghme’s death was carried out by Chilean intelligence agents [30]. In September 1991 Carlos Herrera Jiménez, who killed trade-unionist Tucapel Jiménez, flew away.[31] In October 1991 Eugenio Berríos, a chemist who had worked with DINA agent Michael Townley, was escorted from Chile to Uruguay by Operation Condor agents, in order to escape testifying in the Letelier case. He used Argentinian, Uruguayan, Paraguayan and Brazilian passports, raising concerns that Operation Condor was not dead. In 1995 Berríos was found dead in El Pinar, near Montevideo (Uruguay), his murderers having tried to make the identification of his body impossible.
In January 2005, Michael Townley, who now lives in the USA under the witness protection program, acknowledged to agents of Interpol Chile links between DINA and the detention and torture center Colonia Dignidad, [4] which was founded in 1961 by Paul Schäfer, a Nazi, arrested in March 2005 in Buenos Aires, and since convicted on charges of child rape. Townley also revealed information about Colonia Dignidad and the Army’s Bacteriological Warfare Laboratory. This last laboratory would have replaced the old DINA’s laboratory on Via Naranja de lo Curro street, where Michael Townley worked with the chemical assassin Eugenio Berríos. The toxin that allegedly killed Christian-Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva may have been made in this new lab in Colonia Dignidad, according to the judge investigating the case. [edit] U.S. Congressman Edward Koch In February 2004 John Dinges, a reporter, published The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (The New Press, 2004). In this book he reveals how Uruguayan military officials threatened to assassinate US Congressman Edward Koch (later Mayor of New York City) in mid-1976. In late July 1976, the CIA station chief in Montevideo received information about it, but recommended that the Agency take no action because the Uruguayan officers (among them Colonel José Fons, who was at the November 1975 secret meeting in Santiago, Chile, and Major José Nino Gavazzo, who headed a team of intelligence officers working in Argentina in 1976, where he was responsible for more than 100 Uruguayans’ deaths) had been drinking when the threat was made. In an interview for the book, Koch said that George H.W. Bush, CIA’s director at the time, informed him in October 1976 — more than two months afterward, and after Orlando Letelier’s murder — that “his sponsorship of legislation to cut off US military assistance to Uruguay on human rights grounds had provoked secret police officials to ‘put a contract out for you'”. In mid-October 1976, Koch wrote to the Justice Department asking for FBI protection. None was provided for him. In late 1976, Colonel Fons and Major Gavazzo were assigned to prominent diplomatic posts in Washington, DC, but the State Department forced the Uruguayan government to withdraw their appointments, with the public explanation that “Fons and Gavazzo could be the objects of unpleasant publicity.” Koch only became aware of the connections between the threats in 2001.[32] [edit] Other cases The Chilean leader of the MIR, Edgardo Enríquez, was “disappeared” in Argentina, as well as another MIR leader, Jorge Fuentes; Alexei Jaccard, Chilean and Swiss, Ricardo Ramírez and a support network to the Communist party dismantled in Argentina in 1977. Cases of repression against German, Spanish, Peruvians citizens and Jewish people were also reported. The assassinations of former Bolivian president Juan José Torres and former Uruguayan deputies Héctor Gutiérrez and Zelmar Michelini in Buenos Aires in 1976 was also part of Condor. The DINA entered into contact even with Croatian terrorists, Italian neofascists and the Shah’s SAVAK to locate and assassinate dissidents.[33] Operation Condor was at its peak in 1976. Chilean exiles in Argentina were threatened again, and again had to go underground or into exile. Chilean General Carlos Prats had already been assassinated by the Chilean DINA in Buenos Aires in 1974, with the help of former CIA agent Michael Townley. Cuban diplomats were also assassinated in Buenos Aires in the infamous
Automotores Orletti torture center, one of the 300 clandestine prisons of the dictatorship. These centers were managed by the Grupo de Tareas 18 headed by convicted armed robber Aníbal Gordon, who reported directly to General Commandant of the SIDE Otto Paladino. Automotores Orletti was the main base of foreign intelligence services involved in Operation Condor. One of the survivors, José Luis Bertazzo, who was detained there for two months, identified Chilean, Uruguayan, Paraguayan and Bolivian prisoners who were interrogated by agents from their own countries. It is there that the 19-year-old daughter-in-law of poet Juan Gelman was tortured with her husband, before being transported to Montevideo where she delivered a baby which was immediately stolen by Uruguayan military officers.[34] According to John Dinges’s book Los años del Cóndor Chilean MIR prisoners in the Orletti center told José Luis Bertazzo that they had seen two Cuban diplomats, 22-year-old Jesús Cejas Arias, and 26-year-old Crescencio Galañega, tortured by Gordon’s group and interrogated by a man who travelled from Miami to interrogate them. The two Cuban diplomats, charged with the protection of Cuban ambassador to Argentina Emilio Aragonés, had been kidnapped on August 9, 1976 at the corner of calle Arribeños and Virrey del Pino by 40 armed SIDE agents who blocked the street with their Ford Falcons, the cars used by the security forces during the dictatorship. According to Dinges the FBI and the CIA were informed of their arrest. He quotes a cable sent by FBI agent in Buenos Aires Robert Scherrer on September 22, 1976 in which he mentioned in passing that Michael Townley, later convicted for the assassination on September 21, 1976 of former Chilean minister Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C., had taken part to the interrogatories of the two Cubans. The former head of the DINA confirmed to Argentine federal judge María Servini de Cubría in Santiago de Chile on December 22, 1999 that Michael Townley and Cuban Guillermo Novo Sampoll were present in the Orletti center, having travelled from Chile to Argentina on August 11, 1976, and “cooperated in the torture and assassination of the two Cuban diplomats.” Anti-Castro Cuban terrorist Luis Posada Carriles also boasted in his autobiography, “Los caminos del guerrero”, of the murder of the two young men.[34] [edit] U.S. involvement Further information: U.S. intervention in Chile CIA documents show that the CIA had close contact with members of the Chilean secret police, DINA, and its chief Manuel Contreras.[citation needed] Some have alleged that the CIA’s one-time payment to Contreras is proof that the U.S. approved of Operation Condor and military repression within Chile.[citation needed] The CIA’s official documents state that at one time some members of the intelligence community recommended making Contreras into a paid contact because of his closeness to Pinochet; the plan was rejected based on Contreras’ poor human rights record, but the single payment was made due to miscommunication.[35] A 1978 cable from the US ambassador to Paraguay, Robert White, to the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was published on March 6, 2001 by the New York Times. The document was released in November 2000 by the Clinton administration under the Chile Declassification Project. In the cable Ambassador White reported a conversation with General Alejandro Fretes Davalos, chief of staff of Paraguay’s armed forces, who informed him that the South American intelligence chiefs involved in Condor “[kept] in touch with one another through a U.S.
communications installation in the Panama Canal Zone which cover[ed] all of Latin America”. According to Davalos, this installation was “employed to co-ordinate intelligence information among the southern cone countries”. Robert White feared that the US connection to Condor might be publicly revealed at a time when the assassination in the U.S.A. of Chilean former minister Orlando Letelier and his American assistant Ronni Moffitt was being investigated. White cabled that “it would seem advisable to review this arrangement to insure that its continuation is in US interest.”[citation needed] The “information exchange” (via telex) included torture techniques (e.g. near-drowning, and playing recordings of victims who were being tortured to their families).[citation needed] This demonstrates that the US facilitated communications for Operation Condor, and has been called by J. Patrice McSherry (Long Island Univ.) “another piece of increasingly weighty evidence suggesting that U.S. military and intelligence officials supported and collaborated with Condor as a secret partner or sponsor.”[36] It has been argued that while the US was not a key member, it “provided organizational, intelligence, financial and technological assistance to the operation.”[5] Material declassified in 2004 states that “The declassified record shows that Secretary Kissinger was briefed on Condor and its ‘murder operations’ on August 5, 1976, in a 14-page report from Shlaudeman. ‘Internationally, the Latin generals look like our guys,’ Shlaudeman cautioned. ‘We are especially identified with Chile. It cannot do us any good.’ Shlaudeman and his two deputies, William Luers and Hewson Ryan, recommended action. Over the course of three weeks, they drafted a cautiously worded demarche, approved by Kissinger, in which he instructed the U.S. ambassadors in the Southern Cone countries to meet with the respective heads of state about Condor. He instructed them to express ‘our deep concern’ about ‘rumors’ of ‘plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.'”[6] Ultimately, the demarche was never delivered. Kornbluh and Dinges suggest that the decision not to send Kissinger’s order was due to a cable sent by Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman to his deputy in D.C which states “you can simply instruct the Ambassadors to take no further action, noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.”[37]McSherry, adds, “According to [U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay Robert] White, instructions from a secretary of state cannot be ignored unless there is a countermanding order received via a secret (CIA) backchannel.” [38] Kornbluh and Dinges conclude that “The paper trail is clear: the State Department and the CIA had enough intelligence to take concrete steps to thwart Condor assassination planning. Those steps were initiated but never implemented.” Shlaudeman’s deputy Hewson Ryan later acknowledged in an oral history interview that the State Department was “remiss” in its handling of the case. “We knew fairly early on that the governments of the Southern Cone countries were planning, or at least talking about, some assassinations abroad in the summer of 1976. … Whether if we had gone in, we might have prevented this, I don’t know,” he stated in reference to the Letelier-Moffitt bombing. “But we didn’t.”
[edit] Henry Kissinger Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford administrations, was closely involved diplomatically with the Southern Cone governments at the time and well aware of the Condor plan. According to the French newspaper L’Humanité, the first cooperation agreements were signed between the CIA and anti-Castro groups, fascist movements such as the Triple A set up in Argentina by Juan Perón and Isabel Martínez de Perón’s “personal secretary” José López Rega, and Rodolfo Almirón (arrested in Spain in 2006).[39] On May 31, 2001, French judge Roger Le Loire requested that a summons be served on Henry Kissinger while he was staying at the Hôtel Ritz in Paris. Loire wanted to question Kissinger as a witness for alleged U.S. involvement in Operation Condor and for possible US knowledge concerning the “disappearances” of 5 French nationals in Chile during military rule. Kissinger left Paris that evening, and Loire’s inquiries were directed to the U.S. State Department.[40] In July 2001, the Chilean high court granted investigating judge Juan Guzmán the right to question Kissinger about the 1973 killing of American journalist Charles Horman, whose execution at the hands of the Chilean military following the coup was dramatized in the 1982 Costa-Gavras film, Missing. The judge’s questions were relayed to Kissinger via diplomatic routes but were not answered. [41] In August 2001, Argentine Judge Rodolfo Canicoba sent a letter rogatory to the US State Department, in accordance with the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), requesting a deposition by Kissinger to aid the judge’s investigation of Operation Condor.[42] On September 10, 2001, a civil suit was filed in a Washington, D.C., federal court by the family of Gen. René Schneider, murdered former Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, asserting that Kissinger ordered Schneider’s murder because he refused to endorse plans for a military coup. Schneider was killed by coup-plotters loyal to General Roberto Viaux in a botched kidnapping attempt, but U.S. involvement with the plot is disputed, as declassified transcripts show that Nixon and Kissinger had ordered the coup “turned off” a week before the killing, fearing that Viaux had no chance. As part of the suit, Schneider’s two sons are attempting to sue Kissinger and then-CIA director Richard Helms for $3 million.[43] [44] [45] On September 11, 2001, the 28th anniversary of the Pinochet coup, Chilean human rights lawyers filed a criminal case against Kissinger along with Augusto Pinochet, former Bolivian general and president Hugo Banzer, former Argentine general and dictator Jorge Rafael Videla, and former Paraguayan president Alfredo Stroessner for alleged involvement in Operation Condor. The case was brought on behalf of some fifteen victims of Operation Condor, ten of whom were Chilean.[citation needed] In late 2001, the Brazilian government canceled an invitation for Kissinger to speak in São Paulo because it could not guarantee his immunity from judicial action.[citation needed]
On February 16, 2007, a request for the extradition of Kissinger was filed at the Supreme Court of Uruguay on behalf of Bernardo Arnone, a political activist who was kidnapped, tortured and disappeared by the dictatorial regime in 1976.[46] [edit] The “French connection” French journalist Marie-Monique Robin found in the archives of the Quai d’Orsay, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the original document proving that a 1959 agreement between Paris and Buenos Aires set up a “permanent French military mission” of officers who had fought in the Algerian War, and which was located in the offices of the chief of staff of the Argentine Army. It continued until socialist François Mitterrand was elected President of France in 1981.[47] She showed how Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s government secretly collaborated with Videla’s junta in Argentina and with Augusto Pinochet’s regime in Chile.[48]. The first Argentine officers, among them Alcides Lopez Aufranc, went to Paris to attend two-year courses at the Ecole de Guerre military school in 1957, two years before the Cuban Revolution and when no Argentine guerrilla movement existed.[47] “In practice”, said Robin to Página/12, “the arrival of the French in Argentina led to a massive extension of intelligence services and of the use of torture as the primary weapon of anti-subversive war in the concept of modern warfare.” The annihilation decrees signed by Isabel Peron had been inspired by French texts. During the Battle of Algiers, police forces were put under the authority of the Army, and in particular of the paratroopers, who generalized interrogation sessions, systematically using torture and then disappearances. On September 10, 2003, French Green Party deputies Noël Mamère, Martine Billard and Yves Cochet petitioned for the constitution of a Parliamentary Commission on the “role of France in the support of military regimes in Latin America from 1973 to 1984” before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly, presided by Edouard Balladur. The only newspaper to report this was Le Monde.[49] However, Deputy Roland Blum, in charge of the Commission, refused to hear Marie-Monique Robin, and in December 2003 published a 12-page report described by Robin as being in the utmost bad faith. It claimed that no agreement had been signed, despite the agreement found by Robin in the Quai d’Orsay[50][51] When French Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin traveled to Chile in February 2004, he claimed that there had been no cooperation between France and the military regimes.[52] Reporter Marie-Monique Robin said to L’Humanité newspaper: “The French have systematized a military technique in the urban environment which would be copied and passed to Latin American dictatorships.”[8]. The methods employed during the 1957 Battle of Algiers were systematized and exported to the War School in Buenos Aires.[47] Roger Trinquier’s famous book on counter-insurgency had a very strong influence in South America. Robin said that she was shocked to learn that the French intelligence agency Direction de surveillance du territoire (DST) communicated to the DINA the names of refugees who returned to Chile (Operation Retorno), all of whom were killed. “Of course, this puts the French government in the dock, and Giscard d’Estaing, then President of the Republic. I was very shocked by the duplicity of the French diplomatic position which, at the same time received political refugees with open arms, and collaborated with the dictatorships.”[8]
Marie-Monique Robin also showed ties between the French far right and Argentina since the 1930s, in particular through the Roman Catholic fundamentalist organization Cité catholique created by Jean Ousset, a former secretary of Charles Maurras (founder of the royalist Action française movement). La Cité published a review, Le Verbe, which influenced military officers during the Algerian War, notably by justifying their use of torture. At the end of the 1950s, the Cité catholique established itself in Argentina and set up cells in the Army. It greatly expanded during the government of General Juan Carlos Onganía, in particular in 1969.[47] The key figure of the Cité catholique was priest Georges Grasset, who became Videla’s personal confessor and had been the spiritual guide of the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS) pro-French Algeria terrorist movement founded in Franquist Spain. This Catholic fundamentalist current in the Argentine Army explains, according to Robin, the importance and duration of Franco-Argentine cooperation. In Buenos Aires, Georges Grasset maintained links with Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, founder of the Society of St. Pius X in 1970 and excommunicated in 1988. The Society of Pius-X has four monasteries in Argentina, the largest in La Reja. There, a French priest declared to Marie-Monique Robin: “to save the soul of a Communist priest, one must kill him.” There she met Luis Roldan, former Under Secretary of Religion under Carlos Menem (President of Argentina from 1989 to 1999), who was presented by Dominique Lagneau, the priest in charge of the monastery, as “Mr. Cité catholique in Argentina”. Bruno Genta and Juan Carlos Goyeneche represent this ideology.[47] Argentine Admiral Luis Maria Mendia, who had theorized the practice of “death flights”, testified in January 2007 before Argentine judges that a French intelligence “agent”, Bertrand de Perseval, had participated in the abduction of two French nuns, Léonie Duquet and Alice Domont, who were later murdered. Perseval, who lives today in Thailand, denied any links with the abduction but admitted being a former member of the OAS, and having escaped for Argentina after the March 1962 Evian Accords that ended the Algerian War (1954-62). Referring to Marie Monique Robin’s film documentary titled The Death Squads – the French School (Les escadrons de la mort – l’école française), Luis Maria Mendia asked of the Argentine Court that former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former French premier Pierre Messmer, former French ambassador to Buenos Aires François de la Gorce, and all officials in place in the French embassy in Buenos Aires between 1976 and 1983 be called before the court.[53] Besides this “French connection” he has also accused former head of state Isabel Peron and former ministers Carlos Ruckauf and Antonio Cafiero, who had signed the “anti-subversion decrees” before Videla’s 1976 coup d’état. According to ESMA survivor Graciela Daleo, this is another tactic which claims that these crimes were legitimised by the 1987 Obediencia Debida law, and that they were also covered by Isabel Peron’s “anti-subversion decrees” (which, if true, would give them a veneer of legality, despite torture being forbidden by the Argentine Constitution)[54] Alfredo Astiz also referred before the courts to the “French connection”.[55] [edit] Legal actions Chilean judge Juan Guzman, who had arraigned Pinochet at his return to Chile after his arrest in London, started procedures against some 30 torturers, including former head of the DINA Manuel Contreras, for the disappearance of 20 Chilean victims of the Condor plan.[39]
In Argentina the CONADEP human rights commission led by writer Ernesto Sabato investigated human rights abuses during the “Dirty War”, and the 1985 Trial of the Juntas found top officers who ran the military governments guilty of acts of state terrorism. However, the amnesty laws (Ley de Obediencia Debida and Ley de Punto Final) put an end to the trials until the amnesties themselves were repealed by the Argentine Supreme Court in 2003. Criminals such as Alfredo Astiz, sentenced in absentia in France for the disappearance of the two French nuns Alice Domont and Léonie Duquet will now have to answer for their involvement in Condor. Chilean Enrique Arancibia Clavel was condemned in Argentina for the assassination of Carlos Prats and of his wife. Former Uruguayan president Juan María Bordaberry, his minister of Foreign Affairs and six military officers, responsible for the disappearance in Argentina in 1976 of opponents to the Uruguayan regime, were arrested in 2006. On 3 August, 2007 General Raúl Iturriaga, former head of DINA, was captured in the Chilean town of Viña del Mar on the Pacific coast[56]. He had previously been a fugitive from a five-year jail term, after being sentenced for the kidnapping of Luis Dagoberto San Martin, a 21-year-old opponent of Pinochet. Martín had been captured in 1974 and taken to a DINA detention centre, from which he “disappeared.” Iturriaga was also wanted in Argentina for the assassination of General Prats [56]. According to French newspaper L’Humanité “in most of those countries legal action against the authors of crimes of ‘lese-humanity’ from the 1970s to 1990 owes more to flaws in the amnesty laws than to a real will of the governments in power, which, on the contrary, wave the flag of ‘national reconciliation’. It is sad to say that two of the pillars of the Condor Operation, Alfredo Stroessner and Augusto Pinochet, never paid for their crimes and died without ever answering charges about the ‘disappeared’ – who continue to haunt the memory of people who had been crushed by fascist brutality.”[39]. [edit] See also  History of Argentina  History of Bolivia  History of Brazil  History of Chile  History of Paraguay  History of Peru  History of Uruguay  Dirty War  Amnesty Law  Films depicting Latin American military dictatorships [edit] South American intelligence agencies  DINA DIM  SNI
SIDE [edit] Some participants in Operation Condor  Stefano Delle Chiaie, Italian terrorist, also an alleged operative for Gladio “stay-behind” NATO clandestine structure  Michael Townley, US expatriate, DINA agent involved in Orlando Letelier’s 1976 murder in Washington D.C.  Luis Posada Carriles, a Cuban anti-Castro terrorist who participated in Operation Condor and worked for the Venezuelan DISIP (currently in the US)  Virgilio Paz Romero, who participated to Orlando Letelier’s 1976 assassination and the attack against Bernardo Leighton in Rome[57]  Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (aka Triple A)  Italian secret services [edit] Prominent victims of Operation Condor A few well-known victims of Operation Condor: Martín Almada, educator in Paraguay, arrested in 1974 and tortured for three years Víctor Olea Alegría, member of the Socialist Party, arrested on September 11, 1974 and “disappeared” (head of DINA Manuel Contreras was convicted in 2002 for this crime)  General Carlos Prats, who immediately preceded Pinochet at the head of the Chilean army, assassinated in Buenos Aires in 1974  William Beausire, businessman with dual British and Chilean nationality, abducted in transit in Buenos Aires airport in November 1974, taken to the Villa Grimaldi torture centre in Chile and never seen since[7].  Bernardo Leighton, Christian-Democrat who narrowly escaped murder in Rome in 1975 organized by Italian terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie  Carlos Altamirano, leader of the Chilean Socialist Party, targeted for murder by Pinochet in 1975  Attempted assassination against Emilio Aragonés, the Cuban ambassador in Buenos Aires, in 1975, organized by leader of the CORU, Orlando Bosch  Sheila Cassidy, British physician, arrested in Chile in 1975 and tortured for medical treatment to an opponent of the regime.  Volodia Teitelboim, member of the Communist Party of Chile, targeted for murder alongside Carlos Altamirano, in Mexico in 1976  “Disappearance” of two Cuban diplomats in Argentina, Crecencio Galañega Hernández and Jesús Cejas Arias who transited through Orletti detention center in Buenos Aires (August 9, 1976 – see Lista de centros clandestinos de detención (Argentina)); both were questionned by the SIDE and the DINA, with the knowledge of the FBI and the CIA[58] Andrés Pascal Allende, nephew of Salvador Allende and president of the MIR, escaped assassination attempt in Costa Rica in March 1976  Orlando Letelier, murdered in 1976 in Washington D.C. with his assistant Ronnie Moffitt  US Congressman Edward Koch, who became aware in 2001 of relations between 1970s threats on his life and Operation Condor
 Christian-Democrat and president of Chile from 1964 to 1970 Eduardo Frei Montalva, who may have been poisoned in the early 1980s according to current investigations  former Bolivian president Juan José Torres, assassinated in Buenos Aires in 1976  Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, former Uruguayan deputy, assassinated in Buenos Aires in 1976  Zelmar Michelini, former Uruguayan deputy, assassinated in Buenos Aires in 1976  Carmelo Soria, Spanish diplomat, civil servant of the CEPAL (a United Nations organism), assassinated on July 21, 1976  Jorge Zaffaroni and Maria Emilia Islas de Zaffaroni, maybe members of the Tupamaros, “disappeared” in Buenos Aires on September 29, 1976, kidnapped by the Batallón de Inteligencia 601, who handed them out to the Uruguayan OCOAS (Organismo Coordinador de Operaciones Anti-Subversivas)[59]  Dagmar Ingrid Hagelin, 17-year-old Swedish girl shot in the back by Alfredo Astiz in 1977 and later murdered  Poet Juan Gelman’s son and daughter-in-law (whose baby was stolen by the Uruguayan militaries) [edit] Archives and reports  National Security Archives, a NGO which publicizes the few CIA documents obtained under Freedom of Information Act  “Terror archives”, discovered in 1992 in Paraguay, which permitted opening of prosecution cases against former or active militaries involved in Operation Condor  Rettig Report  Valech Report  Memoriaviva (Complete list of Victims, Torture Centres and Criminals – in Spanish) [edit] Detention and torture centers  Colonia Dignidad, a bizarre and secretive German enclave in activity until 2005, put under state administration end of 2005  Esmeralda (BE-43)  Estadio Nacional de Chile  Villa Grimaldi [edit] Other operations and strategies related to Condor  Operation Colombo, for which Augusto Pinochet was being judged at the time of his death  Caravan of Death, carried on a few weeks after the 1973 coup [edit] Fictional references  Don Winslow’s 2005 book The Power of the Dog is based on the actions and some of the consequences of Operation Condor.
 In DC Comics, the father of the superheroine Fire was a key figure in Operation Condor.[60]  Nathan Englander’s novel The Ministry of Special Cases is set in Buenos Aires in the early 1970s. Its main characters are Kaddish and Lillian, a Jewish couple whose son Pato is disappeared shortly after the Videla junta takes power. Faber and Faber, London, 2007. o Robert Redford http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0073802/ [edit] Bibliography  Stella Calloni, Los años del lobo and Operación Cóndor: Pacto Criminal, Editorial Ciencias Sociales’, La Habana, 2006.  John Dinges, “The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents” (The New Press, 2004)  Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New Press).  Marie-Monique Robin, Escadrons de la mort, l’école française (“Death Squads, the French School”). Book and film documentary (French, transl. in Spanish, Sudamericana, 2002).  J. Patrice McSherry, “Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America” (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005)  Nilson, Cezar Mariano; Operación Cóndor. Terrorismo de Estado en el cono Sur. Lholé-Lumen; Buenos Aires, 1998. o Paredes, Alejandro. La Operación Cóndor y la guerra fría. . Universum. [online]. 2004, vol.19, no.1, p.122-137. ISSN 0718-2376.  Gutiérrez Contreras, J.C. y Villegas Díaz, Myrna. Derechos Humanos y Desaparecidos en Dictaduras Militares, KO’AGA ROÑE’ETA se.vii (1999) – Previamente publicado en “Derecho penal: Implicaciones Internacionales”, Publicación del IX Congreso Universitario de Derecho Penal, Universidad de Salamanca. Edit. Colex, Madrid, Marzo de 1999 Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre prisión política y tortura. Santiago de Chile, Ministerio del Interior – Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2005. [edit] Footnotes and references 1. ^ Victor Flores Olea. “Editoriales – El Universal – 10 de abril 2006 : Operacion Condor”. El Universal (Mexico). http://www.el-universal.com.mx/editoriales/34023.html. Retrieved on 2009-03-24. 2. ^ “Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos”. http://www.pj.gov.py/cdya/index.html. Retrieved on 2007-06-25. 3. ^ J. Patrice McSherry (2002). “Tracking the Origins of a State Terror Network: Operation Condor”. Latin American Perspectives 29 (1): 36–60. 4. ^ “2006: el ocaso de los ―cóndores mayores‖”. La Nación. 2007-12-13. http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias/site/artic/20061212/pags/20061212213006.html. Retrieved on 2007-06-25.
5. ^ “Predatory States. Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America/When States Kill. Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror”. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3821/is_200610/ai_n17195860. Retrieved on 2007-10-24. 6. ^ Condor legacy haunts South America, BBC, June 8, 2005 (English) 7. ^ a b c Abramovici, Pierre (May 2001). “OPERATION CONDOR EXPLAINED — Latin America: the 30 years’ dirty war” (in English). Le Monde diplomatique. http://mondediplo.com/2001/08/12condor. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. (free access in French and in Portuguese) 8. ^ a b c L’exportation de la torture, interview with Marie-Monique Robin in L’Humanité, August 30, 2003 (French) 9. ^ Martín Almada, “Paraguay: The Forgotten Prison, the Exiled Country” 10. ^ “Peru: Socio de Condor”. http://www.johndinges.com/condor/documents/Peru%20and%20Condor.htm. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. 11. ^ Gotkine, Elliott (24 August, 2004). “Vital rights ruling in Argentina” (in English). BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3596316.stm. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. 12. ^ “Brazil looks into Operation Condor” (in English). BBC. 18 May, 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/753436.stm. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. 13. ^ Radiobras Brazilian state website (Portuguese) 14. ^ Brasil examina su pasado represivo en la Operación Cóndor, El Mostrador, 11 May 2000 15. ^ Operación Cóndor: presión de Brizola sobre la Argentina, El Clarín, 6 May 2000 16. ^ CUNHA, Luiz Cláudio. Sucesso de investigação. In: Fernando Molica (ed.) 10 reportagens que abalaram a ditadura. São Paulo: Record, 2005, pp. 117-248. Also see the following issues of VEJA magazine: Oct. 20, 1978; Nov. 29, 1978; Dec. 27, 1978; Jan. 17, 1979; Feb. 15, 1979; Jul. 18, 1979; Oct. 24, 1979; and Jun. 11, 1980 17. ^ CUNHA, Luiz Cláudio. Por que sou testemunha de acusação deste seqüestro. Playboy, No. 52, Nov. 1979, pp. 127-131 e 164-168 18. ^ FERRI, Omar. Seqüestro no Cone Sul. O caso Lílian e Universino. Porto Alegre: Mercado Aberto, 1981. 19. ^ CUNHA, Luiz Cláudio. O seqüestro de Lilian e Universindo – 15 anos depois. A farsa desvendada. Zero Hora, Caderno Especial, Nov. 22, 1993, 8 p. Also see O Seqüestro dos Uruguaios – 15 anos depois. RBS Documento. Video produced and presented by RBS TV, Porto Alegre, November 1993 20. ^ BOCCIA PAZ, Alfredo et al. En los sótanos de los generales. Los documentos ocultos del Operativo Condor, Assunção, Paraguai: Expolibro, 2002, pp. 219-222 21. ^ CUNHA, Luiz Cláudio, Glauco Yanonne. Torturador ganhou um Nobel. Zero Hora, Caderno Especial, Nov. 22, 1993, p. 6. 22. ^ PRÊMIO ESSO DE JORNALISMO, see http://www.premioesso.com.br/site/premio_principal/index.aspx?year=1979 (Portuguese) 23. ^ CUNHA, Luiz Cláudio. Morre o homem que salvou Lílian Celiberti. Zero Hora, Dec. 10, 2006 24. ^ MARIANO, Nilson. As Garras do Condor . São Paulo: Vozes, 2003, p. 234. 25. ^ (10) BOCCIA PAZ, Alfredo et al., op. cit., pp. 229-263; DINGES, John. Os anos do Condor. Uma década de terrorismo internacional no Cone Sul, São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2005, pp. 347-353. For further information on the ‘Arquivos do Terror’, see http://www.unesco.org./webworld/paraguay/documentos.html 26. ^ Las Relaciones Secretas entre Pinochet, Franco y la P2 – Conspiracion para matar, Equipo Nizkor, February 4, 1999 (Spanish) 27. ^ “Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976” (in English). National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm. Retrieved on 2006-12-15.
28. ^ Landau, Saul (20-21 August, 2005). “Terrorism Then and Now” (in English). CounterPunch. http://www.counterpunch.org/landau08202005.html. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. 29. ^ Allard, Jean-Guy (26 March, 2003). “WHILE CHILE DETAINS CONTRERAS… Posada and his accomplices, active collaborators of Pinochet’s fascist police” (in English). Granma. http://www.granma.cu/ingles/mar03/mier26/12posada.html. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. 30. ^ Neghme Cristi Jecar Antonio, Memoria Viva, (Spanish) 31. ^ Sanhueza, Jorge Molina (25 September 2005). “El coronel que le pena al ejército” (in Spanish). La Nación. http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias/site/artic/20050924/pags/20050924223646.html. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. 32. ^ “Ed Koch Threatened with Assassination in 1976” (in English). National Security Archive. 18 February 2004. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB112/index.htm. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. 33. ^ Los crímenes de la Operación Cóndor, La Tercera, 2001. (Spanish) 34. ^ a b Automotores Orletti el taller asesino del Cóndor, Juventud Rebelde, January 3 2006 (mirrored on El Correo.eu.org (Spanish)/(French) 35. ^ “CIA Activities in Chile” (in English). CIA. 18 September 2000. https://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/chile/index.html#10. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. 36. ^ “Operation Condor: Cable Suggests U.S. Role” (in English). National Security Archive. 6 March 2001. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010306/. Retrieved on 2006-12-15. 37. ^ Peter Kornbluh; John Dinges (10 June 2004). “Kornbluh / Dinges Letter to Foreign Affairs”. The National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB125/index.htm. 38. ^ J. Patrice McSherry (Spring 2005). “The Undead Ghost of Operation Condor”. Logos: a journal of modern society & culture. Logosonline. http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_4.2/mcsherry.htm. Retrieved on 2007-06-26. 39. ^ a b c Latin America in the 1970s: “Operation Condor”, an International Organization for Kidnapping Opponents, L’Humanité in English, December 2, 2006, transl. January 1, 2007 40. ^ Henry Kissinger rattrapé au Ritz, à Paris, par les fantômes du plan Condor, Le Monde, May 29, 2001 (French) (mirrored here) 41. ^ [ http://www.guardian.co.uk/pinochet/Story/0,11993,735920,00.html Kissinger may face extradition to Chile], The Guardian, June 12, 2002 42. ^ “Argentina”, written at New York, Washington, London, Brussels, Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, Human Rights Watch, 2002, <http://hrw.org/wr2k2/americas1.html&gt;. Retrieved on 2006-12-15 43. ^ [ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1536547.stm Kissinger accused over Chile plot], BBC News, September 11, 2001 44. ^ [ http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,550375,00.html Kissinger sued over Chile death ], The Guardian, September 12, 2001 45. ^ [ http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/0responses/2005-0743.resp.html Schneider v. Kissinger ], U.S. Department of Justice, June 28, 2005 46. ^ Piden extraditar a Kissinger por Operación Condor, in: La Jornada, 2007-02-16 (in Spanish)[1] 47. ^ a b c d e Argentine – Escadrons de la mort : l’école française, interview with Marie-Monique Robin published by RISAL, October 22, 2004 available in French & Spanish (―Los métodos de Argel se aplicaron aquí‖, Página/12, October 13, 2004 48. ^ Conclusion of Marie-Monique Robin’s Escadrons de la mort, l’école française (French) 49. ^ MM. Giscard d’Estaing et Messmer pourraient être entendus sur l’aide aux dictatures sud-américaines, Le Monde, September 25, 2003 (French) 50. ^ « Série B. Amérique 1952-1963. Sous-série : Argentine, n° 74. Cotes : 18.6.1. mars 52-août 63 ».
51. ^ RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES SUR LA PROPOSITION DE RÉSOLUTION (n° 1060), tendant à la création d’une commission d’enquête sur le rôle de la France dans le soutien aux régimes militaires d’Amérique latine entre 1973 et 1984, PAR M. ROLAND BLUM, French National Assembly (French) 52. ^ Argentine : M. de Villepin défend les firmes françaises, Le Monde, February 5, 2003 (French) 53. ^ Disparitions : un ancien agent français mis en cause, Le Figaro, February 6, 2007 (French) 54. ^ ―Impartí órdenes que fueron cumplidas‖, Página/12, February 2, 2007 (Spanish) 55. ^ Astiz llevó sus chicanas a los tribunales, Página/12, January 25, 2007 (Spanish) 56. ^ a b Claudia Lagos and Patrick J. McDonneln Pinochet-era general is caught, Los Angeles Times, August 3, 2007 (English) 57. ^ Declassified documents available on the National Security Archive website 58. ^ Document dated September 22, 1976, sent by Robert Scherer from the FBI to the US embassy in Buenos Aires, with a copy of a SIDE document concerning the interrogation. In his memoirs, Cuban Luis Posada Carriles qualifies these murders as “successes” in the “struggle against communism”. See Proyecto Desaparecidos: Notas: Operación Cóndor Archives, (Spanish), October 31, 2006 (Retrieved on December 12, 2006) 59. ^ SIDE cable, National Security Archive 60. ^ Rucka, Greg, Defilippis, Nunzio, Weir, Christina (w), Scott, Steve (p), Massengill, Nathan (i). Checkmate 2 (11-12) (March, 2007), DC Comics [edit] External links  Operation Condor on Nizkor’s website  Memoriaviva (Complete list of Victims, Torture Centres and Criminals – in Spanish)  Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America, by J. Patrice McSherry (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) [8]  The Condor Years – How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents  Ed Koch Threatened with Assassination in 1976  Plan Condor on Disinfopedia  Nacimiento del Operativo Cóndor, article in Spanish by Dr Martín Almada on how the enquiry of his case led to the discover of the Lambaré files.  Operation Condor – John Dinges John Dinges is a reporter, author of several books about Operation Condor. He has worked as a correspondent for the Washington Post in South America and is the former director of

NONLETHAL WEAPONS June 1995 Compiled by Joan Hyatt Bibliographer, Air University Library Maxwell AFB, AL

February 17, 2010

NONLETHAL WEAPONS
June 1995
Compiled by Joan Hyatt Bibliographer, Air University Library Maxwell AFB, AL
[BOOKS][DOCUMENTS][PERIODICALS][Back to Bibliography List]
Books
[Return to Top]
Anderberg, MajGen Bengt and Wolbarsht, Myron. Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New Military Age . New York, Plenum Press, 1992. 244p. Low Energy Antipersonnel and Antisensor Laser (LEL) Weapons, pp 139-176. Book call no.: 623.446 A543L
Applegate, Rex. Kill or Get Killed. Boulder, CO, Paladin Press, 1976. 421p. Chemical Munitions for Control of Mobs and Individuals, pp 323-362. Book call no.: 364.4 A648k 1976
Applegate, Rex. Riot Control: Materiel and Techniques. Harrisburg, PA, Stackpole Books, 1969. 320p. Book call no.: 364.4 A648k 1969
Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1994. 431p. Waging Wars with Nonlethal Weapons, by Paul O’Connor, pp 333-344. Book call no.: 355.033073 C4373 Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Magyar_Challenge/PDFs/challenge.pdf
Toffler, Alvin. War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century. Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1993. 302p. Book call no.: 355.02 T644w
U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World. New York, Norton, 1994. 256p. New applications of Nonlethal and Less Lethal Technology, by Richard Garwin, pp 105-131. Book call no.: 327.73009049 U582
Documents
[Return to Top]
AAI Corp. Incapacitating Agent Weapons Technology. Baltimore, MD, 1979. 99p. Doc. call no.: M-U 42492-4
Australia. Royal Australian Air Force. Air Power Studies Centre. Non-Lethal Weapons: Implications for the RAAF. Fairbairn AFB, Australia, 1995. 22p.(Paper No. 38) Doc. call no.: M-U 36760-111
Ehmke, Charles. The Use of Non-Lethal Chemical Agents in Limited Warfare. Maxwell AFB, AL, 1966. 58p.(Air University. Air Command and Staff College. Thesis) Doc. call no.: M-U 35582-7 E33u
Hansen, George. Non-Lethal Gases for Guerrilla Warfare. Maxwell AFB, AL, 1966. 56p.(Air University. Air War College. Professional study) Doc. call no.: M-U 32983 H2492n
Higgins, John. Non-Lethal Chemical Weapons in Counterinsurgency. Maxwell AFB, AL, 1967. 43p.(Air University. Air Command and Staff College. Thesis) Doc. call no.: M-U 35582-7 H636n
Hust, Gerald. Taking Down Telecommunications. Maxwell AFB, AL, 1994. 65p.(Air University. School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Thesis) Doc. call no.: M-U 43998-1a H972t Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS_Theses/SAASS_Out/Hust/hust.pdf
Linder, Jim. Non-Lethal Weapons: Direct Employment Against Non-Combatants in MOOTW. Newport, RI, 1995. 15p.(Naval WAr College. Paper) Doc. call no.: M-U 41662 L744n
Morehouse, David. A New Strategic Era: A Case for Nonlethal Weapons. Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1992. 252p.(U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Thesis) Doc. call no.: M-U 42022 M825n
National Security and the Need for Nonlethal Options by J. B. Alexander. Los Alamos, NM, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1993. 1 vol.(LA-UR-93-285) Doc. call no.: M-U 43813-1 no.93-285
Non-Lethal Weapons and the Future of War. by John Alexander. Los Alamos, NM, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1995. 1 vol.(LA-UR-95-699) Doc. call no.: M-U 43813-1 no.95-699 Potential Non-Lethal Policy Issues. by J. B. Alexander. Los Alamos, NM, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, 1992. 1 vol.(LA-UR-92-3206) Doc. call no.: M-U 43813-1 no.92-3206
Roberts, Clifford. Nonlethal Agents in Limited War. Maxwell AFB, AL, 1966. 44p.(Air University. Air Command and Staff College. Thesis) Doc. call no.: M-U 35582-7 R6432n
Stuck, Monte. Future U.S. Use of Non-Lethal Chemical Agents in Warfare. Norfolk, VA, 1972. 1 vol.(Armed Forces Staff College. Staff study) Doc. call no.: M-U 36185-21 S932f
U.S. Air Force Armament Laboratory. CBU-30/A Incapacitating Munitions Systems. s.l., 1967. 41p.(AFATL-TR-67-178) Doc. call no.: M-U 42025 no.67-178
U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center. Brief Survey of Non-Wounding Anti-Riot Weapons by Renaud de la Taille. Charlottesville, VA, 1980. 13p.(FSTC-HT-1092-79) Doc. call no.: M-U 38479-34 1980 no.1092-79
U.S. Army Research Laboratory. Less-than-Lethal Weapons Development for Law Enforcement. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1993. 46p.(ARL-TR-51) Doc. call no.: M-U 44090-1 no.51
Periodicals
[Return to Top]
Aftergood, Steven. The Soft-Kill Fallacy: The Idea of Non-Lethal Weapons Is Politically Attractive and Purposely Misleading. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50:40-45 Sep-Oct ’94. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9409081585&db=aph
Alderman, Lesley. In Your Face. Money 22:15 Apr ’93. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9303180459&db=aph
Alexander, John. Non-Lethal Weapons Demand Expands as Missions Change. National Defense 80:34-35 Mar ’96.
Alexander, Lexi and Klare, Julia. Nonlethal Weapons: New Tools for Peace. Issues in Science and Technology 12:67-74 Winter ’95-’96. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9601243991&db=aph
Amouyal, Barbara. Use of Nonlethal Weapons May Alter Military Strategy. Defense News 5:7 Nov 19 ’90.
Amouyal, Barbara and Munro, Neil. Labs Rush Nonlethal Arms for Mideast Deployment. Defense News 10:1+ Nov 5 ’90.
Anderberg, Bengt and others. Blinding Laser Weapons and International Humanitarian Law. Journal of Peace Research 29:287-297 Aug ’92. Also available online at: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3433%28199208%2929%3A3%3C287%3ABLWAIH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6
Andrews, Andrew and Alexander, John. Softer Response Required as Global Threats Change. National Defense 78:23-24 Oct ’93.
Arbetter, Lisa. A Pepper Pinch. Security Management 38:14-15 Jun ’94. Use of pepper in security personnel training. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9502011333&db=buh
Army Prepares for Non-Lethal Combat. Aviation Week & Space Technology 138:62 May 24 ’93.
Atwal, Kay and Tapscott, Mark. Non-lethal Laser Rifle Testing at Fort Bragg, Naval Anti-Missile Laser Is Readied for Sea. Defense Electronics 25:18-19 Apr ’93.
Baker, David. Wizard Wars & Air Power in the 21st Century–Part 2. Air International 47:214-217 Oct ’94.
Barry, John. Soon, Phasers on Stun. Newsweek 123:24-26 Feb 7 ’94. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9401317723&db=aph
Capaccio, Tony. Are Vapor Bullets in Air Force Future? Defense Week 16:9 Jan 9 ’95.
Capaccio, Tony. U.S. Commanders State Uses for Non-Lethal Technology. Defense Week 16:3+ Jan 23 ’95.
Cassidy, Peter. Guess Who’s the Enemy. Progressive 60:22-24 Jan ’96.
Cohen, Eliot. The Mystique of U.S. Air Power. Foreign Affairs 73:109-124 Jan-Feb ’94. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9404111579&db=f5h
Cook, Joseph and others. Non-Lethal Weapons Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies. Journal of Legal Studies 5:23-43 ’94-’95. An electronic copy of this article may be viewed by using the AU Library subscription database Lexis/Nexis Academic Universe at the site below: Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/firstsearch/au.htm
Cook, Nick. Russia Leads in Pulse Weapons. Jane’s Defence Weekly 18:5 Oct 10 ’92.
Cooper, Pat. U.S. Tests Nonlethal Weapon Policy in Somalia. Defense News 10:28 Feb 27-Mar 5 ’95.
Cooper, Pat and Opall, Barbara. Perry Plans To Launch Nonlethal Warfare Effort. Defense News 9:6 Sep 19-25 ’94.
Davis, Malcolm. How To Win Wars Without Actually Killing. Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 20:36-37 Apr-May ’94. Research into Electro-magnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons.
Debban, Alan. Disabling Systems: War-Fighting Option for the Future. Airpower Journal 7:44-50 Spring ’93. Also available online at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/debban.html
deBriganti, Giovanni. Lasers, Viruses, May Rule No-Fly Zone Sky. Defense News 9:1+ Feb 7-13 ’94.
DOD To Adopt Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons by Late 1994. Defense Daily 183:301-302 May 25 ’94.
DOD Urged To Adopt Nonlethal Warfare Strategy. Defense Electronics 24:22 Mar ’92.
Donnelly, John. Task Force Endorses Hard Look at Non-Lethal Weapons. Defense Week 16:9+ Jul 3 ’95.
Evancoe, Paul. Non-lethal Alternatives Weighed by Law Officers. National Defense 78:28-30 May-Jun ’94.
Evancoe, Paul. Non-lethal Technologies Enhance Warrior’s Punch. National Defense 78:26-29 Dec ’93.
Evancoe, Paul. Tomorrow’s Weapons of Choice? Military Technology 18:68-71 Jun ’94.
Evancoe, Paul and Bentley, Mark. CVW: Computer Virus as a Technology Weapon. Military Technology 18:38-40 May ’94.
Examples of Nonlethal Weapons. Defense Electronics 24:22 Mar ’92.
Fischetti, Mark. Less than Lethal Weapons (in police equipment). Technology Review 98:14-15 Jan ’95. Also available online at: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1893548&sid=10&Fmt=3&clientId=417&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Fulghum, David. Air Force May Delay JPATS, TSSAM. Aviation Week & Space Technology 141:26-27 Sep 19 ’94.
Fulghum, David. ALCMs Given Nonlethal Role. Aviation Week & Space Technology 138:20-22 Feb 22 ’93.
Fulghum, David. EMP Weapons Lead Race for Non-Lethal Technology. Aviation Week & Space Technology 138:61 May 24 ’93.
Fulghum, David. Smart Weapons To Boost Impact of B-1, B-2 Force. Aviation Week & Space Technology 140:48-49 May 2 ’94.
Fulghum, David. U.S. Weighs Use of Nonlethal Weapons in Serbia If U.N. Decides To Fight. Aviation Week & Space Technology 137:62-63 Aug 17 ’92.
Garwin, Richard. Secret Weapons for the CNN Era. Harper’s Magazine 289:17-18 Oct ’94.
Gips, Michael. Girth Control (stun belts for prisoner control). Security Management 39:11 Jun ’95. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9506291615&db=buh
Goodman, Glenn. Upping the Nonlethal Ante: Pentagon Funds a New Weapons Initiative. Armed Forces Journal International 131:13 Jul ’94.
Goure, Dan. Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America’s Future? Washington Quarterly 16:175-192 Autumn ’93.
Grudowski, Mike. Not-So-Lethal Weapons. New York Times Magazine, pp 40-41, Aug 13 ’95. Police equipment.
Gunther, Judith. The Digital Warrior. Popular Science 245:60-64+ Sep ’94. Also available online at: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=5024649&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=417&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Head, Andy. Laser Protection Concepts. Military Technology 19:17-20+ May ’95.
Hecht, Jeff. Lasers Designed To Blind. New Scientist 135:27-31 Aug 8 ’92.
Herskovitz, Don. Killing Them Softly. Journal of Electronic Defense 16:41-42+ Aug ’93.
Hitchens, Theresa. DOD Nonlethal Effort Fuels Fear of Treaty Violations. Defense News 9:3+ Sep 26-Oct 2 ’94.
Hogg, Ian. World of Insecurity Remains. Jane’s Defence Weekly 22:33+ Nov 12 ’94.
Holt, Pat. Non-Lethal Warfare’s Promises and Problems. Christian Science Monitor 87:19 Aug 3 ’95. A Council on Foreign Relations report: Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9508250575&db=aph
Horgan, John. Bang! You’r Alive. Scientific American 270:22+ Apr ’94.
Hunter, Roger. Disabling Systems for the Air Force. Airpower Journal 8:43+ Fall ’94. Also available online at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/hunter.html
John B. Alexander, Program Manager for Nonlethal Defense, Los Alamos (NM) National Laboratory. Aviation Week & Space Technology 140:19-20 Jan 24 ’94.
Joy to the World. Computerworld 24:72 Dec 24 ’90-Jan 1 ’91. Computer viruses as nonlethal weapons.
Kiernan, Vincent. War Over Weapons That Can’t Kill. New Scientist 140:14-16 Dec 11 ’93.
Knoth, Artur. March of the Insectoids. International Defense Review 27:55-58 Nov 1 ’94.
Lancaster, John. Pentagon, Justice Dept, Set Plans for Sharing Nonlethal Technology. Current News Early Bird, p 4, Mar 23 ’94. Original in: Washington Post, p 3, Mar 23 ’94.
Langreth, Robert. Soft Kill (R & D). Popular Science 245:66-69 Oct ’94. Also available online at: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=5024739&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientId=417&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Less Than Lethal. International Defense Review 27:28-30+ Jul ’94.
Lewer, Nick. Non-Lethal Weapons. Medicine and War 11:78-90 Apr-Jun ’95.
Lorenz, Frederick. Less-Lethal Force in Operation United Shield. Marine Corps Gazette 79:68-76 Sep ’95. Also available online at: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=5024739&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientId=417&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Manley, Harriot. Guide to Self-Defense Devices. Good Housekeeping 216:227 Mar ’93.
Merchant, Julie. Threat Weapons and Weapons Technologies: Implications for Army SOF. Special Warfare 7:32-39 Jul ’94.
Metz, Steven and Kievit, James. The Siren Song of Technology and Conflict Short of War. Special Warfare 9:2-10 Jan ’96.
Morris, Chris and others. Weapons of Mass Protection: Nonlethality, Information Warfare, and Airpower in the Age of Chaos. Airpower Journal 9:15-29 Spring ’95. Also available online at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/morris.html
Morrison, David. Bang! Bang! You’ve Been Inhibited! National Journal 24:758-759 Mar 28 ’92.
Morrison, David. Crime-Fighting 2001. Government Executive 26:42-44 Oct ’94. Also available online at: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=8954783&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=417&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Morrison, David. Robocops. National Journal 26:889-893 Apr 16 ’94. Also available online at: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=5881480&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientId=417&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Morrison, David. War Without Death? National Journal 24:2589 Nov 7 ’92. Neven, Thomas. Nonlethal Weapons: Expanding Our Options. Marine Corps Gazette 77:61-62 Dec ’93.
Nollinger, Mark. Surrender or We’ll Slime You. Wired 3:90+ Feb ’95.
Non-lethal Devices Slice Across Science Spectrum. National Defense 78:25 Oct ’93.
Non-Lethal Weapons: Alternatives to Deadly Force. Futurist 27:20-23 Sep ’93. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9311291682&db=aph
Nonlethal Weapons Give Peacekeepers Flexibility. Aviation Week & Space Technology 137:50-51 Dec 7 ’92.
O’Connell, Edward and Dillaplain, John. Nonlethal Concepts: Implications for Air Force Intelligence. Airpower Journal 8:26-33 Winter ’94. Also available online at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/dil.html
Opall, Barbara. Pentagon Unites Jostle over Non-Lethal Initiative. Defense News 7:6 Mar 2 ’92.
Phasers on Stun. Journal of Policy Analysis & Management 9:94-98 Winter ’90.
Rosenberg, Barbara. Non-Lethal Weapons May Violate Treaties. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50:44-45 Sep-Oct ’94. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9409081586&db=aph
Rosenberg, Eric. Pentagon Memo Seeks To Better Explain Non-Lethal Weaponry. Defense Week 16:5 Mar 6 ’95.
Rothstein, Linda. The Soft-Kill Solution. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50:4-6 Mar-Apr ’94. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9402237527&db=aph
Scott, William. Panel’s Report Backs Nonlethal Weapons. Aviation Week & Space Technology 143:50-51 Oct 16 ’95. The Commission on Roles and Missions Report, 1995.
Serwer, Andrew. Crime Stoppers Make a Killing. Fortune 129:109-111 Apr 4 ’94. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9403257647&db=aph
The Sound of Waco. Journal of Electronic Defense 16:42 Aug ’93. Using sound as a nonlethal weapon.
Starr, Barbara. Pentagon Maps Non-Lethal Options. International Defense Review 27:30-31 Jul ’94.
Sticky ‘Em Up. Maclean’s 108:11 Mar 6 ’95. U.S. Marines use sticky foam in Somalia. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9503067504&db=aph
Stix, Gary. Fighting Future Wars. Scientific American 273:92-98 Dec ’95. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9512034960&db=aph
Tapscott, Mark. Reno Asks Aspin for Non-lethal, Other DOD Weapons To Fight Crime. Defense Electronics 25:8 Dec ’93.
Tapscott, Mark and Atwal, Kay. New Weapons That Win Without Killing on DOD’s Horizon. Defense Electronics 25:41-46 Feb ’93.
Tennenbaum, Abraham and Moore, Angela. Non-Lethal Weapons: Alternatives to Deadly Force. Futurist 27:20-23 Sep-Oct ’93. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9311291682&db=aph
Tigner, Brooks. NATO Eyes Peacekeeping Tools. Defense News 9:4+ Jul 11-17 ’94.
Tillman, Andrew. Weapons for the 21st Century Soldier. International Defense Review 27:34-38 Jan ’94.
Toro, Taryn. Foreign Students in Berlin Urged To Arm Themselves. Chronicle of Higher Education 40:35 Jul 20 ’94. Also available online at: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1574853&sid=13&Fmt=2&clientId=417&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Welsch, Roger. Sticker Shock. Natural History 103:30-31 Oct ’94. A humorous look at non-lethal weapons. Also available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9410115382&db=aph
Williams, Robert. Non-Lethal Devices Slice Across Science Spectrum. National Defense 78:25 Oct ’93.
[Return to Top]
Return to Bibliography List
Last Updated: August 18, 2005

Electronic Mind Weapon ARTICLE List

February 17, 2010

Return to Site Index
Electronic Mind Weapon ARTICLE List
Updated: August 11, 2000
This fine list of electronic mind weapon related articles is courtesy Nancy Buss.
Newspaper & Magazine Articles on MC & NLW
(Users are asked to verify citations.)
Aftergood, Steven: Secrecy and Government Bulletin, Issue 28, Nov.
1993.
Aftergood, Steven: “The soft-kill fallacy,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, pp. 40-45, Sept./Oct. 1994.
Alexander, John B.: “The new mental battlefield: Beam me up
Spock,” Military Review (A US Army Journal) pp. 47-54, Dec. 1980.
The Associated Press: “Mind-altering microwaves: Soviets studying
invisible ray,” Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Sec. A, p. , 22
Nov. 1976. *
Bacon, S.: “Now they’re probing the hidden depths of your mind,”
Popular Mechanics, Vol. 136: pp. 62-65, Aug. 1971.
Barry, John, and Morganthau, Thomas: “Science of war: Nonlethal
weapons,” Newsweek, pp. 24-26, 7 Feb. 1994.
Bartch, Paul: “Neurotransmission.,” Resonance, No. 17: pp. 8-10,
July 1990.
Bearden, Thomas: “An approach to understanding psychotronics,”
DDC (AD-A027866) June 1976.
Beardsley, Tim: “Making waves,” Scientific American, Vol. 268 No.
2): p. 32, Feb. 1993.
Beck, Robert C.: “ELF: Extremely low frequency fields: They
affect us all in ways we may never consciously realize!” Nexus,
Vol. 2 (No. 6): pp. 11-15 & 66-67, Jan./Feb. 1992.
Beck, Robert C.: “Extreme low frequency (ELF) magnetic fields and
EEG entrainment: A psychotronic warfare possibility?” Association
for Humanistic Psychology Newsletter, Apr. 1978 or Biomedical
Research Associates, Los Angeles, CA, 1978.
Besly, Kim: “Electromagnetic pollution: A little known health
hazard. A new means of control,” Preliminary Report, Greenham
Common Woman’s Peace Camp, Inland House, Southbourne, Emsworth,
Hants, England , 1993.
“Biomedical Aspects of Nonionizing Radiation, Naval Weapons
Laboratory (NWL) Dahlgren, VA, Symposium, 10 July 1973.
Blackmon, Janet: “Woman fears government zapping,” Sun Journal,
New Bern, NC, 28 Sept. 1992. (Mildred Cooper)
Boyce, Nell: “Bioterrorism Special Report: Nowhere to Hide,” New
Scientist Vol. : pp ., Mar. 21, 1998.
Brodeur, Paul: “A reporter at large: Microwaves -I and -II,” New
Yorker, 13, 27 Dec. 1976.
Budiansky, Stephen, and Good, Erica, E.: “Orlikow v. US,” US News
& World Report (Investigative Report) Vol. (No.): p. 34, 24 Jan.
1994.
Burrell, Garland E., Jr.: “Mental privacy: An international
safeguard to governmental intrusion into the mental processes,”
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6: pp, 110+,
1975.
Butler, Declan: “Advances in neuroscience may threaten human
rights,” Nature, Vol. 391 (Issue): p. 319, Jan. 1998. *
Butterfield, Fox: “$2.15 million for hidden weapon research,” The
New York Times, Seattle Post Intelligencer, Sec. A-3, Friday, 10
Mar. 1995.
Byrne, Harlan S.: “California microwaves,” Barrons, Vol. 72 (No.
13): pp. 48-49, 30 Mar. 1992.
Cannon, Martin: “Mind control and the American Government,”
Lobster, No. 23, 1993.
Caylor, Ron: “Government working on machine that can read your
mind,” The National Enquirer, June 22, 1976. (article created
sensation)
Chernishev, I.: “Can rulers make ‘zombies’ and control the world?”
Orienteer, pp. 58-62, Feb. 1997.
Collins, Larry: “Mind Control,” Playboy, January 1990.
Coupland, Robin M.: “Non-lethal weapons: Precipitating a new
arms race? Medicine must guard against its knowledge being used
for weapon development,” British Medical Journal, Vol. 315: p. 72,
12 July 1997.
Crary, David: “Soldiers recount most memorable Iraqi surrenders,”
Associated Press The Daily Commercial, Mar. 1, 1991.
DeBoskey, Bruce H.: “Nonionizing radiation: Hidden hazards,”
Trial Magazine, Vol. 26, (No. 8): pp. 32-36, Aug. 1990.
De Caro, Chuck: “Washington: The zap gap: The Soviets may be
ahead of us in the development of radio-frequency weapons,”
Atlantic Monthly, pp. 24-28, March 1987. *
DeLeno, Steven: “Electronic Concentration Camp”,
“Disabling people and electronics,” Microwave News, Jan./Feb.
1996. *
DoD, Intel agencies look at Russian mind control technology
claims,” Defense Electronics, July 1993.
Dodgen, Larry: Nonlethal weapons,” US News & World Report, Vol.
(No.): p. 5, Aug. 4, 1997.
Dornheim, M.A.: “USAF studying brainwaves to increase crew
performances,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 20: pp.
18+, Feb. 1986.
Doswald-Beck, Louise and Cauderay, Gerald C.: “The development of
new antipersonnel weapons,” International Review of the Red Cross,
Vol. 279 , 1 Nov. 1990.
Edwards, D.D.: “Cells haywire in electromagnetic field?” Science
News, Vol. 133: pp. 216, 2 Apr. 1988. (work of W.R. Adey)
Edwards, D. D.: “ELF: The current controversy,” Science News,
Vol. 131: pp. 107-109, 14 Feb. 1987.
“Electromagnetic fields: New-wave coverage issues,” Best’s
Review, 1991.
Elliott, Dorinda, and Barry, John: “A subliminal Dr. Strangelove.
Mind: Using the power of hidden suggestions, this Russian
Scientist (Igor Smirnov) tries to rewire the brain,” Newsweek, p.
57, 22 Aug. 1994.
“Emerging threat
“Expert meeting on certain weapon systems and on implementation
mechanisms in international law,” Report of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland, May 30 – June 1,
1994 (issued July 1994).
“Final Report on Biotechnology Research Requirements for
Aeronautical Systems through the Year 2000,” Vols. I and II,
Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, TX, 1982.
“From Russia with love.At Los Alamos?” Intelligence Report: Parade
Special Supplement, 1993?
“German workshop on mechanisms of EMF interactions,” Microwave
News, Nov./Dec. 1991.
Glenn, J.C.: “Conscious technology: The co-evolution of mind and
machine,” Futurist, Sept./Oct. 1989.
Herron, Robert (Maj.): “Electronic Warfare: New priority for next
generation fighters,” Aerospace America, p. 64, 1984.
Hough, Warren: “High tech civilian control studied: Secret
Pentagon – DOJ Memo of Understanding, `Nonlethal’ weapons under
development are being added to the government arsenal in its war
against its own citizens,” The Spotlight, p. , July 31, 1995. *
Hutchison, Michael: MegaBrain Report: The Psycho-technology
Newsletter
Keeler, Anna: “Remote mind control technology,” Full Disclosure,
Vol. 15: pp. 1-14, 1989. Also published in Mike Coyle’s MindNet
Journal, Vol. 1 (No. 23a: Part I & No. 23b: Part II); and in
Resonance, No. 23: Part I: pp. 3-14, Feb. 1993 & No. 24: Part II:
pp. 3-16, May 1992. *
Kelly, Jack A. and Conway, Joseph: “Nonlethal weapons: Emerging
requirements for security strategy,” Insitute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, May 1996.
Kempster, Norman: “Sci-fi comes true: Mind reading machine tells
secrets of the brain,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 20, 1976. *
Krawczyk, Glenn: Nexus, Vol. 2 (No. 22); pp., Oct./Nov. 1994.
Krawczyk, Glenn: “Big brother’s recipe for ‘Revolution in Military
Affairs'”, Nexus, pp. 31-36, June/July 1995. *
Lopez, Ramon: “Special operations survive Pentagon budget
constraints,” International Defense Review, Vol. 26 (No. 3): p.
247, 12 Dec. 1994.
MacGregor, R.J.: “A brief survey of literature relating to
low-intensity microwaves on nervous function,” RAND Report,
R-4397, June 1970.
MacGregor, R.J.: “A direct mechanism for the direct influence of
microwave radiation on neuroelectric function,” RAND Report
R-4397, June 1970. (“The electrical component of microwave
radiation induces transmember potentials in nerve cells and thereby
disturbs nervous function and behavior.”)
MacKenzie, Debora: Bioterrorism Special Report: Bioarmageddon,”
New Scientist, Vol. Sept. 19, 1998.
Maddox, J., et al.: “”, Nature, Vol. 334 (No. ): 287-, 1988.
Mann, Paul: “Mass weapons threat deepens worldwide,” Aviation
Week & Space Technology, Vo.. 144 (No. 25): p. 58, 17 June 1996.
Manning, Jeane: “Electronic telepathy devise” (unnamed source,
from Angels Don’t Play This HAARP)
Martin, Harry V., and Caul, David: “Mind control,” (A 13-part
series) The Napa Sentinel, Napa, CA 1995.
Matthews, Owen: Report: “Soviets used top secret ‘psychotronic’
weapons,” Moscow Times, Sec. 750, 11 July 1995.
McAuliffe, Kathleen: “The mind fields,” Omni Magazine, pp.
258-267, Feb. 1985.
McKinney, Julianne: “Microwave harassment and mind control
experimentation,” Unclassified, Vol. IV (No. 3) Parts I & II: 20
pgs., June/July 1992. *
Merritt, J. H., et al.: “Some biological effects of microwave
energy directed at the head,” (Unpublished and unclassified
abstract circulated to conference participants. Conference was
sponsored by the DoD Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center)
19??. (See Steneck, Nicholas: The Microwave Debate, p.)
Metz, Steven, and Keivit, James: “The revolution in military
affairs and conflict short of war,” Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI), US Army War College, US Government Printing Office (No.
1994-504-111/00089) July 25, 1994. (references to mind
manipulation)
Michrowski, Andrew: “Covert ELF warfare,” Specula (formerly pub.
as The Journal of the American Association of Metascience) p. 27,
Jan./Mar. 1980.
“Microwave measurements,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol.
144 (no. 18): p. 73, 29 Apr. 1996.
Microwave News, May/June 1988.
“Military on nonlethal weapons: A very attractive option,”
Microwave News, Nov./Dec. 1993.
“The Mind Control Papers,” Freedom News Journal, 1980. (ISBN:
0-915509-35-3)?
“Mind-reading computer,” Futurist, p. 49, May/June 1992.
Mintz, John: “The secret’s out: Covert E-Systems, Inc. covets
commercial sales,” The Washington Post, p. A-1, A-10, 24 Oct.
1994.
Mizrach, Steve: “Electromagnetic effects on human behavior,”
MindNet Journal, Vol. 1 (No. 82) July 1996. *
Mollick, Ethan: “A gentler war: The debate over non-lethal
weapons,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 18 (No. 4): p.46,
Fall 1996.
Morrison, David C.: “Sites unseen: A sketch of the Pentagon’s
secret ‘black’ bases used for stealth aircraft, special operations,
and electronic eavesdropping programs emerges from a National
Journal study,” National Journal (Defense Report) pp. 1468-1472,
June 4, 1988. *
Opall, Barbara: “US experts: Focus arms control goals,” Defense
News, p. 6, 24-30 Nov. 1997.
Opall, Barbara: “US explores mind control technology,” Defense
News, pp. 4, 29, Jan. 11-17, 1993. *
Opall, Barbara: “US, Russia hope to safeguard mind-control
techniques,” Defense News, p. 4, 11-17 Jan. 1993.
Page, J.: “Tuning in on brainwaves,” Science, Vol. 5: pp. 88+,
Oct. 1984.
Pasternak, Douglas: “Wonder weapons: The Pentagon’s quest for
nonlethal arms is amazing. But is it smart?” US News & World
Report (Special Report), Vol. 123 (No. 1): pp. 38-46, July 7,
1997. *
Pengelley, Rupert: “Wanted: A watch on non-lethal weapons,”
International Defense Review, Vol. 24 (No. 4): p. 1, 1 Apr. 1994.
“Perry plans to launch nonlethal warfare”, Defense News, Sept.
19-25, 1994.
Persinger, Michael A.: “On the possibility of directly accessing
every human brain by electromagnetic induction of fundamental
algorithms,” MindNet Journal, Vol. 1 (No. 65) June 1995.
Pool, Robert: “Electromagnetic fields: The biological evidence,”
Science, Vol. 249: pp. 1378-1381, 21 Sept. 1990.
Posner, Michael I.: “Seeing the mind,” Science, Vol. 262: pp.
673-674, 29 Oct. 1993.
Possony, Stefan: “Scientific advances hold dramatic prospects for
phy-strat,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, July 1983.
Ray, J.: “The body magnetic,” Buzzworm, Vol. 4: p. 22, Sept./Oct.
1992.
Ricks, Thomas E.: “Nonlethal arms: New class of weapons could
incapacitate foe yet limit casualties,” The Wall Street Journal,
pp. A1 & A4, Jan. 4, 1993. *
Rosenberg, Barbara Hatch: “Non-lethal weapons may violate
treaties,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, pp. 44 – 45,
Sept. – Oct. 1994. (Note: Rosenberg gives the full name of this
treaty as “Convention on prohibition or Restriction of the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.”)
Schmitt, Eric: “Zany new weapons for US team in Somalia,”
International Herald Tribune, 16 Feb. 1995.
Schmitz, Tom: “California’s Livermore weighs plan to use Russian
technology,” The Journal of Commerce, April 8, 1993. *
Selden, Gary: “Machines that read minds,” Science Digest, Oct.
1981.
Sharp, Joseph C. et al.: “Generation of acoustic signals by pulsed
microwave energy,” IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and
Techniques, May 1974.
Shorto, Russell: “Armageddon: Killing them softly,” Gentlemen’s
Quarterly, March 1995. *
“Still under wraps” Aviation Week and Space Technology, pp. 35+,
June 7, 1993.
Sweetman, Sherri: Report on the Attorney General’s Conference on
Less than Lethal Weapons, US Dept. of Justice, National
Institute of Justice, March 1987.
Thomas Timothy: “The mind has no firewall,” Parameters: US Army
War College Quarterly, Vol. 28 (No. 1): pp. 84-92, Spring 1998. *
Tigner, Brooks: “NATO panel to consider nonlethal weapon
guidelines,” Defense News, p. 14, 29 Sept. 1997.
Tigner, Brooks: “Europeans protest US ionospheric research,”
Defense News, p. 3, 16-22 Feb. 1998.
Tyler: IN: Dean, David J. (ed.): Low-intensity Conflict and
Modern Technology, Air University Press, USAF, Center for Aerospace
Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell AFB, AL, June 1986. *
“US Nullifies Nuremberg Law,” Earth Island Journal, p. 18, Winter
1996-97. *
Victorian, Armen: “The military use of electromagnetic, microwave,
and mind control technology,” Lobster, No. 34: pp 2-7, Winter
1998. (Also published in Resonance, No., Apr. 1998)
Victorian, Armen: “Mind reading computer,” Time Magazine, 1 July
1974.
Victorian, Armen: “Neural manipulation by remote radar,”
Resonance, No. 30: pp. 25-28, March 1996. (Also published in
Lobster No. 30) *
Victorian, Armen: “Psychic warfare and nonlethal weapons”
Walker, Martin: “Dark dreamer of Star Wars,” 5 May 1995.
Wall, Judy: “Electromagnetic weapons,” Resonance, No. 29: pp
27-33, May 1995. *
Wall, Judy: “Military use of mind control weapons,” Nexus, pp.
11 – 16, Oct. – Nov. 1998. (Unedited version originally
published in Resonance, No. 33, April 1998. *
Wall, Judy: “Synthetic telemetry,” Resonance No. 29: pp. 17 – 26,
May 1995. *
Weiner, Malcolm H., Chairman: “Nonlethal technologies: Military
options and implications”, Report of an independent task force
sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations released June 22,
1995.
Wright, Steve: “An appraisal of technologies for political
control,” European Parliament Scientific and Technological Options
Assessment (STOA) Luxembourg, European Parliament, 6 Jan. 1998.
* = On file
Return to Site Index


PHASERS ON STUN

February 17, 2010

SOON, ‘PHASERS ON STUN’
The Science of War: A new generation of nonlethal weapons may help rout mobs, subdue gunmen, even win wars without killing the innocent
Newsweek, Feb. 7, 1994 John Barry in Washington with Tom Morganthau in New York.
FACED WITH A MOB OF stone-throwing women and children whose ragged ranks concealed one or more snipers, Pakistani troops on a U.N. peace-keeping mission in Mogadishu last June opened fire and killed about 20 unarmed civilians which was probably just what Somalias rebel warlords hoped the Pakistanis would do. In Haiti last October, the mere threat of a dockside confrontation with a gang of gun-toting toughs was enough to prevent the landing of small force of U.S. military advisers. Then there’s the tragic finale ofthe FBI’s standoff with the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas — which suggests that the problems of maintaining law and order without bloodshed are by no means confined to the Third World.
But what if U.S. or U.N. forces and what if the FBI had an arsenal of tricky, new-tech weapons that could rout a mob, find and subdue hidden gunmen or fill an enemy fortress. With a potent but harmless tranquilizer? What if American Globocops could keep the peace fight future wars without killing or injuring civilians? The possibility of a new generation of nonlethal weapons is now attracting serious attention at the Pentagon and. since the Waco tragedy, at the U.S. Department of Justice as well. And while we have not arrived at the point when U. S. troops can “set phasers on stun,” like Capt. James Kirk of the Starship Enterprise, the era of nonlethal armaments is closer than most civilians realize. “The world is changing and our military’s role is changing,” says Dan Goure of Washington’s center for strategic and International Studies.”The capabilities they have don’t seem to match the new roles we see out there. There is a growing sense we need new tools.”
The search for new “tools” has spawned the first systematic effort to develop non-lethal weapons in U.S. military history. Newsweek has learned that in the wake of Somalia, Defense Under Secretary John Deutch has authorized a team of Pentagon officials to explore the feasibility of nonleathal weapons (NLWs) and the exotic technologies behind them. This team, headed by Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s director of tactical systems, aims to set up priority programs for NLWs that could be funded as early as 1995. The likely first choice, according to Newsweek sources, is a riot gun that would fire tiny beanbags. Beanbags should be safer than rubber bullets which can be lethal at close range, but they would still knock a man down.
According to a small but fervent group of visionaries who have been touting NLWs for years, this homely innovation may contain the seeds of military revolution. Non-lethals have a long history in warfare the ancient Greeks used smoke to conceal troop
movements around 425 B.C. — but they have almost always been used to help warriors kill and destroy. This is begining to change — primarily, as Goure says, because great powers like the United States need new options to control rougue governments and insurrectionaries without resorting to total war. On the first night of operation Desert Storm for exarnple, the U.S. Navy launched cruise missiles that showered electrical generating plants around Baghdad with millions of tiny carbon filaments. These filaments disabled Iraq’s air-defense system without damaging the plants themselves. “We wanted to defeat Iraq, not destroy it,” says Air Force Col. John Warden, commandant of the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, in Montgomery, Ala. (Later airstrikes with conventional bombs, however, reduced the turbine halls to rubble.)
Warden and other new-wave military thinkers say that the list of exotic technologies that could be harnessed for nonlethal weapons is already large and growing. It includes lasers, microwaves, sound waves, strobe lights, electromagnetic pulses, microbes, chemicals, computer viruses — even giant nets. Potentially these seem to offer U.S.forces new options across the whole range of missions, from crowd control to a strategic shutdown of an entire nation. Beanbag bullets, chemical sprays and noise generators would be handy against hostile crowds. Other technologies, like “super-caustic” chemicals that eat through metal or rubber or plastic, would disable not only tanks and trucks but virtually any machine. The most devastating would be electromagnetic pulses, high-powered microwaves and computer viruses that, by disabling all electrical and electronic systems, could cripple a whole society.
Some are simply weird. Consider two nonlethal weapons developed at Sandia National Laboratories, a top-secret government research facility in Albuquerque, N.M . These NLWs, which could have helped a lot in Haiti or Somalia, were originally designed to protect U.S. nuclear warheads in army and air force storage bunkers. Sandia experts were asked to consider the possibility that terrorists might one day invade such a bunker and hold the warheads themselves hostage. “One false move,” the terrorists could say, “and we contaminate the continent.”
This is a particularly tricky problem, since no one wants use guns or explosives around a nuclear warhead. The Sandia solution, now being peddled to U.S. law-enforcement agencies, for use against criminals and rioters was to come up with two very strange types of foam. One foam is supersticky: intruders would be drenched in a substance that, exposed to the air turns into taffylike glue. The other creates an avalanche of very dense soap bubbles that would leave the terrorists unable to hear, see or move, although they would still be able to breathe. Either way, the bad guys would be immobilized until the foams were dissolved and no one would fire a shot.
‘Slick’ems’: Other researchers developed chemical compounds that do much the samething to vehicles. Known as slick’ems and stick’ems, these chemicals make pavements either too sticky or too slippery for tanks and trucks to move. Then there are nets,metallic shrouds for tanks and trucks, filament nets for people. Fired in canisters about the size of large soda bottle, these nets pop open overhead, then fall to trap the target.
Or take beam weapons. A staple of science fiction fra the time of H. G. Wells, “ray guns” are military reality mostly as laser-aiming devices to allow precision targeting of conventional explosives, but also as defensive weapons that can dazzle the pilot of an attacking plane or blind the optics in an enemy tank’s gun sight. Los Alamos Laboratory has tested the prototype of a laser rifle, and there are unconfirmed reports of large-scale Army experiments with similar guns. So types of lasers can burn holes in metal or human flesh, which means they can destroy and kill. And unlike conventional firearms laser can be tuned to lower energy pulses that could produce a knockout blow. As a result, though no one says the day is near — U.S. soldiers may someday hear order to set their laser rifles on “stun.”
Behind the new interest in nonle weapons stands an unlikely cast of characters — a husband-and-wife team of science-fiction writers, a former deputy director of the CIA and an intellectually eclectic millionaire, among others. The science-fiction writers, Janet and Christopher Morris of Hyannisport, Mass., spent years noodling about the concepts of nonlethal warfare. By the late ’80s their ideas had a certain following among a group that included Ray Cline, the CIA’s deputy director for intelligence in the 1960s, and John Alexander, a former Green Beret colonel who is now at Los Alamos. Alexander met the Morrises and their work attracted Cline. It also attracted support from Malcom Wiener, a New York-based millionaire and an influential member of New York’s Council on Foreign Relations. After a series of seminars and skull sessions that widened the net of participants, Cline got appointment with George Bush to promote nonlethals.
Their appointment, sheduled for the day Iraq invaded Kuwait, never happened and the NLW initiative marked time for the next two years. But its visionary possibilities gradually attracted men like Dick Cheney, Bush’s secretary of defense, and by the time Bill Clinton took office in January 1993, a rough consensus had formed. It got a boost, bureaucratically speaking, from e FBI’s debacle in Waco. Newsweek has learned that the FBI considered and rejected exotic nonlethal technologies for use against David Koresh and his followers. Sources tell Newsweek that the FBI consulted Moscow experts on the possible use of a Soviet technique for beaming subliminal messages to Koresh. The technique uses inaudible transmissions that could have convinced Koresh he was hearing the voice of God inside his head. The air force offered a top secret nonlethal system that, according to one source, “would have given [the FBI] the ability to make a surprise attack with a large number of agents.”
None of this was used, of course, and in he aftermath of the tradgedy, Attorney General Janet Reno asked the Pentagon and the CIA to join her department in a search for nonleathal technologies that could be used by both the military and civilian law enforcement. “The problem is not a shortage of promising technologies,” says David Boyd, director of science and technology at the National Institute of Justice. “My sense is that a lot of what’s in the labs could be fielded pretty quickly and cheaply.”
The result now is what Pentagon officials describe as a low-key, pragmatic program to develop useful NLW’s within the next three to five years. Technical glitches may eliminate many of the gizmos that already on the drawing boards of various government
labs, But even assuming technologies can be made to work, there are large practical problems that inhibit use of nonlethal weapons in the real world. One is international law: most chemical and biological weapons are banned by treaty. Another is adapting military training doctrines to less-than-lethal warfare. A third is the risk that the attempt to use NLWs could backfire. How will Congress and the public react, some skeptics ask, if U.S. troops in a future Haiti or Somalia get shot while trying to catch rioters with nets? Even more ominous, others warn, is possibility that terrorists might turn nonlethal weapons against the United States. A drawback of some NLWs, like computer viruses, is that complex societies are more vulnerable to disruption.
Beanbags: Still, U.S. troops will someday use NLWs to control a hostile mob like one the Pakistanis faced in Mogadishu last year — and the scenario is fascinating. They might use sound barriers, strobe lights and beanbag rounds to rout the mob. They might use surveillance drones equipped with magnetometers to sense the presence of snipers rifles, and stickyfoam or nets to catch the men with guns. They could use slick’ems and stick’ems against the Somali “technicals,” a knockout gas against the warlords’ headquarters. If the rebels use a radio transmitte broadcast anti-U.N. propaganda, the U.S. Air Force already has a flying transmitter that can replace the warlords message with one that supports the peacekeepers. If the Somalis station snipers in buildings, the Russians have a radar system that can look through walls and spot them. And the laser rifle with its dual power setting — one for “stun” and the other for kill — is somewhere down the road. Take a message to Mohammed Aidid, Scotty: tell him the Entereprise is here.
New Age Arsenal [sidebar] The Pentagon is developing some strange technologies and even stranger gizmos. AIRCRAFT. High-power lasers disorient enemy pilots and disable cockpit displays. Aerosol-delivered liquids suddenly turn metal brittle. TROOPS. Sound generator produces noise to the pain level; on-board widget protects crew. Red and blue strobe lights nauseate unfriendly crowds. Hideously awful smells immobilize troops; aerosol mists draw disengagement lines. The world’s largest flash bulb temporarily blinds onlookers. TANKS. High-powered microwaves fuse radios and destroy electronic guidance systems of artillery shells. Nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse zaps radios, computers and lighting circuits. TRUCKS. Microbes eat engine hoses, belts, electrical insulation. “Pyrophoric” particles burn out engines when drawn into air intakes; “slick’em” and “stick’em” sprays make roads impassable. Compounds turn diesel fuel and gasoline into jelly.
|Back to MC:TT&P Home|

Neural Interfaces

February 17, 2010

Neural Interfaces
Resistance Manifesto | February 27, 2006
Neural Interface (electrodes wired directly into the brain)
Neural Interfaces A Neural Interface is any type of data link between the human nervous system and an external device, such as an electronic or hybrid computer or machine. Such links allow the transmission of information to and from the human nervous system to the external devices. Bioelectric signals are obtained from the body or brain via implanted electrodes or computer chips and are converted from an analog to a digital format. Early innovations with Neural Interfaces allowed users to control cursors, play video games, or control electronic devices such as robots. Amputees will also be able to use Neural Interfaces to control advanced prostheses. At the Palo Alto Rehabilitation Research and Development Center, developers have working on the Nerve Chip, a device that provides a direct interface to peripheral nerves within an amputee’s nerve stump and detects electrical signals able to control prosthetic limbs. Such devices will no doubt be a benefit to the physically handicapped, allowing them greater mobility and control over their environment. One such benefit specifically highlighted is by using Neural Interfaces to obtain control signals from undamaged sensor-motor areas of the brain to control neuroprosthetic devices (such as artificial arms or wheelchairs) so that paralyzed people can regain certain motor functions. But, once Neural Interfaces have reached the complexity and capability of controlling the emotions, memories, and thoughts of people connected to such devices, the potential for abuse is limitless. It‟s been admitted that the CIA has been involved with Satanic experiments and research involving brainwashing and torture. Many of the Nazi scientists who experimented on mind control in Germany were secretly brought into the U.S. under Project Paper Clip, where their work continued. (See Mind Control) The findings and devices that have come out of such research which has been made public, only begin to expose the depths of these Satanic experiments on unknowing and unwilling subjects. These devices play an intimate role in the Beast‟s system of slavery as Neural Interfaces open the door to the last sacred place on earth, the human mind. Physicist Stephen Hawking, for example, believes that we should “develop as quickly as possible technologies that make possible a direct connection between brain and computer, so that artificial brains contribute to human intelligence rather than opposing it.”(#1) The mysterious creator of the Georgia Guidestones alluded to the combination of man and machine in the 1980s, saying, “We suggest that scholars throughout the world begin now to establish new bases upon which later generations can develop a totally new universal language for men and machines. It will be adapted to our speech mechanism and to the language faculties and patterns impress in our nervous systems. Its spoken and printed forms will capable of accurate interchange by electromechanical means.” (Christian, Robert – Common Sense Renewed [1986] p. 14-15) (See Georgia Guidestones) History of Neural Interfaces Dr. Jose Delgado, a neurophysiologist at Yale University in the 1960s carried out experiments involving Electronic Stimulation of the brain and by implanting a small electrode in the brain of animals and using a device he called a stimoceiver, which operated by FM radio waves, he was able to
electrically control a wide range of emotions in his subject. In his book Physical Control of the Mind, Dr. Delgado said in the early 70‟s: “The technology for nonsensory communication between brains and computers through the intact skin is already at our fingertips, and its consequences are difficult to predict. In the past the progress of civilization has tremendously magnified the power of our senses, muscles, and skills. Now we are adding a new dimension: the direct interface between brains and machines. Although true, this statement is perhaps too spectacular and it requires cautious clarification. Our present knowledge regarding the coding of information, mechanisms of perception, and neuronal bases of behavior is so elemental that it is highly improbable that electrical correlates of thoughts or emotions could be picked up, transmitted, and electrically applied to the suitable structure of a different subject in order to be recognized and to trigger related thoughts or emotions. It is, however, already possible to induce a large variety of responses, from motor effects to emotional reactions and intellectual manifestations, by direct electrical stimulation of the brain. Also, several investigators have learned to identify patterns of electrical activity (which a computer could also recognize) localized in specific areas of the brain and related to determined phenomena such as perception of smells or visual perception of edges and movements. We are advancing rapidly in the pattern recognition of electrical correlates of behavior and in the methodology for two-way radio communication between brain and computers.” (Delgado, Jose – Physical Control of the Mind p. Page 95 – 96) Delgado acknowledge people expressed fears that this new technology was a threat to possible unwanted and unethical remote control of the cerebral activities of man by other men, but wrote this danger is quite improbable and is outweighed by the expected clinical and scientific benefits. The Washington Post reported in 2003 that scientists in North Carolina had built a brain implant that lets monkeys control a robotic arm with their thoughts, marking the first time in history that mental thoughts and intentions had been harnessed and were able to move a mechanical object and perform various tasks such as grabbing objects and adjusting the grip.(#2) The researchers no doubt had in mind that soon the technology would be able to help people who had been paralyzed or had spinal cord injuries by enabling them to operate machines with their thoughts as naturally as others do with their hands. It was also planed that paralyzed people could have movement to their own arms or legs restored. The scientists also planned that the technology would soon allow soldiers to control wireless robots which will be used during war and for other operations. (See Terminators) Neurobiologist Miguel Nicolesis from Duke University Medical Center in Durham, North Carolina and his colleagues had been able to demonstrate the recording and analysis of brain waves and the ability to decipher different signals from different animals. These advanced experiments, led by Miguel A.L. and published in the journal PLoS Biology, were more examples of progressions of science fiction-like studies, in which animals and humans had learned to use their brain and thoughts to operate external mechanical devices. Until Nicolesis‟ achievements, such interactions had been limited to making a cursor move on a computer screen or other non-mechanical type operations. Later came the creation of the system where monkeys could consciously control the movement of a robotic arm attached to a Neural Interface. The researchers implanted hundreds of electrodes the diameter of human hairs into areas of the brains of rhesus macaque monkeys that were known to produce signals which control the movement of various muscles and limbs. The signals from the electrodes were downloaded and analyzed by a computer in order to develop recognizable patterns of signals which represented particular movements by the monkey‟s arm. Surgery The surgeries were painstaking, taking nearly 10 hours. The monkeys had bundles of wires protruding from their heads and had
glue used to fill in the bits of missing bone in their skulls. When asked about the abuse of the monkeys, Nicolelis insisted they liked the experiments saying, “If anything, they’re enjoying themselves playing these games. It enriches their lives,” he said. “You don’t have to do anything to get these guys into their chair. They go right there. That’s play time.” He added. “It’s quite plausible that the perception is you’re extended into the robot arm, or the arm is an extension of you,” agreed the University of Washington’s Fetz, a pioneer in the field of brain-controlled devices. Then, in 2005 the BBC reported that a robot arm controlled by a Neural Interface created at the University of Pittsburgh was fully mobile from the shoulder and elbow and had a gripper that works like a hand. “It moves much like your own arm would move.” Said Dr Andrew Schwartz of Pittsburgh University. But before long, the scientists said, they would upgrade the system so that the users could transmit their mental commands to machines wirelessly. “For something basic like grasping a cup of coffee or brushing your teeth, apparently you could do almost all of this with this kind of prosthesis,” said Idan Segev, director of the center for neurocomputation at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.(#3) Testing on Humans John P. Donoghue, a neuroscientist at Brown University had been developing a similar system for paralyzed patients saying one of the first benefits of the interface would be the ability of people to type and communicate on the Internet by simply thinking. The list of potential applications is endless. “Once you have an output signal out of the brain that you can interpret, the possibilities of what you can do with those signals are immense,” said Donoghue co-founder of Cyberkinetics Inc. of Foxboro, Massachusetts. Nicolelis and others persued approval from the Food and Drug Administration to do experiments on humans. Human tests have already shown corresponding patterns of brain signals linked to limb movements. The algorithm sends the messages from the brain to the robotic arm, which carries out the actions the monkey intended to perform with its own limbs. The monkeys in the experiment were able to grasp and hold food with the robotic arm, while their real arms were restrained. “We can use the population vector to accurately predict the velocity and direction of normal arm movement,” said Dr Schwartz. “It moves much like your own arm would move” he added. Dr Schwartz said his team was working to develop prosthesis with realistic hand and finger movements. A Foxborough, Massachusetts-based company called Cyberkinetics built a Neural Interface system named BrainGate which allowed the user to control a Pong paddle, draw with a cursor, operate a TV, and open email.(#4) Cyberkinetics is only one of several labs working on Neural Interfaces, and many of them are funded by more than $25 million in grants from the U.S. Department of Defense, which is currently working on such systems being implemented with soldiers. (See Terminators) In March 2005, Cyberkinetics announced a user with BrainGate was capable of turning on a TV and could change the channels. Depression Implant It is widely reported that nearly 10% of Americans suffer from depression, and the widespread drugging of the population has resulted from such claims, aiding the pharmaceutical industry while sedating the population. In February 2005, the FDA conditionally approved a Neural Interface system to treat chronic depression.(#5) The system targets the Vagus Nerve and is called VNS Therapy, and consists of a pacemaker-like device which is
implanted under a person‟s chest which gives electrical impulses to the brain through an electrode connected to a nerve in the person‟s neck. Cyberonics has sold a similar device for reducing seizures in people with epilepsy. It costs about $20,000 including surgical and hospital expenses, said Cyberonics Chief Executive Skip Cummins. The FDA said approval was conditional on final labeling, protocols for a post-marketing dosing study, as well as resolution of manufacturing issues and any outstanding clinical trial issues. On June 2004, an FDA advisory panel voted 5-2 to recommend approval of the device for chronically depressed patients who had failed other treatments. The agency, however, turned down the company’s application earlier in August. Cyberonics then submitted an amended application, hoping to overcome FDA concerns about the device’s safety and effectiveness for relieving severe depression. Side effects of the device include hoarseness and throat tingling. The device is the only product Cyberonics sells. Annual sales are about $110 million. The company said it is building its organization to support a potential late 2005 launch of the product for depression. Military Applications Published documents from the Department of Defense show that in the mid 1990s plans were being drawn up to use Neural Interfaces, not only on our troops, but on the civilian population as outlined in Chapter 4 of Information Operations: A New War-Fighting Capability contained in Volume 3 of Air Force 2025 by the U.S. Department of Defense (1996). Air Force 2025 is a report on a study conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense which identified the technologies and practices that will need to be implemented by the year 2025, in order for the United States to “remain the dominant air and space force in the 21st century.” Of course, an element of that technology is Neural Interfaces. “The implanted microscopic brain chip performs two functions. First, it links the individual to the IIC creating a seamless interface the user and the information resources. In essence, the chip relays the processed information from the IIC to the user, second the chip creates a computer generated mental visualization based upon the user‟s request.” (p. 35) And what is the key reason for supporting the implant able brain chip? Security, of course. “An implanted microscopic chip does not require security measures to verify whether the right person is connected to the IIC, whereas a room, helmet, or sunglasses requires additional time-consuming access control mechanisms to verify and individual‟s identity and level of control within the Cyber Situation.” (p. 35) This document published in 1996 foresaw resistance to such ideas citing, “Implanting „things‟ in people raises ethical and public relations issues. While these concerns may be founded on today‟s thinking, in 2025 they may not be as alarming” and goes on to say, “The civilian populace will likely accept an implanted microscopic chips that allow military members to defend vital national interests.” (p. 36) Aside from military applications, Information Operations describes possible commercial uses. “This capability will have extraordinary commercial applications from medical advances. These advances will help restore patients with damaged neural, audio, and visual systems as well as enable them to achieve the ultimate virtual reality trip.” (p. 25) The documents actually say, „ultimate reality trip‟ pointing to the use of uploading information into the human mind in the form of the five senses by being physically connected to the system. Types of Neural Interfaces Electrooculogram (EOG) Signals are obtained from eye movements with sensors that are in contact with the skin on a user’s face. Electrical signals are generated by movements of the eyeballs, which then radiate throughout the facial skin and are captured by sensors.
Electromyogram (EMG) Signals are obtained from muscle movements with sensors that are placed on the skin. The contracting and relaxing of muscles produces electrical signals that are detected by sensors. Electroencephalogram (EEG) Signals are obtained from brainwaves with sensors located on a user’s scalp. Electrocardiogram (EKG) Signals are obtained from the heart, allowing devices to respond to changing heart rates. Neural Electrode Signals are obtained directly from active neurons using electrodes. Neural electrodes provide a two-way data transmission between mind and machine. Resist Neural Interfaces Neural Interfaces are dangerous to say the least. Paralleled with other medical advances and benefits, such as helping the handicapped, are dangers that until recently have only been discussed in a science fiction context. With the incremental expansion of technology and the creation of Hybrid Computers, we are approaching the end of mankind‟s scientific achievements. (See Hybrid Computers) The nightmare scenarios that are unfolding all point to the fig tree blossoming as the Beast‟s system gains strength. Besides the technology that is made known and available to the public, one wonders what is actually being hidden from the public view and scrutiny. With military technology decades ahead of the publics, many wonder what kind of hybrid technology is being held in secret. What is it capable of? What is it doing right now? What will it do in the coming years? What will this technology ultimately do to mankind as the Beast system consumes the world? With much of the New World Order‟s policies discussed and decided in secret, it is only logical that large scientific breakthroughs and experiments are concealed with the same kind of secrecy. Do not accept a Neural Interface for “enhancement” purposes. Whether a member of The Resistance who is handicapped or has a medical condition requiring a Neural Interface and accepts it, is a personal decision, but be careful. This is dangerous territory. Forced Neural Interfaces in prisons will likely replace medication and rehabilitation therapy. Our mind is the last safe place on Earth, and now even that is under attack. Power to the Resistance! # 1 InformationWeek Sep 5, 2001 Stephen Hawking Warns of „Terminator‟-Style Menace by David M. Ewalt # 2 Washington Post October 13, 2003 Monkeys Control Robotic Arm With Brain Implants By Rick Weiss # 3 BBC Feb. 18, 2005 Brain-controlled ‘robo-arm’ hope: Scientists in the US have created a robotic arm that can be controlled by thought alone. Michelle Roberts # 4 Wired Magazine March 2005 Issue 13.03 Mind Control by Richard Martin # 5 Reuters: Feb 3, 2005 US OKs Cyberonics depression implant-shares

Neurophone

February 17, 2010

The key to the Neurophone® GPF-1011 DSP is the stimulation of the nerves of the skin with a digitally coded signal that carries the same time-ratio code that is recognized as sound by any nerve in the body.
The Neurophone® was invented by Dr. G. Patrick Flanagan in 1958 when he was 14 years old. It is a precision scientific instrument with an extensive digital signal processor that encodes sound and modulates it onto ultrasonic signals. Patrick was a child prodigy in electronics, chemistry and physics. He had discovered an entirely new way to transmit sound into the human brain. Patrick’s profound invention has received two United States patents, #3,393,279 and #3,647,970. It took medical science 33 years to discover how the device works.
It has been said that great inventions take 50 years before they are understood. In 1991, Martin Lenhardt of the University of Virginia discovered that human beings have the ability to detect ultrasonic sound when it is transmitted through the skin, bones and liquids of the body. His groundbreaking discovery was published in the prestigious journal Science, Vol. 253, 5, 1991, 82. Lenhardt had duplicated Patrick’s original 1958 Neurophone® using sophisticated ultrasonic transducers and discovered that a tiny organ in the inner ear that is normally associated with balance is also a hearing organ for ultrasonic sound.
The organ is called the saccule and is about the size of a pea. It contains nerve endings, called macula, and an otolith, a gelatinous cap containing fine sand-like particles of calcium carbonate called otoconia. When the head is tilted in relation to gravity, the macula signals the vestibulocochlear nerve in the nervous system so that balance can be regained. The saccule has nerve endings that are distributed throughout the brain. Some of these nerves go to the area of the brain that computes sound. Other nerves are distributed into areas concerned with long-term memory. The Neurophone® transmits modulated ultrasonic sound at 40,000 cycles per second (40 kHz). When we swim with dolphins or whales, we can hear the ultrasonic energy emitted by these mammals through our saccule. By using the Neurophone®, we can train our brain pathways so that we can “hear” through the saccule pathway. It may be that our ancestors could communicate with whales and dolphins by the use of ultrasonic sound. When the Neurophone® is used as an experimental listening device, these pathways are developed and appear to expand consciousness balancing the left and right hemispheres of the brain.
People who have used the Neurophone® daily over an extended time find that it helps to relieve stress and imparts a feeling of well-being.
The GPF-1011 DSP Neurophone® has been developed and engineered to provide a means for ultrasonic waves to be interpreted by our brain as “hearing”. The technology bypasses the normal audio mechanisms used by the body to hear sound and provides a direct neural stimulation directly to the brain. By bypassing the ears to hear- reading, meditating, studying and learning in general may become easier to comprehend and retain.
Generally, commercial digital speech recognition circuitry is based on a technology called dominant frequency power analysis. While speech may be recognized by such a circuit, a more effective and natural speech encoding is based on time ratios. If the phase of the frequency power analysis circuits are not correct, they will not work. The intelligence (sound) is carried by phase information. The frequency content of the voice gives our voice a certain quality, but frequency does not contain information. Most attempts at computer voice recognition and voice generation are only partially successful. Until digital time-ratio encoding is used, our computers will never be able to truly talk to us. By recognizing and using time-ratio encoding, we could transmit clear voice data through extremely narrow bandwidths.
If the Neurophone® transducers are placed on the closed eyes or on the face, the sound can be clearly ‘heard’ as if it were coming from inside the brain. When the transducers are placed on the face, the sound is perceived through the trigeminal nerve. There was an earlier test performed at Tufts University that was designed by Dr. Dwight Wayne Batteau, one of my partners in the United States Navy Dolphin Communication Project. This test was known as the “Beat Frequency Test”. It is well known that sound waves of two slightly different frequencies create a ‘beat’ note as the waves interfere with each other. For example, if a sound of 300 Hertz and one of 330 Hertz are played into one ear at the same time, a beat note of 30 Hertz will be perceived. This is a mechanical summation of sound in the bone structure of the inner ear. There is another beat, sounds beat together in the corpus callosum in the center of the brain. This binaural beat is used by the Monroe Institute and others to simulate altered brain states by entraining (causing brain waves to lock on and follow the signal) the brain into high alpha or even theta brain states. These brain states are associated with creativity, lucid dreaming and other states of consciousness otherwise difficult to reach when awake. The Neurophone® is a powerful brain entrainment device. If we play alpha or theta signals directly through the Neurophone®, we can move the brain into any state desired. Batteau’s theory was that if we could place the Neurophone® transducers so that the sound was perceived as coming from one side of the head only, and if we played a 300 Hertz signal through the Neurophone®, if we also played a 330 Hertz signal through an ordinary headphone we would get a beat note if the signals were summing in the inner ear bones. When the test was conducted, we were able to perceive two distinct tones without beat. This test again proved that Neurophonic hearing was not through bone conduction.

NEW WORLD VISTAS

February 17, 2010

NEW WORLD VISTAS
Looking toward
the Future,
Learning from the Past
LT COL DIK DASO, USAF
OVER FIVE DECADES ago, the Army Air Forces initiated the first technology forecast in military his-tory. The report, Toward New Horizons, was written by a team of 31 scientists— all experts in their fields—led by Dr. Theodore von Kármán, the eccentric California Institute of Technology (CalTech) aerodynamicist. Since this first science and technology (S&T) study, the US Air Force has sponsored a major S&T study once each decade. It has been five years since the commencement of the most recent study, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century. Looking back at the yearlong study reveals much about the evolution of the Air Force over the past 60 years.
At the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) building in Washington, D.C., on 10 November 1994, Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall approached the podium be-fore an audience of scientists, Air Force personnel, and at least two historians to deliver her opening remarks for the 50th anniversary gathering of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). She spoke of the émigré Hungarian aeronautical scientist, Kármán, and a career Army Air Forces officer, General of the Air Force Henry “Hap” Arnold, who came together under the pressures of World War II and formed the Scientific Advisory Group
(SAG), the forerunner of the SAB, in the fall of 1944. The SAG’s purpose was to forge a de-tailed plan, a blueprint for the future development of the Army Air Forces. The group was to travel the world, investigate all possible roads of inquiry, and determine how best to pursue new technologies and build a superior air force. Through the spring and summer of 1945, this group of scientists traveled to Germany, England, Japan, the Soviet Union, and many countries in between searching for the finest minds and most advanced laboratories that had, on occasion, nearly tipped the scales of victory in favor of the Axis. The preliminary report, Where We Stand, and the final report, Toward New Horizons, became the blueprints for the building of the scientific and technological infrastructure of today’s Air Force.
The secretary’s references to Arnold and Kármán were nothing new. In fact, every time any major Air Force S&T study had been initiated over the past five decades, eloquent speakers had evoked the words and deeds of the two architects of American air su-
67
68 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 1999
Arnold awards Kármán the Meritorious Civilian Service Award for his workonToward New Horizons, February 1946.
1
premacy. This occasion turned out to be no different from times past. As she spoke, Dr. Widnall’s voice—determined, comfortable, clear, and focused—challenged Dr. Gene Mc-Call and his 1994 Scientific Advisory Board to “rekindle that inquisitive attitude” initiated by Kármán’s group some 50 years earlier. McCall was challenged to write a report in the Kármán tradition. The report, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, was completed on 15 December 1995, exactly 50 years after Kármán’s report was placed on General Arnold’s desk.
New World Vistas, formally delivered during a senior staff briefing in the secretary’s conference room in the Pentagon, was more like Kármán’s first report than any of the others
that had been written each decade following Toward New Horizons. This was not an accidental occurrence. There were similarities that reflected a cognizance of history, and there were differences that reflected the evolution of science, technology, and society in this country over the past five decades.
This article relates some of my observations as the historian attached to the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. Then I will make a few comparisons between the first Kármán study and the latest McCall study.
My association with the SAB began as an outcropping of dissertation research. In 1993, at the suggestion of Duane Reed, of the US Air Force Academy Special Collections Branch, I embarked upon a biographical study of General Arnold and Dr. Kármán. In
NEW WORLD VISTAS 69
the summer of 1994, I contacted Col Timothy Courington, executive director of the SAB, to arrange to attend the 50th anniversary gathering of the SAB that November. It is my opinion now, as it was after that initial November meeting, that Colonel Courington was the driving force behind the SAB’s routine smoothness and today deserves much of the credit for the successful accomplishment of the 1995 McCall report. His reflective, casual, assured approach to most issues impressed every member of the SAB. If there is a silent hero in this story, it is undoubtedly Tim Courington, now retired from the US Air Force.
While in Washington that November, I had the opportunity to interview several of the SAB members, both past and present. It was a researcher’s dream come true. In the same room sat two original SAG members, several past SAB chairmen, many retired USAF officers who had dealt directly with the SAB at all levels, the most outstanding being Gen Bernard Schriever and Gen Lew Allen Jr. General Arnold had participated in Schriever’s wedding, and Kármán worked for him when he directed the development of the USAF intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) pro-gram. Allen was a former Air Force chief of staff and after retirement had directed the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), the same organization founded by Kármán in the Arroyo Seco of California in the late 1930s. Other no-tables were Dr. Ivan Getting, the father of the global positioning system (GPS); Dr. Court Perkins, a masterful storyteller and former chief scientist of the Air Force; Mr. Chet Hasert, a Kármán student, European companion, and original SAG member; and Dr. Ed-
ColTim Courington, at right, welcomes Dr.Richard Hallion, Air Force historian, and Gen Ronald Fogleman, Air Force chief of staff, to the 50th anniversary celebration of the Scientific Advisory Board, November 1994.
70 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 1999
Dr.EdwardTeller, Dr.Gene McCall, and Dr.Court Perkins during the awards ceremony at the 50th anniversary gathering ward Teller, coinventor of the “dry” hydrogen bomb that made the ICBM a practical weapon. General Arnold himself even appeared as an “apparition” from the balcony at the banquet in the NAS that night as part of the entertainment program.
The keynote speaker for the symposium was Secretary of Defense William Perry. Although Vice President Al Gore was supposed to kick off the afternoon session, last-minute priorities canceled his appearance. In any event, interest in the Scientific Advisory Board was and remains keen within the federal government.2
During early November, Dr. Widnall and The Arnold “apparition”in the balcony at the NAS that the Air Force chief of staff Gen Ronald Fogleevening
man (trained in history at Duke University)
NEW WORLD VISTAS 71
formally issued their “New World Vistas” challenge to the SAB in a two-page memo dated 29 November 1994. This sequence was reminiscent of a legendary Arnold/Kármán meeting at LaGuardia Airport back in August 1944. It was at that meeting that Arnold convinced Kármán to write the first S&T forecast for the Army Air Forces. Kármán accepted the challenge, but it was not until 7 November that Arnold got around to putting his re-quest down on paper. My point in recounting these events is to demonstrate that the origins of New World Vistas were steeped in the realization and recognition of historical events and Air Force traditions—traditions that began before the Air Force became an independent service. The study itself was to be guided by principles similar to those that Kármán used in the first report. The 16 speeches
Gen Ronald R.Fogleman addressed the SAB members, past and present, at the gathering at the NAS on 10 November 1994.
given at the 50th anniversary symposium throughout that November day traced the chronology of the SAB and were not only in-formative but at times nostalgic.3 Further, the NAS setting, near a supersized statue of Albert Einstein, helped set an atmosphere of inspiration and imagination for several of the SAB members.
During the first week of February 1995, Dr. McCall finalized plans for the study’s format with Dr. Widnall. She insisted that the report should pursue joint service involvement, simulation, and modeling opportunities and should investigate areas where “explosive rates” of technological change might affect the Air Force. Widnall’s and Fogleman’s November tasking letter quoted Kármán’s directly: “Only a constant inquisitive attitude to-ward science and a ceaseless and swift adaptation to new developments can maintain the security of this nation.”4
Answering the call to proceed immediately, Dr. McCall selected Maj Gen John Corder, USAF, Retired, not a scientist himself,
5
as his deputy. A stark contrast existed be-tween these two men. Corder represented the task-minded side of the New World Vistas lead-
Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E.Widnall enjoyed the formal gathering at the NAS on the evening of 9 November 1994.
72 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 1999
ership. McCall represented the typical scientist: thoughtful, not overly mindful of time schedules, relaxed in the extreme. This pairing was similar to the original SAG’s top two. Kármán had selected Dr. Hugh Dryden, long-time chairman of the National Bureau of Standards, an excellent administrator. Kármán, often introspective and self-described as “always late,” was counterbalanced by the well-organized Dryden.6 The McCall/Corder team held similar balance.
Over the next four months, McCall and Corder selected panel chairmen and held preliminary meetings. By mid-March, the panels were formed (although some changes occurred during the course of the study), and some even met in full session to jump-start the investigation process.
On 10 April, the panel chairmen gathered near Dulles Airport at Westfield’s, a luxury meeting facility. The committee chairs gave a brief summary of their preliminary efforts, and a few outsiders delivered specific briefings designed to broaden ideas on S&T forecasting. Of note were presentations by Dr. Peter Bishop, who discussed “alternative futures.” This was a true “out of the box” attempt at looking toward the future. Dr. Clark Murdock, deputy special assistant to the Air Force chief of staff on long-range planning, also made a presentation, more conventional but still an attempt to open the panel chairmen’s minds to possibilities for envisioning the future. Earlier in the year, John Anderson, a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) long-range planner, had briefed panel chairmen on his “Horizon Mission Methodology,” a “future-to-present” approach to forecasting. The attendees left with an introduction to forecasting that appeared new and far reaching. From my observations, the majority of the panels did not use these methods in their entirety but incorporated portions of them at certain points during the study.
Next, from 2 to 5 May, the SAB general membership meeting took place at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. This meeting, although not specifically designed as a New World Vistas panel workshop, turned out to be one of the most significant events in the yearlong process. Specialists from across the United States, as well as the SAB membership, were invited to participate in working groups that addressed “broad technical and mission areas.”7 It was during this meeting that the 12 New World Vistas panels utilized their time and roughed in preliminary approaches to their specific reports. The rough draft was to be completed by the end of the SAB summer study held in Newport Beach, California, in July—a short three months away. Thus, it was with the help of many nonpanel members— outside of the New World Vistas formal structure—that preliminary ideas for the report were developed and shared.
From 10 to 21 July, the New World Vistas panels convened in the lovely surroundings of Newport Beach. Vistas consisted of six technology panels and six applications panels. The meeting place was the NAS’s Beckman Center in Newport Beach, which had been equipped with a network mainframe linking all of the separate panel computers together. Each room was equipped with laptop computers, and each computer was linked to the other. The idea was to simplify and speed up the final editing process. Compared to the SAG working environment of 50 years earlier, this high-technology atmosphere certainly reflected changes in American society as well as within the scientific community. Kármán’s group worked with slide rules and manual typewriters. There was only one electric type-writer in the Beckman Center, and the only slide rule might have been found in a display case of old scientific paraphernalia.
The New World Vistas study had seven primary objectives:
1. Predict how the explosive rate of technological change will impact the Air Force over the next 10 to 20 years.
2. Predict the impact of these technological changes on affordability.
3. Predict science and technology areas where dual-use defense conversion occurs, industry leads and military follows, and a partnership with industry exists.
4. Predict S&T areas the Air Force will have to develop where no commercial market exists.
5. Offer advice as to whether our lab structure is consistent with the study and what changes, if any, should be made.
6. Offer advice as to whether the current SAB charter is consistent with the findings of the study and what changes, if any, should be made.
7. Evaluate the study in light of how the Air Force contributes to the joint team.
During the length of the study, a World Wide Web page allowed interface directly with the American public. This is, perhaps, the most remarkable aspect of New World Vistas. The vast majority of the report is unclassified. One classified volume that incorporates all of the classified portions of all of the panel’s reports does exist. Kármán’s original study was classified at such a high level that fewer than a hundred copies were distributed, and it remained classified for nearly a decade. Dr. Ivan Getting, also a member of the first SAG study, recalled that the classification of the original report made it nearly useless outside of Air Force circles.8
Inexorable links to the civilian, commercial world precluded any serious thought about a restrictive classification. But the nature of S&T has changed dramatically since 1945. Today, the Air Force is becoming a customer of industrial technology, whereas in the past the Air Force (indeed, the military in general) pushed the technological process.
By the end of July, a firm timetable had been established for finalizing the New World Vistas report. Corder hoped that the report might be finished by the first week in November. Remarkably, all but Dr. McCall’s Summary Volume were in final draft form by Thanksgiving. The 15 December report deadline was rapidly approaching, and those handling the final printing process were working long, hard hours to have the report in its final form for the secretary of the Air Force’s meeting deadline. Completion was just not possible. The Summary Volume had seen several edits during the first week of December amidst stiff
NEW WORLD VISTAS 73
Ivan Getting, father of the global positioning system
discussion by panel members over its content. After some last-minute alterations, the Summary Volume was published in enough quantity to ensure that the secretary of the Air Force and all visiting senior staff members received one. In all fairness, the first draft of the Summary Volume had been released to the panel chairs in August for their comments. It was the difficulty of incorporating the comments from 12 different sources that slowed the Summary Volume’s completion. But the majority of reports had not been published in final form. In fact, the volumes piled upon the briefing table on 15 December were simply the draft copies of the panel reports, nicely bound by Air Force graphics.
Kármán’s report, although placed on Arnold’s desk on 15 December 1945, was only the final draft of the executive summary “Science: The Key to Air Supremacy.” The copy of all 33 sections, in 12 volumes, was not finalized until early spring the following year.
Nonetheless, the process of publicly releasing McCall’s report began with much fanfare on 31 January 1996. Secretary Widnall and Dr. McCall held a national press conference in the Pentagon to explain the purpose of New World Vistas. Dr. Widnall assured re-porters that “this report will not sit on the shelf and gather dust.”9 Prime-time reports
74 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 1999
Left to right, Dr.Edward A.Feigenbaum, Gen Ronald R.Fogleman, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Kaminski, Secretary of the Air Force SheilaWidnall, and Dr.Gene McCall, November 1994
aired that evening on “ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings” and Cable News Network (CNN). Newspapers across the country also carried stories covering the New World Vistas report via United Press International (UPI) and Reuters News Agency press releases. The results of the report are also part and parcel of Air Force 2025, an Air University project that emphasized planning for the future of the Air Force. The multiaxis approach to forecasting in the Air Force—several studies and agencies working long-range planning issues concurrently—was also an Arnold creation. In 1945, Arnold funded the first RAND studies, established the Office of Scientific Liaison headed by Col Bernard Schriever, and established a separate Re-search and Development Directorate headed by Gen Curtis E. LeMay.
As with any forecast, some portions will prove right and some wrong. Kármán’s 1945 report, for example, did not envision the impact of the computer on the Air Force. But then it seemed that few saw a great need for computers in the age of the slide rule. There is a certain irony in the fact that the chief scientist
of the Air Force during the New World Vistas study, Dr. Edward A. Feigenbaum, was a computer scientist. Feigenbaum was the first Air Force chief scientist from that discipline and also New World Vistas chair of the Information Technology Panel.
In regard to the first SAG study in 1945, there were significant long-term impacts on the fledgling Air Force. Eventual “fallout” included (1) establishment of a permanent Scientific Advisory Group in 1946 strengthened by its reorganization in 1948; (2) establishment of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) in 1950; (3) establishment of the Arnold Engineering and Development Center (AEDC) in 1951; (4) creation of the US Air Force Academy in 1956; and (5) establishment of a number of specific development programs, particularly the Air Force ICBM program.10 These were all fruits of Kármán’s intellectual seed. In fact, the institutionalization of science and technology permeating today’s Air Force can trace its origins to Kármán’s two major reports for General Arnold in August and December 1945.
NEW WORLD VISTAS 75
The conclusions drawn in New World Vistas may one day have similar reach as those of Kármán’s first study. Perhaps in a decade we will have an idea of their impact. Following is a summary of these conclusions:
1. There will be a mix of inhabited and uninhabited aircraft. Specifically, the Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) will fill many roles and expand performance into the hypersonic range, enabling strikes anywhere on the globe within minutes.
2. Large and small aircraft will project weapons. “Large” aircraft will be the first to carry directed-energy weapons and, eventually, will carry smaller UCAVs internally, providing intercontinental standoff capability. The roles of this type of vehicle will reach into space as well.
3. We must extend airlift capabilities. Expansion of airlift fleets will need to include “point-of-use” delivery capability. Essentially, this means improving precision airdrop capability to keep up with the increased tempo of operations in any future endeavor. “The problem of airdrop should be treated as seriously as the problem of bomb drop.”
4. The future force will become efficient and effective through the use of information systems to enhance US operations and confound the enemy. Information and space will become inextricably entwined. The human-machine inter-face must also improve as the machines improve. “Information munitions” will become part of the inventory just as laser-guided bombs, infrared missiles, or cruise missiles are today.
5. Space and space systems will become synonymous with effective operations. The protection of our assets and the denial of capabilities to an enemy will be essential.
6. Sensors and information sources will be widely distributed. In the past, there has been a failure to recognize that information originates as data from active and passive sensors. New information systems will correlate data into information much more effectively than before.
Dr. McCall also added a few cautions to those who read only the Summary Volume. First, affordability must not be eliminated from the overall picture. Second, and extremely important, operational components of the Air Force must plan jointly––that is, with “each other, other services, and allies.” The expanding information network should make this easier in time as “internetting of nodes” becomes more and more seamless.
It is also interesting to note a few of the general guidelines that are attached to the end of the second chapter. Two in particular struck me as significant to the ultimate success or failure of this venture. It is important that all Air Force members be aware of these as potential stumbling blocks to the ultimate implementation of recommendations from this report.
1. Identification and development of revolutionary concepts require intuition, in-novation, and acceptance of substantial risk.
2. Most revolutionary ideas will be opposed by a majority of decision makers.11
Clearly, Dr. McCall was suggesting that without bold, creative, high-level leadership, the ultimate success of New World Vistas might be at risk. The implication was that in a massive bureaucratic organization like the Air Force, technological change is dependent upon a certain amount of “out-of-the-box” thinking and acceptance of some failures along the way. Whether Air Force leadership, in light of the constant battle of the budget, can make such a leap remains to be seen.
This brings us back to the historical aspects of this report and a statement made by General Arnold back in 1946:
Successful research, being the product of inspiration, cannot be purchased like a commodity. It is the product of the human mind—of intellectual leadership. . . . All of the funds and facilities devoted to research will be wasted unless at the same time America possesses competent
76 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 1999
intellectual leadership. . . . The proper cultivation of the human mind is the essence of the task.12
The continued evolution of the Air Force as a technological megasystem within the boundaries of a complex American society has been determined by the realities inherent in Arnold’s statement during these past five decades, and it will depend on innovative, command-level leadership for the next five decades.
Arnold’s words might remind us that, although some elements of military technology may change, other elements remain painfully the same. Perhaps it was Kármán who was most prescient when he said, “A report does not make a policy. It depends on the administration.”13 McCall has taken that thought one step further. It is McCall’s opinion that to be effective and successful, this report must be kept alive through several generations of senior Air Force leadership.14 Only time will
Notes
1. For a summary of the first five studies, see Dr. Michael Gorn’s Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944–1986 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force His-tory, 1989). This article is a summary of the author’s observations made during 1995. He was assigned to the SAB staff as a historical advisor for a videotape produced by Air Force Television that documented the history of the SAB and examined the relation-ship of Air Force S&T and its impact upon and relationship to the civilian world. To review Kármán’s 1945 reports to General Arnold in their entirety, see the appendices in Dik Daso, Architects of American Air Supremacy: Gen Hap Arnold and Dr. Theodore von Kármán (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
2. Col Timothy Courington to Dr. John McLucas, memorandum, subject: [Scientific Advisory Board], 18 July 1994, SAB files.
3. The Ancillary Volume of the New World Vistas study contains the 16 speeches, a number of interviews done with many of the study’s participants, as well as several long-term forecast essays written anonymously by members of the New World Vistas panels. New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century: Ancillary Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1995).
4. Memorandum for Lt Gen Richard Hawley, subject: [New World Vistas], 13 February 1995, SAB files.
5. General Corder’s reply to Dr. McCall was excellent. “Wow,” it began, and then expressed a keen awareness of the monumental task at hand while accepting the position. On file in SAB (1994) files.
6. Theodore von Kármán, interview with Shirley Thomas, January 1960, audiotape recording, Indiana University Special Collections.
reveal whether or not McCall’s perceptions and desires for his report will compare favor-ably with Kármán’s prescience. Perhaps Mc-Call’s own words are best repeated here: “Forecasting is not an exact science, and the path will wind as it disappears into the shadow of the future. We guarantee the journey to be productive even if the road ends in an unexpected place.”15
Since the release of New World Vistas in January 1996, the volumes have found their way into Pentagon offices that drive programs— from doctrine to procurement—and into Air Force laboratories where New World Vistas projects lace the working docket—from lasers to special materials programs. To judge the New World Vistas forecast a success or failure after over five years would certainly be pre-mature; however, construction is under way for the future, even if the road’s end is not yet in sight. ■
7. Dr. Gene McCall to SAB members, ad hoc advisors, and invitees, 17 March 1995, SAB files.
8. Dr. Ivan Getting, interview with author, tape, National Academy of Sciences, 9–10 November 1994.
9. Dr. Sheila Widnall, press conference, videotape, Pentagon, 31 January 1996.
10. Teddy Walkowicz, “USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Hap’s Brain Child,” Air Force Magazine, June 1955, 50–54. Walkowicz wrote, “In a very real sense, this report was a product of the intimate friendship, confidence and mutual respect between the soldier and the scientist: Arnold and Kármán. Each explored the other’s mind, and their associates left behind a legacy of imaginative, yet scientifically sound, planning to help insure the qualitative supremacy of American airpower.” The second and third of these were the result of the Ridenour/Doolittle Report, September 1949, which recommended their development, among other reforms in Air Force science.
11. See Summary Volume, chapter 1, 3–13, in Dr. Gene Mc-Call, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century. This entire volume is only 70 pages long, not including appendices, and should be required reading for all Air Force personnel. Copies may be obtained through the USAF/SAB, Pentagon.
12. H. H. Arnold, “Science and Air Power,” Air Affairs, December 1946, 190.
13. Theodore von Kármán, interview with Donald Shaughnessy, Columbia University Oral History Interviews, US Air Force Academy, Special Collections, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 10.
14. Dr. Gene McCall, interview with author, Beckman Center, Newport Beach, California, videotape, 13 July 1995.
15. Summary Volume, 54.

EXPLOITATION OF MILLIMETER WAVES FOR THROUGH-WALL SURVEILLANCE DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN

February 17, 2010

EXPLOITATION OF MILLIMETER WAVES FOR
THROUGH-WALL SURVEILLANCE DURING
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN
By:
Major G.J. Burton CD PPCLI
and
Major G.P. Ohlke CD Intelligence
Land Force Technical Staff Programme V
Department of Applied Military Science
Royal Military College of Canada
Kingston, Ontario
24 May 2000
EXPLOITATION OF MILLIMETER WAVES FOR
THROUGH-WALL SURVEILLANCE DURING MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
COVER PAGE
DISCLAIMER
ABSTRACT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2 – VISUALIZING THE URBAN BATTLEFIELD
CHAPTER 3 – CANADIANS IN URBAN OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 4 – MILLIMETER WAVES
CHAPTER 5 – PASSIVE MILLIMETER WAVE TECHNOLOGY
CHAPTER 6 – ACTIVE MILLIMETER WAVE TECHNOLOGY
CHAPTER 7 – STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DISCLAIMER AVERTISSEMENT
This report was written by a student on
the Land Force Technical Staff
Programme at the Royal Military
College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario.
It has not been altered or corrected as
a result of assessment and it may
contain errors. This report is an
unofficial document. The views
expressed in the report are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect
the opinion or policy of the Royal
Military College, the Canadian Forces,
the Department of National Defence or
the Government of Canada
© Her Majesty the Queen as
represented by the Minister of National
Defence.
Le présent rapport a été rédigé par un
étudiant du Programme d`état-major
technique de la Force terrestre du
Collêge militaire royal du Canada,
Kingston, Ontario. Il n`a été ni modifié,
ni corrigé par suite d`une évaluation et
pourrait renfermer des erreurs. Ce
rapport est un document non officiel.
Les opinions exprimées dans le
présent rapport sont celles de l`auteur
et ne représentent pas nécessairement
l`opinion ou la politique du Collêge
militaire royal, des Forces armées
canadiennes, du ministêre de la
Défense nationale ou du gouvernement
du Canada.
© Sa Majesté la Reine représentée par
le ministre de laDéfense nationale.
ABSTRACT
EXPLOITATION OF MILLIMETER WAVES FOR THROUGH-WALL
SURVEILLANCE DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN
By: Major G. Ohlke CD Int and Major G. Burton CD PPCLI
One of the main concerns during military operations in urban terrain is detecting people through
walls. The problem is being addressed through the development of technology that exploits
millimeter wave radiation. Millimeter waves penetrate non-conductive walls and clothing, making
through-wall surveillance possible. The human body emits millimeter waves that can be received
by passive detectors. Active millimeter wave radar can detect human body surface motion,
including heartbeat and respiration.
This paper examines millimeter wave technology that could be used for through-wall surveillance
during military operations in urban terrain. The methods of research included literature searches
and surveys of industry, as well as attendance at the meeting of NATO Technical Group 14 on
Millimeter Wave Research and Development held on 7 February 2000 at the Defence Research
Establishment Valcartier in Quebec. The application of the technology to Canadian Land Force
operations is assessed. A preliminary statement of requirement has also been developed for the
Director of Land Requirements.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXPLOITATION OF MILLIMETER WAVES FOR THROUGH-WALL
SURVEILLANCE DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN
TERRAIN
In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
(CCRA) have expressed an interest in surveillance technology that would permit the detection of weapons
and drugs through clothing and baggage. Indeed, the CCRA procured a detection device known as the
Rapiscan Secure 1000 for use in airports. Unfortunately, the devices will not be used, as they do not meet
guidelines established by Health Canada.
The Canadian Army does not presently have an official capability requirement for through-wall
surveillance. Despite this, several prototype devices known as Radar Vision, made by the American
company Time Domain, have been procured for evaluation by the Defence Research Establishment Ottawa
and the Joint Task Force 2.
The aim of this paper is to survey the problem of through-wall detection and surveillance, which is being
addressed through the development of technology that exploits millimeter wave radiation.
Millimeter waves are electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths in the range 10mm to 1mm with
corresponding frequencies of 30 to 300 GHz, located between the microwave and infrared portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum. The advantages of millimeter waves include their ability to provide accurate,
excellent image identification and resolution. They also provide remote measurements while operating
through smoke, dust, fog or rain. At the same time, millimeter waves can be vulnerable to absorption by
certain atmospheric and meteorological activity. Different millimeter-wave frequencies work best for
particular tasks. Millimeter waves penetrate non-conductive walls and clothing, making through-wall
surveillance possible. The human body emits millimeter waves that can be received by passive detectors.
Active millimeter wave radar can detect human body surface motion, including heartbeat and respiration.
Research has included literature searches and surveys of industry. However, as millimeter wave
technology is in its infancy, most companies and laboratories with ongoing research and development
refused to share their proprietary knowledge. The authors were able to attend the meeting of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Technical Group 14 on Millimeter Wave Research and Development
held on 7 February 2000 at the Defence Research Establishment Valcartier in Quebec.
To set the stage for through-wall surveillance technology, the evolving urban battlefield and Canadian
operations in urban terrain are examined. Then, the current focus of military research into millimeter wave
technology by several NATO countries is examined. Although through-wall surveillance is not a high
priority within NATO, the many other uses of millimeter wave technology are presented. This is followed
by a snapshot of the current state of industry in developing passive and active millimeter wave, throughwall
surveillance devices. Finally, the application of the technology to Canadian Land Force operations is
assessed and the essential steps toward a statement of requirement have been developed for the Director of
Land Requirements.
Ultimately, the Canadian Army does not presently have a through-wall surveillance capability, and the
technology is still in the early stages of development. It is recommended that a formal statement of
requirement be initiated, and that the Defence Research Agency be tasked to investigate all pertinent
technologies.
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
In August 1999, the US Air Force Research Laboratory Information Directorate (AFRL/IF) and the
National Institute of Justice Office of Science and Technology (NIJ/OST) launched a joint program to
demonstrate existing sensors, and develop new ones, for detecting concealed weapons and permitting
through-wall surveillance of personnel.1 Both organizations solicited proposals for the development and
demonstration of innovative technology to better detect concealed weapons in the hands of criminals. In
the United States, this capability is the number one technology priority of the state and local law
enforcement community. The technology would also provide law enforcement officers and military
personnel engaged in peace keeping, the ability to conduct surveillance through exterior and interior
building walls in hostage rescue situations.2
Urban centers have increasingly become the sites of conflict throughout the world, and will remain so as
we move into the 21st century. The complexities of the urban environment such as line-of-sight
restrictions, inherent fortifications, limited intelligence, densely constructed areas and the presence of noncombatants
restricts current military technology. The United States Army and the United States Marine
Corps have realized that they do not possess the overwhelming technology advantages in an urban
environment as in other environments. To this end, they have jointly formed the Military Operations in
Urban Terrain Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (MOUT ACTD). The MOUT ACTD was
formed to demonstrate the military utility of new technologies combined with operational concepts that will
increase the lethality, survivability, mobility and command and control capabilities of soldiers and Marines
operating in an urban environment.3 The MOUT ACTD has identified thirty-two operational requirements
for which technological solutions are sought. Requirement Number 7 is for a through wall sensor. This
should ideally be a small, hand-held through-wall sensor capable of rapidly sensing through walls to
determine if next room is empty, or occupied by friend or enemy, or by a combatant or a non-combatant.4
In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
(CCRA) have expressed an interest in surveillance technology that would permit the detection of weapons
and drugs through clothing and baggage. Indeed, the CCRA procured a detection device known as the
Rapiscan Secure 1000 for use in airports. Unfortunately, the devices will not be used, as they do not meet
guidelines established by Health Canada.5
The Canadian Army does not presently have an official capability requirement for through-wall
surveillance. Despite this, several prototype devices known as Radar Vision, made by the American
company Time Domain, have been procured for evaluation by the Defence Research Establishment Ottawa
and the Joint Task Force 2.6
The aim of this paper is to survey the problem of through-wall detection and surveillance, which is being
addressed through the development of technology that exploits millimeter wave radiation. Millimeter
waves penetrate non-conductive walls and clothing, making through-wall surveillance possible. The
human body emits millimeter waves that can be received by passive detectors. Active millimeter wave
radar can detect human body surface motion, including heartbeat and respiration.
Research has included literature searches and surveys of industry. However, as millimeter wave
technology is in its infancy, most companies and laboratories with ongoing research and development
refused to share their proprietary knowledge. The authors were able to attend the meeting of the North
1 Hewish, Mark. “New Funding for Through-Wall Surveillance.” Jane’s International Defense
Review, Volume No. 32, August 1999, 3.
2 Through The Wall Surveillance and Concealed Weapons Detection SOL BAA-99-04-IFKPA,
accessed 20 May 2000. Available from http://www.ld.com/cbd/archive/1999/06(june)/10-jun-
1999/asol005.htm; Internet.
3 The MOUT Homepage – Technology, Weapons, Equipment, accessed 20 May 2000. Available
from http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/techa.html; Internet.
4 MOUT ACTD Operational Requirements, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://mout.actd.org/req.html; Internet.
5 Godfrey, Tom. “RCMP Want X-Ray Machine That Makes Clothing Invisible.” Toronto Sun, 27
February 2000.
6 Mitchell, Lieutenant-Colonel D., Director of Land Requirements 5, National Defence
Headquarters, Interviewed by author, 30 March 2000.
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Technical Group 14 on Millimeter Wave Research and Development
held on 7 February 2000 at the Defence Research Establishment Valcartier in Quebec.
To set the stage for through-wall surveillance technology, the evolving urban battlefield and Canadian
operations in urban terrain are examined. Then, the current focus of military research into millimeter wave
technology by several NATO countries is examined. Although through-wall surveillance is not a high
priority within NATO, the many other uses of millimeter wave technology are presented. This is followed
by a snapshot of the current state of industry in developing passive and active millimeter wave, throughwall
surveillance devices. Finally, the application of the technology to Canadian Land Force operations is
assessed and the essential steps toward a statement of requirement have been developed for the Director of
Land Requirements.
CHAPTER 2 – VISUALIZING THE URBAN BATTLEFIELD
The global trend to urbanization is a key factor in the consideration of a future military suite of surveillance
sensors. Specifically, the rapid growth of urban areas in the developing world leads to the preconditions for
conflict and it is quite likely that Canadian soldiers will have to operate in this type of environment. The
conduct of military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) has often been considered extremely difficult both
from the standpoint of mobility and of locating the enemy.7
While mobility remains a serious problem, it is now possible to exploit technology to discover ‘what is on
the other side of the wall’. The infantry soldiers who must do the detailed high-risk work to locate the
enemy cannot do so today without exposing themselves to observation and fire. Millimeter wavelength
technology, which is applicable in both passive and active modes can ‘see through’ standard construction
materials. Undoubtedly, this ‘see through’ capability will prove to be a great aid to tactical decision making
at the most junior levels of command and even in individual engagements. In addition, active millimeter
wave radar systems can also be employed where there is no consequence to their detection and perhaps
where their known presence contributes to deterrence.
Mentioned above, urbanization is a phenomenon that is not surprising or strange
to most Canadians who have seen profound and continuing expansion in most
cities and towns across the country. Nonetheless, urbanization can mean many
things, which, although related, can spring from different causes and have
radically different effects. Unprecedented urban growth is dramatically reshaping
global population configurations, particularly in developing countries. The results
are significant. More than half of the total world population will be urban by the
year 2000. During the 1990’s, some 600 million people will be added to our cities
– representing two thirds of the expected global population increase. Of 21
‘megacities’ projected for the turn of the century, 17 are expected to be in the
developing world.
Findings such as these from the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development’s (IBRD) report entitled, Urban Policy and Economic Development:
An Agenda for the 1990’s8 have resulted in a renewed focus on the policy
7 Strickland, Captain R.T. “FIBUA: New Twists On The Old Game”. The Infantry Journal. Vol 31,
Spring 1997. Indeed, existing Canadian Army Doctrine emphasizes these issues but is very
cursory in its coverage see B-GL-309-001/FT-001 The Infantry Battalion in Battle, specifically
Chapter 13, Section 3 “Fighting in Built Up Areas”, LFC dated 1992-03-31.
8 Cited in Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), “Global Urbanization: Towards
Better Understanding,” Development Express No. 93, 4 April 1993.
implications of this phenomenon. In the 1970’s, the prospect of rapid urbanization
generated many urban development programs in developing countries. However,
the 1980’s saw macroeconomic initiatives – primarily structural adjustment
programs – supersede the focus on urban development. Again in the 1990’s,
however, donors and practitioners are beginning to treat urbanization as a
priority.
Urban development has returned to favour with wider understanding of two
strategic conditions:9
• The near nexus between urbanization and economic development – illustrated by the
disproportionate share of GNP produced in urban centres.
• The irreversibility of urbanization – natural population increases now account for more than half of
all urban growth.
The United Nations publication World Urbanization Prospects 1990 identifies the various definitions in
current use. Canada, for instance, considers urban to be all “incorporated cities, towns, and villages with a
population of 1000 or more and their urbanized fringes”. Some of the other definitions for urban being used
are:10
• For Botswana, the agglomeration of 5000 or more people – with 75 percent engaged in nonagricultural
economic activities.
• Albania requires towns and other industrial centres to have more than 400 inhabitants to qualify as
urban.
• In Burkina Faso, urban is “the sum of 14 towns”.
The United Nations uses the definitions applied by the various member countries when calculating urban
populations. Perhaps the most common of these is the one used by, amongst others, Guadeloupe: “localities
with 2000 or more inhabitants”. However, the United Nations prefers its own definition for “urban
agglomerations” which is: populations contained within the contours of a contiguous territory inhabited at
urban levels without regard to administrative boundaries.11
POPULATION GROWTH AND URBANIZATION
While the urban population of the developing world
increases at about 4 percent per annum, the growth
rates for particular regions vary significantly12.
• Latin America (already 72 percent urbanized) has the slowest annual growth rate – 2.9 percent on
average between 1985 and 1990.
• Africa (34 percent urbanized) demonstrates a current growth rate in excess of 5 percent, with no
expectations for a decline in this rate to the year 2000. East Africa is particularly high at 6.8
percent.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
• Asia accounted for some 68 percent of all urban population growth in the less developed regions
between 1975 and 1990. Annual growth rates of 6.1 percent in East Asia and 4.0 percent in South
Asia will likely maintain a rate above 4 percent into the next millennium.
SPECTRUM OF URBAN COMBAT
Urban combat can be waged at varying degrees of intensity and commitment. Urban combat can include
the actions of an outside force intervening to rescue its citizens from a hazardous urban setting, such as the
US Marine Corps noncombatant evacuations at Tirana, Kinshasa, Monrovia and Freetown. Urban combat
may include the actions of a peace enforcement force when local police have lost control and criminals or
rival factions have seized control, as evident during the Los Angeles riots, Mogadishu, Beirut and Rio de
Janeiro. Urban combat may be the result of armed insurrections like Budapest in 1956 and Monrovia, Herat
in 1979, and it certainly includes the actions in a city under martial law where urban guerrillas oppose the
armed force and engage in terrorist acts similar to Kabul, Dublin, Kandahar and Jerusalem. City fighting
between two distinct armed forces is the most obvious form of urban combat, as demonstrated in Seoul,
Hue, Panama City, Grozny and Sarajevo. And strategic nuclear destruction of cities remains a possible, if
irrational, form of urban combat. 13
A Somali gunman takes flight during Operation Restore Hope, 1993.
Activity at the lower end of the urban combat spectrum is more probable than at the upper end. Thus,
planners should consider how to fight criminal gangs, armed insurgents and urban guerrillas.
13 United States Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Grau, Lester W. and Kipp, Dr. Jacob W.
“Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter,” first published in Military Review, July-August 1999.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF URBAN COMBAT
Every city is unique. Some are robust and resilient, while others are fragile and unable to cope with daily
demands, let alone military actions. Some cities, particularly in the developing world, can barely provide
basic water, sewage, power, transport, garbage collection and public health services to their citizens.
Military actions in some cities, such as Hong Kong, New York, Frankfurt, Seoul and Singapore, would
endanger the very economic stability of the nation—and the planet. Military actions in other cities may
have only local consequences. Still, military actions will have greater political, economic, sociological and
commercial consequences in cities than in the countryside. Consequently, the operational commander will
probably be constrained by various political dictates, limitations and rules of engagement (ROE). Political
decisions made far from the scene may change the mission or insert other forces with different missions
into the city—with perilous results.14
Operational commanders must weigh many considerations before attempting to seize a city. Traditional
urban operations begin by surrounding the city, a daunting operation itself. The nature of many of the
burgeoning cities in the developing world will negate this option. For example, Shanghai and surrounding
environs contain over 125 million people and 2,383 square miles, and its police force approaches the size of
the US Marine Corps.15
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF URBAN COMBAT
Technology will have only a marginal impact on the operational resolution of urban combat, but it can
produce tactical advantages. Some older technology is more applicable in urban combat than newer
technology. For example, the .223 (or 5.56mm NATO) bullet common to most modern infantry weapons
will not penetrate many walls—unlike the venerable .303 or .308 (or 7.62mm NATO) rounds that easily
penetrate through brick, wood and adobe. Tanks will have limited utility in the modern western city,
particularly among high-rises, where the elevation of the main gun and co-axial machinegun are
insufficient. Self-propelled howitzers will provide better direct-fire support to the infantry. The Russians
found the venerable ZSU 23-4 armored, antiaircraft quadruple automatic 23 mm cannons an excellent
weapon against basements and upper floors in Grozny.During the fighting in Herat, the Soviets found that
the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher was an effective direct-fire weapon against guerrilla strong points
during urban combat. Artillery is very useful in providing smoke screens—every fourth or fifth Russian
artillery round fired in Grozny was smoke or white phosphorus. The Russians noted benefits of white
phosphorus smoke—it is toxic, readily penetrates protective mask filters and is not banned by any treaty.
The Russians found that wheeled armored personnel carriers (BTRs) were often better suited for urban
combat than tracked armored personnel carriers (BMPs).
Protecting armoured vehicles will be a primary concern for the small-unit leader. In combat in Grozny, the
Chechen lower-level combat group consisted of 15 to 20 soldiers subdivided into three- or four-man
fighting cells consisting of an antitank gunner armed with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG), a
machine gunner, a sniper and perhaps an ammunition bearer/assistant gunner. Deploying as anti-armour
hunter-killer teams, the sniper and machine gunner would pin down supporting infantry while the RPG
gunner engaged an armored vehicle. Cells deployed at ground level, in upper stories and in basements.
Normally five or six hunter-killer teams simultaneously attacked a single armored vehicle. Kill shots were
generally aimed at the top, rear and sides of vehicles, and Chechens dropped bottles of jellied gasoline on
top of vehicles. The Chechen hunter-killer teams tried to trap vehicle columns in narrow city streets by
destroying the first and last vehicles, trapping the column and allowing its gradual destruction. The
Russians countered this technique by moving dismounted infantry in front of the armored vehicles. They
14 Hahn, Robert F. and Jezior, Bonnie. “Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025.” From
Parameters, Summer 1999, 74-86. Accessed 20 May 2000. Available from http://carlislewww.
army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/hahn.htm; Internet.
15 United States Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Grau, Lester W. and Kipp, Dr. Jacob W.
“Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter,” first published in Military Review, July-August 1999.
included ZSU 23-4 antiaircraft guns in the column, mounted reactive armor on vehicles and outfitted them
with wire mesh cages that provided a 25-30 centimeter stand-off to defeat RPG shaped charges.
Russian doctrine called for a 6:1 advantage in personnel for urban combat. In Grozny, some 60,000
Russians engaged 12,000 Chechens. The Russian 5:1 advantage was not enough. Initially, the Russians did
not mass sufficient combat power forward, and the tactical correlation of forces favored the Chechens. The
Russians learned to garrison every building they captured or else the Chechens would retake it and use it to
cut off the Russian advance. The requirement to garrison everything seized meant that a battalion ran out of
combat power after advancing only a few blocks.16
Urban combat expends huge amounts ammunition, particularly fragmentation grenades, smoke grenades,
tear gas grenades, demolition charges, disposable one-shot antitank grenade launchers, artillery smoke
rounds and artillery white phosphorus rounds. This severely stresses the logistics system, in many cases –
certainly with infantry ammunition, because much of the firing is ‘speculative’. The old drills expended
ammunition, often upon unoccupied space, in order to save lives. Contrariwise, the expenditure of
ammunition to no effect in one location often alerted the enemy waiting in ambush at the next location.
Today, it is possible to determine whether or not a certain space is occupied and this situational awareness
informs tactical movement or engagement as indicated.
Urban combat is small-unit combat conducted primarily by individual soldiers, fire teams, sections and
platoons. Dismounted infantry, the primary combatants, require combined arms augmentation and
reinforcement. Armoured vehicles provide direct-fire support; engineers supply crossing and demolition
support, and mortar and artillery pieces provide smoke and fire support. It is to be expected that armies
equipped with self-propelled air defence guns and chemical weapons, including flame-throwers, will
employ these systems in sustained urban combat.17
Tactics vary with the type of enemy and city, intensity of combat and unit mission. Urban terrain and ROE
strip away many combat multipliers of a modern army. Aggressive patrolling, ambushes and raids will
probably be key in any urban combat. The ability of skilled marksmen and snipers to engage and kill point
targets will prove decisive in the series of small fights that comprise an urban tactical battle. The detection
of the enemy is critical with the first well placed shot or grenade being decisive. Millimeter wave
technology will be key to the early detection of the enemy in an urban situation. Fratricide will be a
constant concern, particularly along unit boundaries. An active millimeter wave radar system could assist
in differentiating friendly troops from the enemy.
‘Bypass the urban areas’, the key doctrinal response for mechanized and armoured forces during the Cold
War is becoming impertinent. Urban sprawl, the high-tech battlefield and the expeditionary role for
Canadian Forces make this axiom problematic. On the modern battlefield, an enemy aware of Canadian
advantages in manouevre by fire may well chose to occupy urban terrain, precisely because the city negates
technological advantages and imposes constraints. Manouevre warfare indicates the objective is the
enemy’s destruction. If the enemy locates in a city then that is where the destruction must occur.
The range of urban terrain features is very broad. In the economically developed world one finds modern
stone, steel and concrete cities with intensive subterranean features. In the developing world, one finds
16 United States Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Grau, Lester W. and Kipp, Dr. Jacob W.
“Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter,” first published in Military Review, July-August 1999.
17 Canadian and US Army doctrine well appreciates the stresses, strains and high expenditure
rates in both personnel and materiel that will be experienced during sustained urban combat, see
B-GL-001/FT-001 The Infantry Battalion in Battle (LFC, dated 1992-03-31), especially Chapter
13, Section 3 “Fighting in Built Up Areas”. US Army doctrine is contained in Field Manual 90 – 10,
Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Aug 79; Field Manual 90 – 10 – 1,
Infantryman’s Guide to Urban Combat, Sep 82; and Field Manual 7 – 70, 71, 72, Light Infantry
Platoon/Squad Company, and Battalion, Sep 86, Aug 87, and Mar 87.
sprawling cities that combine modern buildings and ‘shanty-town’ slums; ancient masonry cities with
crowded bazaars and tangled road networks; lightly built tropical cities that spill out onto the waterways;
and crowded coastal cities which stretch for miles and push up the sides of coastal mountains.
THE WORST CASE SCENARIO – SUSTAINED URBAN COMBAT
Sustained urban combat is the most difficult and costly of all the urban operations but there is evidence that
Canadian Forces can generate substantial advantages over enemy forces in urban fighting. Some armies
have become quite good at sustained urban combat, but even an historically favourable exchange ratio
would imply very high Canadian casualties in most urban combat scenarios. Furthermore, minimizing
Canadian casualties may require taking steps that increase civilian casualties and collateral damage. Canada
would not tolerate the losses resulting from ‘favourable’ exchange ratios, and perhaps not the civilian
casualties either, unless important national interests were at stake which could not be attained in a cheaper
way. At this point, it is useful to review the experiences of other nations in sustained urban combat that is
more recent than our own.
CHAPTER 3 – CANADIANS IN URBAN OPERATIONS
BACKGROUND
History demonstrates that well trained forces can conduct sustained urban combat and generate favorable
exchange ratios. The first class Israeli army, specifically its Parachute Battalions, was able to exchange 2:1
with the Jordanians, a formidable enemy at the tactical level, while refraining from massive use of
firepower in the capture of the old city of Jerusalem in 1967. Israeli forces took Eastern Jerusalem from
Jordanian forces in 2 days at a cost of only 200 Israeli soldiers killed. About twice as many Jordanians died
in the battle, and there was relatively little damage to the city. The following year, U.S. and South
Vietnamese forces demonstrated that well-trained forces could achieve a much better exchange ratio in
urban warfare if they were willing to destroy the city. It took 3 1/2 weeks for U.S. and South Vietnamese
forces to drive the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong from Hue. About 5,000 North Vietnamese were
killed in the battle. The costs to the U.S. and South Vietnamese were 147 Americans killed, 384 South
Vietnamese soldiers killed, and tremendous destruction to large parts of the city. 18
The U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were highly effective at Hue, but at the cost of tremendous
destruction to the city. The Russians in Grozny demonstrated what happens when a poorly trained army
tries to do what the U.S. and South Vietnamese did in Hue. The Russians exercised force majeur in their
assault and destroyed much of Grozny, but the personnel attrition was probably even with the highly
motivated Chechen militia.
Canadian soldiers did not fight in the ground war phase of the Persian Gulf War, had they done so the
indications are that their casualties would have been minimal to nil. But that is if one considers only the
desert war. In this instance it is again useful to be informed by an American view.
“Even if the U.S. could achieve similarly impressive results in the future, the
missions would still be costly. Only 63 Americans died during the ground attack
during the Gulf War. Had the U.S. been forced to fight a Republican Guard
division in Kuwait City, and had the U.S. achieved a 2:1 exchange ratio in the
urban fighting, several thousand American soldiers and Marines would have been
killed. Even if the U.S. invests the resources necessary to prepare its forces for
sustained urban combat, only important national objectives will merit these types
of casualties. And these missions will only make sense if there are no cheaper
ways to achieve these objectives.”19
18 Press, Daryl G. “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems And The Future” January 1999, summary
of a conference sponsored by the MIT Security Studies Program. Held May 20, 1998
19 Ibid.
PREPARING FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN
Again, being advised by American operational research, the United States Army and Marine Corps are
equipping and training U.S. troops for urban operations.20 Their new focus on urban operations is
warranted. Given that the U.S. military is likely to spend far more time in the next decade engaged in urban
operations than destroying armored formations in open terrain so will the militaries of their allies, including
Canada’s. But what type of operations should they prepare for?
In his summary to the MIT Securities Studies Program conference (20 May 98) entitled “Urban Warfare:
Options, Problems and the Future (dated January 1999), Daryl G. Press posits that U.S. military forces
should be “prepared to conduct embassy evacuations and hostage rescue missions in urban areas. They
should also prepare for ‘policing’ operations. Although policing missions are rarely in America’s interests —
our humanitarian goals can be achieved more effectively with less risk to U.S. soldiers through nonmilitary
alternatives — this mission continues to be common. Until this pattern changes, U.S. troops should
prepare for urban policing missions.”21
On the other hand, Press states that the “the United States has not sent troops into sustained urban combat
for thirty years, and it is difficult to imagine future scenarios that would justify the substantial costs which
these missions entail. There are other ways of disarming enemy forces who have entrenched themselves in
a city. Although these alternatives are not ideal, they are far better than the likely consequences of sustained
urban combat.”22
In the Second World War, the Canadian Army had extensive experience fighting in urban terrain. The
victory of the 1st Canadian Division at Battle of Ortona in Italy (20-27 Dec 1943) has long been considered
one of the most significant successes of Canadian arms.23 In addition, much of the fighting in Northwest
Europe was in the densely populated areas of Holland, Belgium and Germany. Subsequently, during the
Korean War, most Canadian combat experience was in the countryside. The extended deployment to
Europe that committed Canadian troops to NATO forces in Germany and Norway also emphasised
operations in a countryside where the cities and towns were places to be avoided.
The experience of Peace Support Operations (PSO) has involved Canadian soldiers in both rural and urban
settings. The incidence of the deployment of troops within urban areas is increasing. It is necessary to
review a number of issues both doctrinal and technological for future considerations of equipment for
20 Barry, John. “The New Urban Battlefield”, Newsweek, February 21, 2000.
21 Op. Cit.
22 Ibid..
23 Halton, David. “Return to Ortona A Battlefield Redemption.” Accessed 20 May 2000. Available
from http://tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/ortona/index.html&lt;; Internet.
operations and training. Initially, it is necessary to arrive at an appreciation of the nature of military
operations in urban terrain (MOUT).
Wars tend to draw troops into urban areas. Cities have historically played an important role in military
campaigns because roads and rail lines usually intersect in cities, and ports and airfields are frequently
located near major metropolitan centers. Movement into a theater through ports and airfields, or within a
theater on roads or rail, requires the control of major cities.
THE CHALLENGES OF OPERATIONS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT
Urban warfare poses a different set of challenges than those that confronted the Canadian military for
nearly forty years. During the Cold War Canada within the NATO alliance prepared to fight a numerically
superior foe, in armoured warfare, on relatively open terrain, with long-range precision weapons. A clash
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have required the coordination of several corps of NATO
ground forces. In urban terrain, by contrast, engagements occur at short-range, manoeuvre and command
and control are difficult, and battles are typically fought at the section and platoon level without substantial
coordination or fire support from higher echelons. Finally, urban operations raise political risks that were
less relevant in Cold War scenarios.
For years the main focus of military technology has been working to detect and kill the enemy at longer
range than the enemy could target our forces. The goal behind these efforts was to force the enemy to cross
a ‘killing zone’ before they could engage with their shorter-range systems. In urban terrain, however, longrange
weapons are less useful. Long-range target acquisition is difficult because obstacles obstruct line-ofsight
and because enemy infantry hide in and move through buildings. A skillful enemy will deploy his
forces in ways that prevent long-range direct fire engagements. Indirect fire support is difficult in urban
terrain, too. Most artillery shells and many air-to-ground weapons fall at too shallow an angle to be
effective in densely built up areas. Furthermore, low flying aircraft are vulnerable to shoulder-fired surfaceto-
air missiles (SAMs) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). And because engagements are fought at very
short range, the dangers of friendly fire from artillery or air support are multiplied. The navigation and
communication difficulties resulting from urban terrain (described below) further complicate effective fire
support as units have difficulty knowing or reporting their own positions or the positions of friendly and
enemy forces. The long range of Western high-tech weapons is negated in a dense urban environment.
Urban terrain also makes manoeuvre difficult. Streets canalize the movement of ground vehicles. Because
ground routes are predictable, cities offer ideal terrain for setting ambushes. The Russian Army learned this
lesson in Chechnya. Their armored thrust into Grozny was anticipated by Chechen irregulars who
ambushed the Russians from the sides, rear, and above. The narrow streets, soon blocked by burning
Russian vehicles, made it difficult for the embattled Russian armored columns to advance, countermanoeuvre,
or even withdraw.
Urban terrain impedes command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) more than most other
types of terrain. Navigation is difficult in dense urban areas. Global positioning system (GPS) navigation
devices require contact with at least three satellites to generate a location, and this is often impossible either
inside buildings or outside among high-rise structures. Even when ground forces can determine their exact
position in a city, communicating this information to their superiors is not simple. Radios rely on line-ofsight
transmissions that are obstructed in built-up areas, especially inside buildings.
An American writer on futuristic military affairs, Lt. Col. Ralph Peters argues: “The future of warfare lies
in the streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, and sprawl of houses that form the broken cities of the world.”24
Peters was writing in reaction to a small-scale military disaster that had occurred in Mogadishu, Somalia. In
a battle in the back alleys of Mogadishu, an elite US Ranger Company suffered 18 killed and 73
wounded—a 60 percent casualty rate. All the high-tech equipment that the Rangers were meant to have at
their disposal—satellite images, laser-guided munitions and the like—were largely useless in the teeming
streets. After Vietnam, the US military spent billions of dollars developing the kill-at-a-distance weapons.
24 Peters, Ralph. “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations”. Parameters, Summer 2000.
Without question, these weapons were devastatingly effective in the desert fighting of the gulf war.
Nonetheless, such weaponry does little to no good when an enemy soldier is just a few feet away. A 1994
Pentagon study after Mogadishu baldly concluded, “Our current capability was developed for a massive,
rural war… Since the future looks much different, new capabilities will have to be developed.” 25
Finally, urban terrain raises political problems for a Canadian expeditionary force. First, the Ortona model
reflected in our doctrine notwithstanding, using massive firepower to overwhelm enemy positions can
cause substantial physical damage to a city including the destruction of vital infrastructure and cultural
sites. Enemies who sense Canadian reluctance to destroy these sites may strategically locate their forces
near these locations. Second, urban operations can easily kill large numbers of non-combatants. Given
smoke, dust and obscurants and night time operations, civilians are difficult to distinguish from enemy
infantry. If enemy forces are not ‘in uniform’, the risk to civilians is even greater.
In sum, urban areas deny to Canadian and allied forces many of the technological advantages that were
developed during the Cold War, they constrain manoeuvre, they strain C3I systems, and they raise
substantial political problems by putting non-combatants and non-military targets in the way of military
forces.
THE TYPES OF URBAN OPERATIONS
Urban terrain creates significant problems for standard western military forces. What can be done to equip
the Canadian soldiers who must operate in this environment irrespective of diplomatic and political
considerations? To assess these issues we may subdivide “urban operations” into the different types of
operations that the Canadian Army might be asked to perform in urban terrain. These categories were
proposed by Daryl G. Press26, specifically for the US Armed Forces, to help identify the conditions under
which urban operations might make sense, the types of operations that forces should prepare to conduct,
and the feasibility of U.S. forces developing dominance over enemies in urban terrain.
Press identifies three types of urban operations: policing operations, raids, and sustained urban conflict. The
three categories of urban operations and their salient features are summarized in the table on the next page.
Each of these operations is described and distinguished from the others by the mission’s goals, strategic
importance, the nature of the adversary, and the difficulty.
25 Cited in United States Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Grau, Lester W. and Kipp, Dr.
Jacob W. “Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter,” first published in Military Review, July-
August 1999.
26 Press, Daryl G. “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems And The Future” January 1999, summary
of a conference sponsored by the MIT Security Studies Program. Held May 20, 1998
Type Goals Strategic
Importance
Military
Risks
Recent
Examples
Policing Operations Deter violence Low Low Haiti, Bosnia
Early Somalia
Raids
Evacuation of
Embassies
Seize Ports and Airfields
Counter WMD
Seize Enemy Leaders
Seize or interdict
facilities,
personnel or
materiel
Low to high Low to high Liberia,
Albania,
Sierra Leone
Panama
Bosnia,
Somalia (late)
Sustained Urban
Combat
Defeat enemy
forces
very high Very high Grozny,
no recent CA
or Allied
example
The first category of urban operations is “policing operations”, in Canadian terms these cover the spectrum
within Peace Support Operations (PSO) from Peace Keeping to Peace Making operations. Like domestic
policing, the primary goal of international policing is to prevent the outbreak of violence. Canadian
peacekeeping operations in Haiti are an example of a policing mission. Policing missions usually face only
scattered and uncoordinated opposition. Adversaries are often irregular forces who are less skilled than fulltime
military units. The key to success, as in domestic policing, involves maintaining presence throughout
the area of operations, using speed to concentrate overwhelming force against troublemakers, and
separating these troublemakers from the general population as soon as possible.
Peace Support missions frequently involve low strategic stakes for the participating countries. These
missions are usually intended to promote the United Nations’ charter and values rather than protect a given
country’s strategic interests; as a result, the Canadian government and public are unwilling to sustain many
casualties on Peace Support Operations. Success in these missions is possible, however, because Canada’s
low casualty tolerance is offset by the low risks that these missions tend to pose. The greatest cost of
policing operations is the effect of lengthy deployments on the morale, readiness, and retention rates in the
Canadian Forces.
The second type of mission liable to occur in an urban setting, the “raid”, is a broad category that spans the
Canadian doctrinal spectrum from Peace Making to Peace Enforcement. Peace Enforcement can have
many different goals, for example evacuating foreign citizens and embassies, rescuing hostages, arresting
enemy leaders, neutralizing the ‘warfighting’ potential of belligerent powers, seizing port facilities or
airfields, or taking control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites. The common characteristics of
these missions are the rapid insertion of forces into enemy, or disputed territory, the completion of some
mission at the target site (e.g. evacuation of friendly personnel, or destruction of WMD equipment) and the
extraction of friendly forces. The insertion and extraction of forces is often the hardest part of operations in
urban areas. The proliferation of shoulder-fired SAMs and hand-held anti-armor weapons has made the
insertion and extraction of forces very dangerous.
In many cases, since the UN would proclaim its intent in these scenarios, the tactical considerations involve
avoiding being surprised rather than in attaining surprise. Therefore, the importance of handheld, close
range surveillance systems must not be underestimated.
The third category of urban operations is sustained urban combat. The goals of sustained urban combat are
to hold a city, take a city, or destroy enemy military forces that are using a city for shelter. Canadian forces
have not been engaged in sustained urban combat for fifty-five years — since the last fighting in the
German cities of Emden and Bremerhaven in May 1945 at the very end of the Second World War. The
Russian assault into Grozny is the most recent example of sustained urban fighting.
Sustained urban combat could be waged against forces with skill levels that range from poorly trained
civilians to regular military forces. For the reasons described earlier, it is one of the most difficult and
costly types of military operations. Even irregular forces can inflict substantial losses on an attacking force
in sustained urban combat.
It is unlikely that Canada and any coalition we were acting with would embark on sustained urban combat
unless significant national and coalition interests were at stake. For example, in a conventional war between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a 10:1 exchange ratio in NATO’s favor would have been a tremendous
victory for the West. But in a conflict in 1993 between U.S. soldiers and Somali gunmen, a 25:1 exchange
rate in America’s favor was considered to be a terrible defeat. The difference between these two scenarios is
obvious: Americans believed that defending NATO from a Soviet attack was worth the lives of thousands
of Americans; arresting the Somali Warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid, on the other hand, did not merit the
loss of even eighteen soldiers.27 Undoubtedly, Canadian governmental and public opinion would react in a
similar way. It is probable that improved doctrine, specialized equipment, and realistic training can reduce
the risks of various types of urban operations, but these missions will still be unpalatable if the risks remain
high, if the interests at stake are small. Therefore, a system such as the passive, millimeter wave radar
detector becomes invaluable if it prevents our troops from being surprised and avoids the perception of
mission failure due to the incidence of casualties.
27 National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Stanton, John J. “Training Marines for War in
the City Drills in Simulated Urban Zones Underscore Need for New Equipment,” (undated); and
Loeb, Vernon. “After-action Report”, The Washington Post, Sunday, February 27, 2000.
Peace Support Operations generate missions that can usually be carried out within acceptable levels of risk,
and they can become easier with improvements in training and doctrine. New technologies might reduce
the risks of policing operations further. Sniper detection will help soldiers detect enemy snipers. Improved,
lightweight body armor will provide soldiers increased protection from handgun rounds and fragments
from explosive munitions. Optical equipment that allows troops to look around corners without exposing
themselves will give them greater protection. Given the extreme close quarters of urban fighting and the
presence of obscurants such as smoke from burning buildings and smoke shells, a system that allows the
soldier to “see” through structures and obscurants will save lives and set our soldiers up favourably for
decisive engagements.
THE WORST CASE SCENARIO REVISITED
At present it appears most unlikely that Canadian Forces troops will become involved in sustained urban
combat in the next decade. But should such fighting occur, it would imply very high Canadian casualties.
Furthermore, minimizing Canadian casualties may require taking steps that increase civilian casualties and
collateral damage. Canada would find it very difficult if not impossible to tolerate the losses resulting from
‘favourable’ exchange ratios, and perhaps not the civilian casualties either, unless important national
interests were at stake, which could not be attained in a cheaper way. In this desperate scenario the use of
millimeter wave detection and surveillance equipment would undoubtedly serve to lessen Canadian
casualties and assist greatly in avoiding the engagement of nonmilitary personnel.
PREPARING FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN
It is evident from American operational research, that the United States Army and Marine Corps are
equipping and training U.S. troops for urban operations.28 Given that the U.S. military is likely to spend far
more time in the next decade engaged in urban operations than destroying armored formations in open
terrain so will the militaries of their allies, including Canada’s. The question remains as to what type of
operations should the Canadian Forces prepare for?
In his summary to the MIT Securities Studies Program conference (20 May 98), Daryl G. Press posits that
U.S. military forces should be “prepared to conduct embassy evacuations and hostage rescue missions in
urban areas. They should also prepare for ‘policing’ operations. Although policing missions are rarely in
America’s interests — our humanitarian goals can be achieved more effectively with less risk to U.S.
soldiers through non-military alternatives — this mission continues to be common. Until this pattern
changes, U.S. troops should prepare for urban policing missions.”
On the other hand, Press states that the “the United States has not sent troops into sustained urban combat
for thirty years, and it is difficult to imagine future scenarios that would justify the substantial costs which
these missions entail. There are other ways of disarming enemy forces that have entrenched themselves in a
city. Although these alternatives are not ideal, they are far better than the likely consequences of sustained
urban combat.”
28 The MOUT Homepage – Technology, Weapons, Equipment, accessed 20 May 2000.
Available from http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/techa.html; Internet; and articles such as
Center for (US) Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “Military Operations In Urban Terrain,” Light
Infantry In Action Part II Newsletter No. 2-88, (undated) and Center for (US) Army Lessons
Learned, Mordica, George J. “It’s a dirty Business, but somebody has to do it. (URBAN
COMBAT).” (undated).
CONCLUDING MATERIAL
There are reasons to believe that future conflicts will involve more urban operations than those in the past.
First, the world is becoming more urban. About half of the world’s population lives in cities today; 70%
will live in urban areas in 25 years. As the number and size of cities grow, so will the frequency that
overseas wars involve urban fighting. Second, cities are the political and economic centers of modern
countries. Wherever fighting occurs in future decades, the chances are good that it, and the people who
control it, will be located in cities.
Finally, United States led coalitions will frequently be drawn into cities because no enemy’s military can
compete with U.S. forces in open terrain. Urban terrain, for reasons described below, negates many U.S.
advantages and capitalizes on the general unwillingness on the part of western countries to kill noncombatants.
Enemies will put their forces — conventional or irregular — in cities to fight on the most
advantageous ground possible.
It is difficult to build and maintain MOUT training facilities that reflect all of the types of urban terrain the
Canadian Forces are likely to encounter. Another commonly perceived drawback is that mock-up villages
are inherently expensive, high-maintenance and too small. Thirty buildings do not constitute a city.29 Given
the almost personal nature of urban combat, it is probably unnecessary to develop specific drills above the
level of Platoon and perhaps even Section.30 For higher levels of command, simulations can play a
valuable role in training unit and formation commanders and staffs for modern urban combat and for the
29 National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Stanton, John J. “Training Marines for War in
the City Drills in Simulated Urban Zones Underscore Need for New Equipment,” (undated).
United States Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Grau, Lester W. and Kipp, Dr. Jacob W.
“Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter,” first published in Military Review, July-August 1999.
30 See Army Lessons Learned Centre (CA), “Zero Template House Clearing Range,” The Bulletin.
Vol 2. No. 2., this article provides a useful model of a training facility for Section Tactics in MOUT
and would be ideal for training with handheld millimeter wave systems.
tactical training of small units in this demanding environment. In urban warfare computerized war games, a
world-class opposing force should contest Blue Forces for the loyalty and support of the indigenous
population. Computerized training systems, such as JANUS, should incorporate city models that allow
interaction at ground level, at various building heights and in subterranean passages. Computerized training
models that currently generate all locations using the UTM system should incorporate nonstandard location
systems.
It is evident that Canada will do its utmost to avoid involvement in major conflict. Nonetheless, the
Canadian Forces will become involved in military operations, which in the future will reside within
coalitions and be focused at the tactical level of command. It is also evident that these operations will
increasingly occur within urban terrain and therefore all possible measures must be taken to increase the
effectiveness and survivability of Canadian Forces soldiers and enable them to engage targets minimizing
collateral damage and the chances of killing or wounding noncombatants. In future, this most assuredly
includes the acquisition and employment of handheld millimeter wave systems at Section level and below.
The Canadian Forces must train and equip today to conduct difficult urban missions; it would be best if this
training and equipment enabled us to avoid the heavy casualties of some future Ortona.
CHAPTER 4 – MILLIMETER WAVES
Millimeter waves are electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths in the range 10mm to 1mm with
corresponding frequencies of 30 to 300 GHz, located between the microwave and infrared portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum.31
Radar applications seem to have particular frequency bands to which they are suited best. Although there
has been much interest in exploring the potential of radar at millimeter wavelengths, it has not been
practical for most applications because of high attenuation even in the “clear” atmosphere. It is difficult to
31 Liu, Yonghua, ed. Radar Principles and Applications, Lecture Notes for Land Force Technical
Staff Course. (Kingston, Ontario: Royal Military College of Canada, 1996), CH10-10.
use millimeter-wave radar for anything other than short range (a few kilometers) within the atmosphere.
For deployment in outer space where there is no atmosphere to attenuate these frequencies, millimeterwave
radar, however, can be considered.32
The advantages of millimeter waves include their ability to provide accurate, excellent image identification
and resolution. They also provide remote measurements while operating through smoke, dust, fog or rain.
At the same time, millimeter waves can be vulnerable to absorption by certain atmospheric and
meteorological activity. Different millimeter-wave frequencies work best for particular tasks. Scientists at
the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI)33 have identified and refined windows of attenuation, the
frequencies that mitigate atmospheric interference with the signals. Atmospheric attenuation of millimeter
waves is shown on the chart below.34
Millimeter wave research at the GTRI has been an ongoing process of discovering the appearance of
objects from tanks to raindrops when viewed by high-frequency waves. Researchers have also determined
the types of data, specifically the absorption and reflection characteristics they can derive from the
interaction of those objects with the waves. In the process, they have pioneered the fundamental science of
the millimeter wave environment, while inventing the hardware, such as antennas, receivers and
transmitters, to use that end of the spectrum.
32 “Radar,” Encyclopædia Britannica Online, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.eb.com:180/bol/topic?eu=117367&sctn=10; Internet.
33 “Millimeter Wave Radar”, Research Horizons, Georgia Tech Research Institute, accessed 20
May 2000. Available from http://www.gtri.gatech.edu/rh-sf99/t-wave.html; Internet.
34 Liu, Yonghua, ed. Radar Principles and Applications, Lecture Notes for Land Force Technical
Staff Course. Kingston, Ontario: Royal Military College of Canada, 1996.
The GTRI built the first military-designation millimeter wave radar in the late 1950s, followed by a
succession of increasingly advanced models. By the 1980s, research to build a radar with a wavelength as
near to 1 millimeter as possible culminated in development of the world’s highest-frequency microwave
radar, operating at 225 GHz. The device can provide useful imaging with an antenna less than 30
centimeters in diameter and is coherent meaning it can detect Doppler returns from moving targets.35
Meanwhile, millimeter-wave systems are increasingly being used in various battlefield scenarios for
tracking functions, since they have an advantage over optical systems in that they can penetrate fog and
smoke. In many such applications, where systems are operated close to the earth’s surface, multipath
interference from the ground can confound target detection and cause erratic tracking. Such interference
not only depends on the system geometry, such as transmitter and receiver height, and system parameters
such as antenna beam width, but also on the terrain type and condition.
Characterization of millimeter-wave multipath is essential for an accurate estimation of angular errors in
tracking scenarios. It is also important to separate the multipath interference signal into its specular and
diffuse components. Scientists at the University of Nebraska Lincoln36 measured the specular and diffuse
reflection coefficients of a variety of terrain types using the phase-interference method based on heightgain
curves. These measurements were made at a frequency of 95 GHz at low grazing angles in the range
0.5 degrees to 2 degrees with transmit-receive antenna separations of 250-500 m.
They also developed a technique to separate the specular and diffuse components by filtering in the spatial
Fourier Transform domain by appropriate choice of filter frequencies obtained from system geometry
considerations. Concrete and packed-snow surfaces show moderate-to-high specular reflection
coefficients, while wet melting snow, gravel and asphalt surfaces have lower values. Grass-covered terrain
showed no specular reflection. On the other hand, rough melting snow and gravel show high values for the
diffuse reflection coefficient, while these values are moderate-to-high for packed snow, asphalt and
concrete, and low for grass.37
Research by the late Jim Gallagher in millimeter spectroscopy paved the way for exploiting millimeter
waves for measurements in radio astronomy, satellite-based studies of the upper atmosphere, climate,
rainfall and vegetation patterns, and a host of other environmental concerns.38
Georgia Tech scientists have also achieved a number of firsts in millimeter characterization of clutter and
targets, essential data for reliable millimeter radar systems. Since the 1960s, more than a dozen projects
have provided millimeter measurements of foliage and rain, the ocean, snow-covered ground, the desert,
and a variety of military vehicles. In the 1980s, GTRI researchers conducted a comprehensive study of the
image-quality effects of atmospheric turbulence and precipitation on millimeter wave propagation.39
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Research and Technology Organization (RTO) has
formed the scientific Technical Group 14 (TG 14), a body of interested member countries whose role is to
collaborate on research into millimeter wave radiation. On 7 February 2000, the TG 14 met at the Defence
Research Establishment Valcartier to report on the status of member country research. The United States,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and Canada were represented.
The largest research effort by far, is being conducted in the United States. The focus of the United States
Army Research Laboratory (ARL) is “strategic dominance across the entire spectrum of operations.” Their
vision is to integrate multiple Radio Frequency (RF) functions to reduce the cost, complexity, volume, and
35 Ibid.
36 Terrestrial Remote Sensing Page, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://doppler.unl.edu/html/terr-projects.html; Internet.
37 Ibid.
38 “Millimeter Wave Radar”, Research Horizons, Georgia Tech Research Institute, accessed 20
May 2000. Available from http://www.gtri.gatech.edu/rh-sf99/t-wave.html; Internet.
39 Ibid.
number of electronic systems on lightweight, highly mobile future battlefield weapons and platforms. The
US Army millimeter wave research topics include millimeter wave targeting and imaging systems for RF
imaging, and frequency control and super resolution for scanning radar antenna in millimeter wave low
angle tracking. To date, the ARL has developed a polarimetric ISAR instrumentation device, which
operates at 8-18, 34, and 94GHz. It has also developed a 35GHz polarimetric monopulse instrumentation
radar, and a 95GHz polarimetric monopulse instrumentation radar.40
The Millimeter-Wave Branch at the ARL is also investigating polarimetric effects in passive millimeter
wave imaging. This research supports the American defence aviation and surveillance communities, which
can use this technology to detect enemy targets through fog and clouds without transmitting. The purpose
of the current work is to investigate the ways in which the passive polarimetric signature of targets in
clutter can be exploited to enhance contrast in airborne imagery.41
The Munition Directorate of the United States Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is conducting
research into active and passive millimeter-wave seeker sensors. The research objective of the
Hammerhead Program is to demonstrate synthetic aperture radar guidance through precision impact against
fixed high value ground targets. The potential advantages of a millimeter-wave synthetic aperture radar
seeker include adverse weather imaging, precision guidance, autonomous operation, and pre-briefed and
real time mission planning. The AFRL is also researching passive millimeter wave technology. A
Radiometric One Second Camera (ROSCAM) has been developed. It is a single element passive
millimeter wave imager, which detects at 95GHz. The intended eventual use for ROSCAM will be on
helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and direct attack and broad area search
munitions.42
95 GHz Passive Images
The British research effort has several thrusts. These include passive millimeter wave imaging at short (0-
100m) and medium (100-10000m) ranges, active millimeter wave radar imaging of fixed ground targets,
relocatable ground targets, mines and extensive ground truth, and active millimeter wave imaging seekers
for future ground attack weapons.
For the British, the challenge of passive detection is to produce real time millimeter wave images at the
right cost whilst maintaining image quality. They do not have the resources to develop a short-range
passive imager, however, for medium range imaging they have developed the “MITRE” 94GHz 8 channel
passive imager.43
In conjunction with its other European research partners from Germany, France, the Netherlands, Britain
conducted a Millimeter Wave Imaging Experiment (MIMEX) in 1999. Each participating nation used its
own experimental millimeter wave imager to detect fixed and relocatable ground targets with great success.
40 United States Army Research Laboratory, Millimeter Wave Research Presentation, 7 February
2000.
41 Ibid.
42 Smith, Roger. MMW R & D. United States, Air Force Research Laboratory Munition
Directorate, 7 February 2000.
43 Appleby, Dr. Roger. UK Strategy, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging. United Kingdom, DERA,
January 2000.
According to Dr. Roger Appleby of DERA, a preliminary database of target profiles was created from
which further experimentation will be based.44
British research into active millimeter wave seekers is aimed at exploiting high spatial resolution imagery
to maximize performance of the seeker. The research thrust is centred on system design, algorithm
development and performance assessment. The ultimate goal according to Dr. Adrian Britton is to develop
common seeker elements for many applications.45
Dutch research into millimeter waves is limited to synthetic aperture imaging radar, radar signatures and
modeling, radar target acquisition and surveillance and antenna design.46
The German research effort into millimeter waves includes passive millimeter wave imaging and active
millimeter wave radar. The thrusts of the German Aerospace Center (DLR) are to develop airborne passive
imaging line scanners and seekers, to improve the spatial and radiometric resolution, to investigate fully
polarimetric signatures and to detect mines.47
German active millimeter wave research includes the imager on the CL-289 Reconnaissance Drone, the
AAMIS Minesearch Demonstrator, the TAIFUN Attack Drone, the SMART Sensor Fuzed Munition for
Artillery, and SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defence guided weapons.48
Canada’s military millimeter wave research is conducted at the Defence Research Establishment Valcartier
(DREV) and is focussed on maritime and land force applications. The maritime thrust includes defence
against millimeter wave guided threats, detection of submarine periscopes, surveillance of small boat traffic
and surveillance of shores. The land thrust includes target acquisition and identification, defensive aid
suites (DAS) and identification friend or foe (IFF).
DREV has developed the Common Aperture Multi-Sensors (CAMUS) device, which operates in the Ka
and W Bands. It is Frequency Modulated (FM) and Continuous Wave (CW), and has a resolution of 20
cm. The present R & D priorities for DREV include integrated Infrared millimeter wave FMCW radar for
fire control through data fusion, integrated Infrared millimeter wave radar for surveillance in both clear and
limited visibility conditions, target identification using holographic neural network technology, and target
characterization from polarimetric features.49
Millimeter waves have the very interesting capability of “seeing through” most packaging, clothing, and
many wall materials, while still providing sufficiently detailed images. They are therefore ideally suited for
use in security and emergency applications. Unlike ionizing x-ray and gamma ray radiation, millimeter
waves cannot penetrate human skin thus security systems based on millimeter wave technology are
completely people safe.
It is particularly interesting that human skin is naturally highly emissive in the millimeter wavelength
region, allowing sensors to distinguish between people and other items in a scene. This is an important
feature for many applications. These natural emissions make it possible to create completely passive
44 Appleby, Dr. Roger. NATO Research: Millimeter Wave Imaging. United Kingdom, DERA,
January 2000.
45 Britton, Dr. Adrian. MMW Imaging Seekers for Future Ground Attack Weapons. United
Kingdom, DERA, February 2000.
46 Van Den Broek, Bert. Radar Defence research at TNO-FEL. TNO-FEL, The Hague, The
Netherlands, 7 February 2000
47 Peichl, Markus and Sub, Helmut. DLR Activities on Passive MMW Imaging for Military
Applications. Institute of Radio Frequency Technology and Radar Systems, German Aerospace
Center, Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany, February 2000.
48 Schimf, H. Application of Millimeter Wave Techniques for Ground Surveillance GE Activities.
Germany, FGAN, 7 February 2000.
49 De Villiers, Dr. Yves. Millimeter-Wave R & D Projects at DREV. Valcartier, Canada, Defence
Research Establishment Valcartier, 7 February 2000.
sensors that rely solely on detecting the existing radiation in a scene, further ensuring user acceptance and
safety.50
CHAPTER 5
PASSIVE MILLIMETER WAVE TECHNOLOGY
“Between microwave and infrared lies the millimeter waveband. This littleheralded
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum turns out to be perfect
for ‘remote frisking’. Millitech Corporation (now Millivision LLC) has
designed a camera to accomplish just that. The idea calls for measuring
the time delay and intensity of millimeter wave energy that radiates
naturally. At millimeter wavelengths, people are good emitters, while
metals are very poor. Dielectric objects, such as plastics, ceramics and
powdered drugs, are somewhere in between. Clothing and building
materials, such as wallboard, are virtually transparent.”
“Frisking From Afar” Popular Mechanics October 199551
Commercial development of millimeter wave technology is leading to a new generation of security and
safety products. These products will also be extremely useful during military and security force operations
in urban terrain. Millimeter waves can pass through walls, clothing, and packaging to allow detection of
hidden people and objects. Not limited to metal, millimeter-wave-based systems allow the detection of
ceramic weapons, plastic explosives, drugs, and other contraband.
The safety of victims, hostages or security forces placed at risk often depends on the ability to assess
situations quickly and accurately. For example, hostage and terrorism situations require knowledge of
building interiors and the location and identification of individuals. Fire fighters need methods to determine
whether or not burning buildings are occupied. Search and rescue teams must be able to locate hidden
survivors in debris or other materials. Military forces fighting in built up areas must be able to determine
where the enemy is, and distinguish combatants from non-combatants.
Regardless of the case, it is vital that this assessment be carried out remotely so as to avoid endangering
more people. Many dangerous situations also require that assessment be done discretely so as to not alert
criminals or the enemy to the intentions of security force personnel.
50 Millivision Homepage, accessed between September 1999 and May 2000. Available from
http://www.millivision.com/; Internet.
51 White, Eleanor, P Eng. The State of Unclassified and Commercial Technology
Capable of Some Electronic Mind Control Effects, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.raven1.net/uncom.htm#TWRAD; Internet.
Another desirable capability is the monitoring and surveillance of activities within a specific area.
Businesses must provide building security, law enforcement personnel need to monitor suspects, and
government agencies and the military must protect sensitive areas.
This wide variety of surveillance applications presents a diverse set of needs. In many cases, the subjects of
the surveillance must remain unaware of being monitored, requiring the covert installation of equipment.
Safety and discretion requirements may mandate monitoring under reduced visibility conditions, such as in
darkness or through smoke or fog. The detection of concealed contraband or other threats demands
capabilities beyond simple visual surveillance.
Millimeter wave imaging systems move beyond traditional surveillance cameras to provide the answer to
these needs. These devices permit the discrete, non-intrusive surveillance of people entering courtrooms,
schools, banks, airports, political meetings, or other sensitive areas. Using the millimeter band of the
spectrum permits imaging impossible for standard surveillance cameras, such as through dense fog or in
complete darkness.
Two kinds of sensors, passive and active, provide a wide range of complimentary capabilities. Passive
sensors rely solely on the natural existing radiation in a scene, ensuring complete safety while making them
difficult to detect and countermeasure. Many wall and most clothing materials are transparent to millimeter
waves, allowing for covert installation and the detection of items hidden on the person.
In addition to valuing our collective safety, our society also values individual liberties. Thus, although
frisking might provide an effective search technique, it is unacceptable in terms of invasion of privacy in
many situations. X-rays can provide an effective search of luggage and other items, but perceived health
risks due to their ionizing effects make them unacceptable for searching for weapons concealed on a
person.
The possible danger posed by the presence of concealed weapons is felt in many areas of our society. From
airports and courthouses to schools and amusements parks, we are now confronted with the need to search
individuals for concealed weapons to ensure public safety. Such searches must be efficient, accurate, and
involve minimal inconvenience for the individuals being searched.
Traditional searches for concealed weapons are limited
by many factors. Metal detectors, the current choice for
many applications, are limited to detecting metal
objects, allowing dangerous items such as non-metal
guns, ceramic knives, and plastic explosives to go
undetected. The high rate of false alarms and the lack
of location information also limit the effectiveness of
metal detectors for this purpose.
Passive millimeter waves sensors, combined with advanced imaging software, are ideally suited to the task
of concealed weapons detection. Able to “see through” most clothing materials, such sensors also provide
shape and location information to aid in determining whether a detected item poses a threat. By using only
the natural existing emissions in the scene, passive systems guarantee safe and non-invasive operation with
as much discretion as the situation requires.
Undetected contraband poses a security risk and financial threat to many of today’s businesses and
government agencies. High-tech companies worry about theft and corporate espionage, border crossing
agents watch for the illegal importation or exportation of goods, and prisons must control contraband to
ensure the safety of both personnel and inmates. Whether concerned with preventing theft, uncovering
smuggling attempts, or eliminating the threat posed by concealed weapons or drugs, these institutions all
require the ability to detect contraband quickly, effectively, and safely.
Traditional contraband detection technology limits the
effectiveness of these operations. X-rays are useful for
searching luggage and other containers, but again,
safety issues restrict use on people and can create
health concerns for operators. Metal detectors are
limited to detecting metal objects and provide no
information on the identity or location of detected items.
Visual and physical searches are slow and intrusive and
may place the searcher at risk.
Millimeter wave imaging systems overcome these problems to provide safe, effective, remote detection of
contraband hidden on the person. Inanimate objects emit different radiation signatures than living beings,
making attempts to disguise contraband ineffective. Passive millimeter wave systems use only natural
existing emissions, guaranteeing safe and non-invasive operation. By being able to “see through” most
clothing materials, millimeter wave systems can provide discrete remote sensing capabilities, minimizing
operator risk while maintaining subject privacy. As an imaging system, millimeter wave sensors cannot
determine chemical composition, but when combined with advanced imaging software they can provide
valuable shape and location information, helping to distinguish contraband from permitted items.
Millivision LLC of Massachusetts is leading industry in the development of passive millimeter-wave
detectors that are non-invasive to the human body, that are safe for operators, subjects and bystanders, and
that are difficult to countermeasure. Millivision is presently developing and producing three prototypes of
millimeter wave detector products, a Gateway Scanner, a Handheld Scanner and a Surveillance Camera.52
The Gateway Scanner is presently under development and in limited use in a number of American airports.
It will check for concealed weapons and other contraband hidden under the clothing of people entering
sensitive areas through well-defined portals. It will use the naturally occurring millimeter wave emissions
from humans entering the scanner to detect metallic and non-metallic weapons, plastic explosives, drugs,
and other contraband hidden under multiple layers of clothing without the necessity of a direct physical
search. The passive image
52 Millivision Homepage, accessed between September 1999 and May 2000. Available from
http://www.millivision.com/; Internet.
formation technique uses no man-made radiation, ensuring complete safety for operators, subjects, and
bystanders.
Civilian applications include security at airports, courtrooms, correctional facilities, government and
commercial office buildings, schools, banks and other financial institutions, high-value manufacturing
plants, and other areas where metal detectors are in use today. Military applications include the protection
of secure facilities and the screening of civilians for concealed weapons and explosives at border crossings
and security checkpoints.
The Gateway Scanner will use a multiple-line millimeter wave sensor capable of producing moderately
high resolution, line-scanned images. The software component of the system will compose these lines into
a complete, calibrated image, perform object-detection, and optionally alert operators to the potential
existence of concealed items. This imaging software will also be used to correct for small movements by
the subject, enhance image quality, and help preserve privacy, making it an essential component of the
system.
The Handheld Scanner will be a portable device, similar to a “radar gun,” used to scan individuals for
concealed weapons or other contraband. It can supplement existing walk-through metal detectors, or be
used alone in security situations where its portability and small size make it more convenient than a fixed
device. It is designed to be especially useful in situations that may require an impromptu search, such as in
military and civilian policing activities.
Like Millivision’s other passive millimeter wave products in development, the Handheld Scanner relies
solely on the existing natural millimeter wave emissions from subjects and objects in the scene. By not
exposing the subject, operator, or any bystander to any man-made radiation, complete safety is ensured.
Using millimeter wave imaging techniques allows the device to detect metallic and non-metallic weapons,
plastic explosives, drugs, and a wide variety of other contraband.
The Handheld Scanner will be a manually operated, self-contained, battery-powered device consisting of a
sensor mounted in a housed assembly with a pistol grip and LCD display mounted on the rear of the unit.
Planned options include a bore-sighted visual TV camera to provide visible light images, which can be used
for visualization and to protect subject privacy. Scanned over a subject, in much the same manner as a
flashlight is scanned over a large object, the Handheld Scanner will generate a sequence of sub-images of
the subject. Integrated imaging software then constructs complete images from this sequence of subimages,
identifies suspect objects in the image, and highlights these objects in the display.
The Handheld Scanner is in development with emphasis on refining the small, lightweight, robust
components required for successful field application while maintaining reasonable per-unit cost.
The Surveillance Camera will provide remote monitoring and surveillance,
including concealed weapons and contraband detection, in a loosely structured
indoor or outdoor environment. It will use passive imaging techniques, ensuring
complete safety for operators, subjects, and bystanders, while making the
system difficult to countermeasure. The ability of millimeter waves to pass
through many wall materials will permit either overt or covert installation.
Each unit will be largely self-contained, with built-in positioning device, a separate power supply that can
be mounted near the camera unit, and a two-way communication link to a central monitoring point.
Because the human body is opaque at millimeter wavelengths, at least two cameras will be required to
provide complete coverage of a given area. A typical installation would involve several cameras, remotely
monitored by an operator, deployed to cover one or more monitored areas. The units may optionally
include a coaxial bore-sighted visual TV camera to provide additional information to the system and its
operators.
Planned options include integrated image understanding software to aid the operator by identifying and
highlighting suspicious objects carried on a person. This software will help ensure subject privacy by
displaying only these suspicious objects, possibly overlaid on the visual image. The Surveillance Camera
is in development with emphasis on generating video frame rate images and providing a large field of view.
Passive millimeter wave technology has great potential to improve the capabilities of security forces in a
wide variety of short-range static circumstances. However, the development of this technology is still in its
early stages. Also under development are a number of active millimeter-wave radar systems, which in the
hands of security forces will provide a capability to detect human presence where that intelligence is
needed.
CHAPTER 6
ACTIVE MILLIMETER WAVE TECHNOLOGY
When millimeter wave signals are received they are so small that they can display a two-dimensional
outline of an object. Lower frequency radar can only show a one-dimensional blip, which indicates an
object’s presence or motion, but not it’s outline. A millimeter wave antenna acts like a camera lens to
focus incoming signals on to a plate with a two-dimensional array of elements sensitive to millimeter wave
frequencies, in exactly the same way a camera focuses light onto a piece of film. Each of the sensitive
elements is scanned in a definite order, just like a TV camera and screen, and a picture showing the outline
of an object is formed. When radio waves are transmitted the emitter is referred to as being active.
Active (radar) millimeter wave imaging systems are able to “see through” most wall materials, providing
the technology of choice for developing situation assessment systems. Such systems extend the ability of
users to view activities from one or two rooms away, or from the outside of a building into its interior.
Using this technology, hostage, terrorism, demolition, and other unlawful and dangerous situations can be
assessed remotely and evaluated for action.
Millimeter wave radar imaging systems can be made extremely sensitive to movement, even to the level of
detecting heartbeats. This makes them ideally suited for search and rescue and other applications where
individuals may be alive, but unable to respond to rescuers. Millimeter waves are non-ionizing and are
incapable of penetrating human skin thus making them completely safe for use. Images from active
systems can be used to form 3-dimensional images of hidden scenes, which could be used to identify and
locate people and major furnishings within a concealed room. Sensitivity to minute motion makes active
systems especially valuable for determining the location and activities of people in a scene.
Three high-tech labs are in the final stages of developing millimeter wave radar devices that can see
through walls by broadcasting radio signals across broad bands of the spectrum to pinpoint a hidden
suspect. Time Domain is an Alabama company that has developed a through-the-wall surveillance system
called Radar Vision. Raytheon has adapted military missile guidance technology into its MARS system, or
Motion and Ranging Sensor. The company promises MARS will spot a lurking fugitive 100 feet away.
That kind of range is enough to find someone hiding two stories up inside a building. Scientists at Georgia
Tech are working on a third system, which is a lightweight through-the-wall radar system that fits inside a
flashlight. With a range of about 40 feet, the radar flashlight displays less information than the other two
devices.
Time Domain
Time Domain has a radical new technology called time-modulated ultra-wide band (TM-UWB)
transmission. It opens up virtually infinite bandwidth in the existing electromagnetic spectrum, according to
Interval Research physicists and other experts. TM-UWB technology was patented in 1987 by engineer
Larry Fullerton the chief technology officer of Time Domain, a small Huntsville, Alabama company. TMUWB
uses precisely timed, extremely short, coded pulses transmitting over a wide range of frequencies.
The company claims on its web site that these can carry orders of magnitude more data than conventional
communications systems, can support an essentially unlimited number of users and are virtually impossible
to jam or detect. This makes them ideal for a wide range of applications from networking to through-thewall
radar and secure communications systems.53
Most conventional radar systems use continuous signals at a fixed frequency or set of frequencies. TMUWB
technology uses a series of short pulses that are billionths of a second or less in duration. The pulses
are transmitted at ultra-precise, nearly random intervals and frequencies to convey the information, using a
technique called pulse-position modulation. The receiver has to be programmed with the right code to
translate the series of pulses into digital ones and zeros. A “zero” might be indicated by transmitting the
pulse 100 picoseconds (trillionths of a second) early and a “one” indicated by transmitting it 100
picoseconds late. A receiver without the right code will only hear noise.
TM-UWB systems are also resistant to “multipath interference” caused by signals bouncing off objects,
such as the “ghosts” seen on old TV sets. As a result, TM-UWB users can operate in the same location
without interfering with one another.
Time Domain plans to license its technology for cutting-edge applications like communications within
buildings, precise determination of the distance between objects, security systems, underground imaging to
rescue people buried in earthquakes, secure military communications and through-the-wall radar.
53The Time Domain Corporation Homepage, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.time-domain.com/; Internet.
Radar Vision by Time Domain54
The U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army are testing radios that can transmit millions of coded pulses
each second over 2 gigahertz (2 billion hertz, or cycles) of bandwidth for covert communications. Time
Domain literature claims that transmissions from the radios, which operate with just 5 milliwatts spread
over more than 2 gigahertz of bandwidth, are “virtually indistinguishable from noise” and can only be
detected by a matched receiver. They can also pinpoint the location of other members of the unit.55
John B. Geiger, vice president of R&D for San Rafael-based Geisas Technology, funded Time Domain to
develop a high-bandwidth digital RF communications link for the Immigration and Naturalization Service
several years ago. He also plans to use TM-UWB technology as an imaging-radar for another U.S.
government agency. The device is capable of digitally mapping structure interiors in real time for law
enforcement agencies. He also hopes to use the technology to build radar to detect non-metallic antipersonnel
land mines. “The U.N. says 26 people are killed or mutilated by land mines every hour
worldwide,” says Geiger.56
The Federal Emergency Management Agency is evaluating Time Domain’s technology in underground
radar units that can locate victims trapped under rubble. UWB technology is superior to conventional radar
systems because it doesn’t suffer from multipath problems (multiple reflections that limit imaging and
ranging precision), according to company literature.57
54 Ibid.
55 Angelica, Amara D. “Powered By Pulse – More than a pipe dream, a new technology could
revolutionize wireless communications.” From Tech Week, 3 May 1999, accessed 20 May 2000.
Available from http://www.techweek.com/articles/5-3-99/pulse.htm; Internet.
56 Ibid.
57 Barnes, Mark A. Covert Range Gated Wall Penetrating Motion Sensor Provides Benefits for
Surveillance and Forced Entries. Huntsville, Alabama, Time Domain Corporation, 1999.
The federally funded Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, tried to license a similar radar technology that it
claims to have invented called “micropower impulse radar.” The U.S. Patent Office rejected Livermore’s
four core patent claims citing original concept rights to Larry Fullerton of Time Domain. Clearly the
competition to develop this technology is fierce.58
Raytheon
The United States National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is sponsoring a demonstration of a portable, briefcasesized,
through-the-wall surveillance device developed by Raytheon (formerly Hughes Missile Systems).
This device is a modification of a commercial motion detector sold by Hughes. It operates using millimeter
wave radar that can locate and track an individual through concrete or brick walls. It measures and displays
the distance to that individual, a capability improvement over the commercial device.
This device was successfully demonstrated with the Los Angeles County (California) Sheriff’s Department
and Albuquerque (New Mexico) Police Department under quasi-operational conditions. It demonstrated
the ability to consistently track the activity of an individual moving behind an eight-inch thick concrete
wall to a range of more than 75 feet from the radar. The NIJ plans on repackaging the device, to make it
more suitable for operational evaluation, and procuring a number of them for operational evaluation with
law enforcement agencies nationwide in 2000. NIJ anticipates receiving a number of prototypes of the
redesigned device, before the end of FY2000. A nationwide demonstration of the system is planned for
FY2001.59
Georgia Tech Research Institute
The radar flashlight developed at Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) is one example of the versatility
of millimeter wave technology. It is a device that detects respiration at a distance, and it may prove useful
in situations where access is difficult, such as a collapsed building following an earthquake.60
In their ongoing search for more applications of millimeter wave technology, GTRI scientists are
examining its potential for an automatic target-recognition system, as well as in various electronic
countermeasures and counter- countermeasures. These include decoy beacons, threat assessment,
reconnaissance and signal disruption.
58 Angelica, Amara D. “Powered By Pulse – More than a pipe dream, a new technology could
revolutionize wireless communications.” From Tech Week, 3 May 1999, accessed 20 May 2000.
Available from http://www.techweek.com/articles/5-3-99/pulse.htm; Internet.
59 Nacci, Dr. Pete. Project Title: Radar-Based Through-the-Wall Surveillance System, accessed
20 May 2000. Available from http://www.nlectc.org/; Internet.
60 Greneker, Eugene F. Radar Flashlight For Through-The-Wall Detection of Humans, accessed
20 May 2000. Available from http://www.raven1.net/radflas2.htm; Internet.
GTRI is currently designing and refining the first prototype unit. A laboratory test area has been
constructed consisting of a section of home siding and drywall, a wooden front door, and a section of brick
and mortar. The laboratory model was able to detect individuals through each of these materials. It also
demonstrated the ability to detect an individual through the laboratory’s cinder block walls. GTRI is
working to combine the two parts of this device into a single unit. NIJ plans on demonstrating the Radar
Flashlight with law enforcement agencies through its National Law Enforcement and Corrections
Technology Center (NLECTC) (Southeast Regional Center) before the end of 1999.61
Also known as the Life Assessment Detector System (LADS), the radar Flashlight is a millimeter wave
Doppler movement measuring device that can detect human body surface motion, including heartbeat and
respiration, at ranges up to 135 feet (41.15 meters).62 The primary function of the LADS is to provide a
reliable method by which medical and emergency personnel can locate personnel buried in building
collapses or injured on the military battlefield. LADS can detect such signs of life as movement, heartbeat,
or respiration. Originally designed to detect heartbeat and respiration of military personnel wearing
chemical-biological warfare protective over-garments, the LADS has been restructured, greatly increasing
its operational range and providing a means for eliminating “nuisance alarms” which could mimic human
life signs, such as fans, wind drafts, or swaying trees. This is accomplished through neural network
technology, which “trains” the system to recognize human motion and heartbeat/respiration functions. If
these functions are not detected, the reasonable assumption is that there are no survivors. Operating under
such an assumption, the rescue team can now proceed without fear of further loss of life meaning that
rescue and medical personnel and equipment can be deployed more effectively and efficiently.
The LADS consists of a sensor module, a neural network module, and a control and monitor module. The
sensor module is an x-band (10 GHz) transceiver with a nominal output power of 15 milliwatts operating in
the continuous wave (CW) mode. The neural network module device can store many complex patterns
such as visual waveforms and speech templates, and can easily compare input patterns to previously
“trained” or stored patterns. The control and monitor module provides the LADS’ instrument controls, such
as on-off switches, circuit breakers, and battery condition, as well as motion, heartbeat waveform, pulse
strength, and pulse rate displays. The LADS provides life assessment capabilities for battlefield casualties
in a chemical or biological warfare environment. It will also detect people who are trapped in building
rubble, victims of airline, train, or automobile crashes, people trapped in an avalanche, mud slide or trapped
on a mountain ledge, and it will detect people trapped under a collapsed tent structure or hostages being
held in a non-metallic room.63
Patriot Scientific Corporation
61 Nacci, Dr. Pete. Project Title: Radar Flashlight, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.nlectc.org/; Internet.
62 “Millimeter Wave Radar”, Research Horizons, Georgia Tech Research Institute, accessed 20
May 2000. Available from http://www.gtri.gatech.edu/rh-sf99/t-wave.html; Internet.
63 Greneker, Eugene F. Radar Flashlight For Through-The-Wall Detection of Humans, accessed
20 May 2000. Available from http://www.raven1.net/radflas2.htm; Internet.
There is one other company involved with the development of millimeter wave, through-wall radar
technology. Patriot Scientific Corporation has developed radar technologies with a wide range of possible
applications. These include Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR), Communications, Surveillance, Ordnance
Detection, and Stealth Radar.
The development prototype uses a pulse generator to drive the transmit antenna. The pulse is a positive
spike going up to 100V then falling back to ground in one and a half nanoseconds corresponding to a pulse
transmit frequency of 750 MHz. The return signal is read by the receive antenna. At this point some
simple analog processing is done and the signal is digitized at a resolution of 6GHz, and sent to a PC. The
PC correlates the data into a conventional waveform, does some processing, then transmits the data over an
ether net cable to a Pentium workstation. The Pentium workstation is used to apply different digital filters,
combine waveforms, and display the results. This system can be used to demonstrate detection of small
targets buried in sand, people behind walls, and other targets.
Patriot has used its antenna system to demonstrate detection of objects as small as a coke can buried in
sand, through a wall. Even small targets disturb the wave front of the pulse, producing reflections and
modifing the field in measurable ways. Patriot will be testing this technology for suitability for mine
detection.
The key to Patriot’s Radar system is its ability to transmit and receive pulses barely longer than single
cycles at the transmit frequency. The first waveform shown here is a pulse generated by an earlier Patriot
Design, based on “off the shelf” antenna technology. The waveform on the bottom was produced and
received by Patriot’s current design. The current Patriot antenna system produces a pulse at the desired
frequency with little leading or trailing noise. The Patriot antenna system provides many advantages over
pulse-based systems. Patriot originally developed the impulse radar system to allow Time Domain
processing in Patriot’s GPR systems. Because the impulse is extremely short (3 nanoseconds), the time to
return can be used to gauge the distance traveled by the pulse. Furthermore, the transmitting and receiving
antennas are very directional, eliminating much of the multipath components of the return signal. The short
pulse combined with directional transmission and reception to provide a number of important advantages.
These included very low average power during transmission, low interference from other transmitters,
transmission that was invisible to conventional receivers, high bandwidth, digital data transmission and
difficulty in detection by other impulse receivers.64
CHAPTER 7
TOWARD A STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENT
It is an established fact that there is a global demographic trend toward urban agglomeration. In the
developing world the increase in population is greatest in the urban areas both through internal migration
and birth rate. Concomitant with the increase in numbers and concentration of people, crime rates and the
potential for terrorism, and internal and external conflict will also increase.
For the past sixty years, Canadian troops have been deploying to a variety of military operations abroad.
These operations have ranged from observer missions under the United Nations to full scale conventional
warfare during World War II. They have included peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking,
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Without exception, the operations in which Canada has
participated have all occurred in countries where substantial urban terrain is commonplace.
Clearly there is a capability deficiency that technology might be able to overcome. It is essential to future
operations that Canadian Land Forces possess the capability of seeing through walls and of determining if a
person is armed or not. Before Canada can procure such technology, a statement of requirement must be
developed. To start down the path toward a statement of requirement, the following characteristics would
be operationally useful.
64 Patriot Scientific Corporation, Radar/Antenna, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.ptsc.com/radar/index.html; Internet.
a. Ideally the capability will be achieved by a small, hand-held through-wall sensor
capable of rapidly sensing through walls to determine if next room is empty, or occupied
by friend or enemy, or by a combatant or a non-combatant.
b. It should provide the ability to detect weapons (guns and edged weapons) or
survey individuals through walls at a distance, and should detect weapons with little or no
metal content, and explosive materials.
c. One area of interest is the detection of living humans through walls at ranges of
up to 100 feet (30 meters). An awareness of where living people are located within a
building is necessary.
d. The technology should be capable of “seeing through” or penetrating metallic
walls.
e. The technology should identify living humans by such methods as movement,
heart beat, respiration and sound detection.
f. A positive identity tag that could be worn by a person to
provide identification –friend or foe (IFF) capability, should enhance
the technology. The tag could also be used to alleviate some of the
detrimental phenomenological issues associated with various wall
types by reflecting or transmitting a much stronger signal than
would be otherwise be reflected or emitted from the person being
surveyed. An enhancing technology might be a unique approach to
processing that would interpret the sensor data and automatically
decide whether the person had a concealed weapon.
g. The technology should include sensor information management technology that
includes information processing/exploitation/dissemination, and the necessary
telecommunications to enable successful interoperability between special operations units
or law enforcement agencies.
i. The technology should have a self-contained power source.
j. It is desirable that the technology be linked to weapon systems and be effective
to standard battle range of in-service Land Force weapons.
The Canadian Army does not presently have a through-wall surveillance capability, and the technology is
still in the early stages of development. It is recommended that a formal statement of requirement be
initiated, and that the Defence Research Agency be tasked to investigate all pertinent technologies.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Hall, P.S., Garland-Collins, T.K., Picton, R.S., Lee, R.G. Land Warfare: Brassey’s New Battlefield
Weapon Systems and Technology Series, Volume 9, RADAR. Toronto: Pergamon Press Canada Ltd., 1991.
Liu, Yonghua, ed. Radar Principles and Applications, Lecture Notes for Land Force Technical Staff
Course. Kingston, Ontario: Royal Military College of Canada, 1996.
ARTICLES IN JOURNALS AND MAGAZINES
“Bandwidth from Thin Air.” The Economist, 6 November 1999, 85-86.
Barry, John. “The New Urban Battlefield”, Newsweek, February 21, 2000.
Beardsley, Tim. “A Patent Office Ruling Frees the Development of New Ultrawideband Wireless
Systems.” Scientific American, February 2000.
Donahue, Bill. “The Thin Red Subway Line”. Metropolis (www. metropolismag.com), June 1999.
Hewish, Mark. “New Funding for Through-Wall Surveillance.” Jane’s International Defense Review,
Volume No. 32, August 1999, 3.
Peters, Ralph. “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations”. Parameters, Summer 2000.
Scott, William B. “UWB Technologies Show Potential For High-Speed, Covert Communications.”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 June 1990, 43-44.
Strickland, Captain R.T. “FIBUA: New Twists On The Old Game”. The Infantry Journal. Vol 31, Spring
1997.
NEWSPAPERS
Godfrey, Tom. “RCMP Want X-Ray Machine That Makes Clothing Invisible.” Toronto Sun, 27 February
2000.
Loeb, Vernon. “After-action Report”, The Washington Post, Sunday, February 27, 2000.
Maney, Kevin. “Pulsing With Promise.” USA Today, 9-11 April 1999, 1B & 2B.
Markoff, John. “F.C.C. Mulls Wider Commercial Use of Radical Radio Technology.” The New York
Times, 21 December 1998, C1.
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
Army Lessons Learned Centre (CA), “Zero Template House Clearing Range,” The Bulletin. Vol 2. No. 2.
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), “Global Urbanization: Towards Better
Understanding,” Development Express No. 93, 4 April 1993.
Center for (US) Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “Military Operations In Urban Terrain,” Light Infantry In
Action Part II Newsletter No. 2-88, (undated).
Center for (US) Army Lessons Learned, Mordica, George J. “It’s a dirty Business,
but somebody has to do it. (URBAN COMBAT).” (undated).
Field Manual 90 – 10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Aug 79.
Field Manual 90 – 10 – 1, Infantryman’s Guide to Urban Combat, Sep 82.
Field Manual 7 – 70, 71, 72, Light Infantry Platoon/Squad Company, and Battalion, Sep 86, Aug 87, and
Mar 87.
National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Stanton, John J. “Training Marines for War in the City
Drills in Simulated Urban Zones Underscore Need for New Equipment,” (undated).
United States Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Grau, Lester W. and Kipp, Dr. Jacob W. “Urban
Combat: Confronting the Specter,” first published in Military Review, July-August 1999.
ESSAYS
Barnes, Mark A. Covert Range Gated Wall Penetrating Motion Sensor Provides Benefits for Surveillance
and Forced Entries. Huntsville, Alabama, Time Domain Corporation, 1999.
Press, Daryl G. “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems and the Future.” Summary of a conference sponsored
by the MIT Security Studies Program held 20 may 1998, January 1999.
Rosenblum, Lawrence J. Visualizing the Urban Battlefield. U.S. Naval Research
Laboratory, Presented at the Science and Technology Symposium, Defence
Research Establishment Valcartier, 15 December 1999.
NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION PUBLICATIONS
United Nations, “World Population Nearing 6 Billion Projected Close to 9 Billion by 2050.” Population
Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (undated).
United Nations, Kharoufi, Mostafa. “Urbanization and Urban Research in the Arab World.” Discussion
Paper Series – No. 11. UNESCO, March 2000.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
TECHNICAL GROUP 14 WORKING GROUP 7 FEBRUARY
2000
Appleby, Dr. Roger. UK Strategy, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging. United Kingdom, DERA, January
2000.
Appleby, Dr. Roger. NATO Research: Millimeter Wave Imaging. United Kingdom, DERA, January 2000.
Britton, Dr. Adrian. MMW Imaging Seekers for Future Ground Attack Weapons. United Kingdom,
DERA, February 2000.
De Villiers, Dr. Yves. Millimeter-Wave R & D Projects at DREV. Valcartier, Canada, Defence Research
Establishment Valcartier, 7 February 2000.
Pace, Paul and Fournier, G.R. Holographic Neural Technology. Valcartier, Canada, Defence Research
Establishment Valcartier, February 2000.
Peichl, Markus, and Sub, Helmut. DLR Activities on Passive MMW Imaging for Military Applications.
Germany, Institute of Radio Frequency Technology and Radar Systems, February 2000.
Peichl, Markus and Sub, Helmut. DLR Activities on Passive MMW Imaging for Military Applications.
Institute of Radio Frequency Technology and Radar Systems, German Aerospace Center,
Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany, February 2000.
Schimf, H. Application of Millimeter Wave Techniques for Ground Surveillance GE Activities. Germany,
FGAN, 7 February 2000.
Smith, Roger. MMW R & D. United States, Air Force Research Laboratory Munition Directorate, 7
February 2000.
United States Army Research Laboratory, Millimeter Wave Research Presentation, 7 February 2000.
Van Den Broek, Bert. Radar Defence research at TNO-FEL. TNO-FEL, The Hague, The Netherlands, 7
February 2000.
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Angelica, Amara D. “Powered By Pulse – More than a pipe dream, a new technology could revolutionize
wireless communications.” From Tech Week, 3 May 1999, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.techweek.com/articles/5-3-99/pulse.htm; Internet.
Army Research Laboratory Homepage, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from http://www.arl.mil/;
Internet.
Fluid Gravity, Ultra Wide Band Radar Techniques, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.fges.demon.co.uk/fluidultawideban.html;Internet.
Greneker, Eugene F. Radar Flashlight For Through-The-Wall Detection of Humans, accessed 20 May
2000. Available from http://www.raven1.net/radflas2.htm; Internet.
Hahn, Robert F. and Jezior, Bonnie. “Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025.” From
Parameters, Summer 1999, 74-86. Accessed 20 May 2000. Available from http://carlislewww.
army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/hahn.htm; Internet.
Halton, David. “Return to Ortona A Battlefield Redemption.” Accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/ortona/index.html&lt;; Internet.
“Millimeter Wave Radar”, Research Horizons, Georgia Tech Research Institute, accessed 20 May 2000.
Available from http://www.gtri.gatech.edu/rh-sf99/t-wave.html; Internet.
Millivision Homepage, accessed between September 1999 and May 2000. Available from
http://www.millivision.com/; Internet.
MOUT ACTD Operational Requirements, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://mout.actd.org/req.html; Internet.
Nacci, Dr. Pete. Project Title: Radar-Based Through-the-Wall Surveillance System, accessed 20 May 2000.
Available from http://www.nlectc.org/; Internet.
Nacci, Dr. Pete. Project Title: Radar Flashlight, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.nlectc.org/; Internet.
Operations Other Than War (OOTW): The Technological Dimension, accessed 20 May 2000. Available
from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/ootw/ootwhome.html; Internet.
Patriot Scientific Corporation, Radar/Antenna, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.ptsc.com/radar/index.html; Internet.
“Radar,” Encyclopædia Britannica Online, accessed 20 May 2000.
Available from http://www.eb.com:180/bol/topic?eu=117367&sctn=10; Internet.
Terrestrial Remote Sensing Page, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from http://doppler.unl.edu/html/terrprojects.
html; Internet.
The MOUT Homepage – Technology, Weapons, Equipment, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/techa.html; Internet.
The Time Domain Corporation Homepage, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from http://www.timedomain.
com/; Internet.
Through The Wall Surveillance and Concealed Weapons Detection SOL BAA-99-04-IFKPA, accessed 20
May 2000. Available from http://www.ld.com/cbd/archive/1999/06(june)/10-jun-1999/asol005.htm;
Internet.
Ultra Wide Band Working Group Homepage, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.uwb.org/; Internet.
White, Eleanor, P Eng. The State of Unclassified and Commercial Technology
Capable of Some Electronic Mind Control Effects, accessed 20 May 2000. Available from
http://www.raven1.net/uncom.htm#TWRAD; Internet.
UNPUBLISHED INTERVIEWS
Mitchell, Lieutenant-Colonel D., Director of Land Requirements 5, National Defence Headquarters,
Interviewed by author, 30 March 2000.